128 Ga. 434 | Ga. | 1907
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
We-can not agree with the conclusion of the learned judge that “the groundwork of his [plaintiff’s] cause of action” rests upon, “those allegations of negligence that happened in the State of Tennessee,” and that, “under the ruling in the Wilson ease [116 Ga. 189], an action for those things could be -brought only in the county of the residence of the corporation, to wit, in Fulton county.” •While it is true that the negligence of the defendant company began in the State of Tennessee, at a station very near the point where the railroad crosses the boundary between that State and the State of Georgia, under the allegations of the petition there was a continuation of the failure on the. part of the company to exercise due care and diligence for the safety of the passenger, until after the train had passed into Fannin county in this State, where the negligent act of the company finally culminated in the catastrophe to the plaintiff which resulted in the severe injuries set forth in his petition. The defendant contends, that what took place in Georgia was the consequence of the negligent act which took place in Tennessee, and that but for the failure to stop the train a sufficient length of time to allow the would-be passenger to enter the car, he would have been in the coach, would not have been jostle_d by the other passengers, and would not have been thrown from the car;. and that none of the things that were alleged to have occurred in Georgia were independent causes producing plaintiff’s injuries, but were the resulting consequences of the negligence alleged to have-taken place in the State of Tennessee. Even if we agreed with this-contention of the 'defendant, we should still have to hold that the
“Cooley, J., in the case of Post v. Campan, 42 Mich. 96, says: ‘The elements of a cause of action are, first, a breach of duty owing by one person to another; and second, a damage resulting to the other from the breach. Damage where no duty is violated is damnum absque injuria; a neglect of duty, where no loss occurs, is •equally incapable of giving a right of action?’” I Ency. PL & Pr. 116. And the expression “cause of action” is thus defined, in All-husen v. Malgarejo, L. E. 3 Q. B. 343: “The expression ‘cause of action’ means the whole cause of action; that is, all the facts which together constitute the plaintiff’s right to maintain the action.” And again: “The commission or omission of an act by the defendant, and damage to the plaintiff in consequence thereof, must unite to give him a good cause of action. No one of these facts by itself is a cause of action against the defendant.” Jaggard, in his work ••on Torts, states the principle thus: “Where, however, the law will not presume damage, the plaintiff’s cause .of action is complete only when damages conforming to the legal requirements have been
Judgment reversed.