Parravani v. ParravaniParravani v. Parravani
Dated: August 18, 2010
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Cynthia Parravani (“Wife”), appeals from an order of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. This Court dismisses the appeal.
I
{¶2} Wife and Defendant-Appellant, David Parravani (“Husband”), married on October 9, 1971 and had three children during their marriage. Wife cared for the couple‘s three children and her parents during the course of the marriage while Husband worked full-time outside of the home. Husband eventually left the marital residence and purchased a condominium. On September 15, 2008, Wife filed a complaint for divorce without minor children. Husband filed a counterclaim for divorce, and the matter proceeded to a final hearing on November 19, 2009. On January 26, 2010, the trial court issued a judgment entry, granting a divorce.
{¶3} Wife now appeals from the trial court‘s judgment entry and raises four assignments of еrror for our review. We consolidate the assignments of error.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
“THE TRIAL COURT‘S FINDING THAT HUSBAND‘S INCOME WAS ‘AT LEAST $60,000’ SUBSTANTIALLY UNDERSTATED THE HUSBAND‘S INCOME TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE WIFE.”
Assignment of Error Number Two
“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AWARDING SPOUSAL SUPPORT OF ONLY $1,600 PER MONTH AND IN LIMITING THE DURATION TO 13 YEARS.”
Assignment of Error Number Three
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AN UNEQUAL AND INEQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT SUPPORTING FINDINGS.”
Assignment of Error Number Four
“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DIVISION OF MARITAL DEBT AND IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS SUFFICIENT TO INFORM THE PARTIES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS.”
{¶4} In her assignments of error, Wife challenges the amount of income the trial court attributed to Husband, the amount and duration of spousal support the court awarded her, and the lack of specificity in the court‘s order in light of the allegedly inequitable distribution it ordered. This Court cannot reach the merits of Wife‘s assignments of error, as she has not appealed from a final, appealable order.
“The Ohio Constitution limits аn appellate court‘s jurisdiction to the review of final judgments of lower courts. *** For a judgment to be final and appealable, the requirements of
R.C. 2505.02 andCiv.R. 54(B) , if applicable, must be satisfied. This Court has repeatedly found, most notably in Harkai [v. Scherba Industries, Inc. (2000)], 136 Ohio App.3d [211,] 216, that in order to constitute a final appealable order the content of the judgment must be dеfinite enough to be susceptible to further enforcement and provide sufficient information to enablethe parties to understand the outcome of the сase. If the judgment fails to speak to an area which was disputed, uses ambiguous or confusing language, or is otherwise indefinite, the parties and subsequent courts will be unable to determine how the parties’ rights and obligations were fixed by the trial court. A divorce decree, which leaves issues unresolved, is not a final order.” (Internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted.) Baker v. Baker, 9th Dist. No. 09CA009603, 2009-Ohio-6906, at ¶5-6.
“In the absence of a final, appealable order, this Court must dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Helmstedter v. Helmstedter, 9th Dist. No. 24237, 2009-Ohio-3559, at ¶9.
{¶5} “In divorce proceedings, the court shall *** determine what constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property.”
{¶6} Based on the judgment entry of divorce entered in this matter, this Court cannot “determine how the parties’ rights and obligations were fixed by the trial court.” Baker at ¶5. The parties were married in 1971. The court rеferred to the parties as having a “marriage of 38 years.” Presumably, the court divided the parties’ property based on a marriage period starting on the dаte of their marriage and ending on the date of the final divorce hearing, but the trial court did not specify the dates that it used. See
{¶7} Additionally, the parties’ respective incomes and debt obligations are unclear. With respect to the parties’ incomes, the trial court stated the following:
“Considering this is a marriage of 38 years, that Wife has no training beyond high school, never earned more that (sic) $7,500 in any year since 1982, and that Wife was the primary caretaker of the three children, and considering the necessary living expenses of the Wife, along with Husband‘s incоme of at least $60,000 annually and considering his ability to pay, plus all other factors enumerated in
O.R.C. Section 3105.18 , it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Husband shall pay, as spousal support, the sum of Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,600) a month for one hundred fifty six months (156) or until Wife shall remarry or die.”
This Court cannot say whether the trial court assigned any income to Wife. Although the court referenced Wife earning $7,500 at some point, it is unclear whether the court meant that Wife currently earns $7,500, earns something less than $7,500, or does not earn any money. Moreover, the court assigned “at least $60,000 annually” to Husband. This language is problematic because later in the decree the trial court ordered that “[d]ebts of the marriаge should be divided in proportion to the parties’ income.” To determine Husband‘s portion of the debt, one would need to know his exact income. Further, for Wifе to be assigned a division of the debt “in proportion to the parties’ income” she also would have to be assigned an exact income. Without such findings, one cannot determine the rights and liabilities of each party.
{¶8} The trial court‘s judgment entry also does not set forth the “values associated with the martial assets and liabilitiеs *** in sufficient detail.” Keith at ¶7. The court essentially ordered that the parties pay their own debts (i.e., those debts in their own names) and pay a portion of any marital debts. It did nоt set forth orders as to specific debts even though the
{¶9} Finally, although it ordered Husband to pay additional spousal support “until [his] arrearage is paid in full,” the trial court did not indicate the amount of the arrearage. This is espеcially troublesome because Husband admitted at the hearing that he had deducted various items from his spousal support payments to Wife during the divorce proceeding, despite the fact that the deductions might have violated the temporary orders the court had put into place. In short, the trial court‘s judgment entry is far too broad to be helpful in terms of practical application.
{¶10} Based on our review, the trial court‘s judgment entry leaves issues unresolved and does not set forth the rights and obligations of the parties in sufficient detail. See Baker at ¶5-6. Accordingly, it is not a final, appealable order, and this Court cannot reach the merits of Wife‘s appeal.
III
{¶11} This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Wife‘s assignments of error as she has not appealed from a final, appealable order. As suсh, the appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
MOORE, J. CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY
DICKINSON, P. J. CONCURS, SAYING:
{¶12} Because of the deficiencies noted in the lead opinion, the trial court‘s “Judgment Entry” is not a “final оrder, judgment, or decree” as those terms are used in
APPEARANCES:
SHARYL W. GINTHER and KENNETH L. GIBSON, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
WILLIAM LOVE II, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.