| NY | Dec 5, 1851
Lead Opinion
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[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *78 The principal question in this cause is whether the appellants have any interest in the land in question; and that depends on the true construction of the leases or licenses given by the commissioners of the land office, and under which the appellants claim the land. The commissioners in their deed or act of license, simply say that the lands "are hereby "set apart to the said R.G., for the purpose of erecting works "thereon, for the manufacture of coarse salt, pursuant to the *79 "provisions of art. 4, of title 10, of chapter 9, of part 1 of the "revised statutes." On referring to the provisions of the statute on the subject, (1 R.S. 266, 267, §§ 90 to 95,) it appears that any individual or incorporated company, intending to erect works for the manufacture of coarse salt, may make application to the commissioners of the land office in the manner therein prescribed, for the "quantity of land necessary "to the erection thereof." "The commissioners of the land "office shall thereupon set apart such land, or so much thereof "as they shall deem reasonable for the purposes of such individual "or company, in a compact form," c.
"§ 107. [Sec. 94.] Such individual or company shall thereafter "have four years to complete the works thereon; but if "the individual or company shall not, within one year thereafter, "commence such works, and actually expend thereon at "least one-tenth part of the capital so specified, such location "shall be void; and the land, except such parts thereof as "shall have works actually erected thereon, shall be liable to "be located by any other individual or company."
"§ 108. [Sec. 95.] Any part of such location which, at the "expiration of said four years, shall not be actually occupied "by manufactories of coarse salt, pursuant to the intention of "the original location, may be again set apart, by the commissioners" "of the land office, to any other person or company, "for the erection of such manufactories."
It is manifest from these provisions of the statute, that the legislature did not intend to give the applicant any right of occupancy, or interest in the land of the state, set apart to him, beyond what he should actually cover, within four years, with works erected for the manufacture of salt; and as the licenses of the commissioners of the land office, in this case, neither gave, nor professed to give the applicants or lessees any other interest or right than that specified in the statute, they cannot rightfully claim any interest or right in the land of the state, set apart to them, which was not covered by their works within four years after they obtained their licenses. As the land in *80 question was not so covered, the decision of the judge on the trial, and the judgment of the supreme court approving of the same, are in our opinion correct.
Concurrence Opinion
No precise technical words are required in a deed to make a stipulation a condition precedent or subsequent; neither does it depend on the circumstance whether the clause is placed prior or posterior in the deed, so that it operates as a proviso or a covenant; for the same words have been construed to operate as either the one or the other, according to the nature of the transaction, and the intention of the parties. (4 Kent's Com. 124; 4 Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 25, § 10, and note 1;tit. 13, ch. 1, sec. 6, note 1, Greenl. ed.) The precedency of the conditions must depend on the order of time in which the intent of the transaction requires their performance. The rules for finding the intent of the parties are the same as those in regard to covenants. (1 Doug. 689, 691; 1 Saund. 320, note 4.) Where a condition annexed to an estate for years is broken, the estate ipso facto ceases as soon as the condition is broken without an entry. (4 Kent's Com. 128; CokeLit. 214, b; Cruise's Dig. tit. 8, ch. 1, sec. 22; tit. 13, ch. 2, Condition, sec. 45, Greenl. ed.; 3 Coke's Rep. 64, Pennant's case.) The only exception to this rule is where the lease provides expressly, that the landlord shall re-enter in case of a breach of the condition. (9 Paige, 431; 6 Bar. Cres. 519.) There the lease is not void, but voidable only at the election of the landlord. But in all cases where an estate for years is granted on condition, and the lease declares that the estate shall cease and determine on the breach of the condition, without any clause of re-entry or other qualification, the estate will ipso facto cease, as soon as the condition is broken. I think that the estate acquired by the plaintiffs under Gere and Brewster, was an estate on a condition precedent. They acquired no estate or interest whatever in any part of the lots set apart, until they erected manufactories of salt thereon. Before the erection of the manufactories, and until the expiration of the four years, they had *81 only a license to enter and occupy, for the purpose of erecting such manufactories. The license was merely for this and for no other purpose. At the expiration of the four years, the license ceased, as to all the lands then not actually occupied by manufactories of salt; and the commissioners of the land office were at liberty again to set apart such lands to any other person, for the erection of such manufactories. (2 Ed. Ch. Rep. 78; 7 Paige, 22.) Even if the interest of the plaintiffs during the four years was an estate for years, and it be conceded that the condition was subsequent, such estate ipso facto ceased on the breach of the condition, without an entry. In this view of the case, the plaintiffs have no title to the premises occupied by the defendants' railroad, and they were intruders thereon, when the defendants entered to construct their road.
If, after the expiration of the four years, the plaintiffs had an estate at will in the lands not occupied by manufactories of coarse salt, that estate was determined by the sale and conveyance of the state to the defendants. (1 Cruise's Dig.tit. 9, ch. 1, sec. 7, 12, 13, Greenl. ed.) Even where a party making a location on any part of the salt springs' reservation, erects his buildings for the manufacture of coarse salt, within the time prescribed by the statute, he acquires no legal interest or estate in the lands covered by his works, and has only an equitable interest in his erections. The defendants have shown a title derived from the state by letters patent. The plaintiffs being intruders have no right to question or assail it. When the defendants first entered to construct their railroad in November, 1847, the plaintiffs had no estate or interest, possessory or otherwise, in the premises in question, and the whole title was then in the state. The defendants afterwards and before the commencement of this suit, paid the appraised value of the premises to the state, and on the 5th October, 1848, received a conveyance therefor from the governor, founded on the resolution of the commissioners of the land office, directing that letters patent be issued to the defendants for said premises. The defendants were thus at the commencement of this suit in possession *82 of the premises, claiming a title under the state, the owner of the same, which title was afterwards perfected by letters patent, issued by the governor to the defendants. The validity of this title can only be questioned by the state in a direct proceeding to avoid it. (Code of 1851, sec. 433.)
I am of opinion that the judgment of the supreme court should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.