This аction was brought by J. O. Stith, plaintiff, against Oscar Lonnie Parks, and others, to quiet plaintiff’s title to certain lands in Wagoner county, purchased by him at tax sale, and upon which he held two certificate tax deeds. A part of the lands were sold for the 1921 taxes, and the certificate issued in 1922. The remainder was sold for the 1922 taxes, and certificate issued in 1923. Both tax *626 deeds were issued in 1930, and plaintiff occupied the land and paid all taxes thereon after the issuance of his tax deeds. Prior to thе issuance of the tax deeds he paid the tax assessed against the land from and after the date of his certificates, and the taxes so paid were endorsed upon his certificates.
In his answer and cross-petition defendant, Parks, dеnied the validity of the tax deeds, and asked that his title be quieted. In his pleadings he tendered the full amount of taxes, penalties and interest which he would be required to pay if he were redeeming said property from the tax sales.
The sole quеstion presented is whether the trial court correctly determined the amount which defendant must pay into court in order to have the deeds set aside. The trial court found that one tax certificate was invalid because the land desсription in the notice of sale was defective, and that therefore the tax deed conveying that tract was void, and that the other deed was voidable. In arriving at the amount of the tender it followed Wilcox v. Westerheide,
Defendant contends that as to the tract upon which the trial court held the deed void because the land was improperly described in the tax sale notice, plaintiff hаd no right against, or interest in, the land in any event, but had only a remedy against the county for the return of his money under the provisions of
We think a similar rule applies to the instant case and that where a tax
*627
deed is issued, and the former owner seeks to litigate the validity thereof, he must make his tender as required by section 453, whether the deed is void or voidable. Guess v. Thorman,
Defendant further contends that under the provisions of article 2, c. 66 of the Special Session of 1936-1937, S. L. 1936-1937, p. 56, all penalties, interest, and costs levied and assessed against property for 1935 and all prior years were released, and that under this provision the penalties assessed by the trial court prior to July 1, 1937, were remitted and were improperly charged against him by the trial court. He also contends that the trial сourt failed to take into consideration the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, which provides that any tax or assessment against a serviceman should bear interest only at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The trial court held that thеse provisions were not applicable to the instant case, and that a penalty of 18 per cent on each certificate issued and all taxes paid up to and including the year 1928 should be assessed against defendant, and that 8 per cent penalty should be assessed against him on delinquent taxes for 1929, and subsequent years. The 8 per cent penalty for 1929, and years thereafter, is provided in S.L. 1929, c. 53, §2, p. 72.
Examination of the waiver of penalty statutes convinces us that it was not the intention of the Legislature to waive penalties in cases where tax deeds valid on their faces had theretofore issued. All these statutes were enacted to relieve the burden of taxation, and for the purpose оf encouraging taxpayers to pay their delinquent taxes prior to the sale of their lands by the county, in order to aid the collection of taxes and reduce the amount of land which would otherwise be sold and bought in by the various counties. Thus, in the 1936-1937 Act, supra, it is provided that the provisions of the Act shall not relate to penalties, interest, and costs included in, or covered by, outstanding valid tax sale certificates held by individuals, or to affect the validity or lien of tax sale certificates held by the county as to the principal taxes evidenced thereby. A somewhat similar provision is contained in the 1929 Act, supra.
These acts, when carefully studied, in our judgment, reveal that the Legislature did not intend to remit all penaltiеs theretofore accrued in cases where the land had been sold to individuals and tax deeds issued therefor, and that in such cases the statutory penalties remained in full force and effect. Plaintiff filed a cross-petition on apрeal contending, among other things, that the reduction of penalties in the instant case pursuant to the reduction *628 provided in the 1929 Act would impair the obligation of contracts in violation of both the State and Federal Constitutions, but this cross-рetition was thereafter stricken, so that it is unnecessary to determine this question.
In Wilcox v. Westerheide, supra, the parties agreed that the delinquent taxes for the years 1927 and 1928 bore interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum, and that thereafter the delinquent taxes bore interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, this reduction being in view of the 1929 law above referred to, and this court approved that computation. In the instant case defendant does not contend that the court’s computation is incorrect if the waiver of penalty acts do not apply.
Defendant contends that the trial court should have applied the provisions of the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.A. Appx., §501 еt seq., but we do not agree. That act, like the waiver of penalty acts, which we have heretofore discussed, was not intended to apply to situations like the one presented in the instant case.
Defendant also contends that because of the fact that plaintiff was in possession of the property, claiming to be the owner, the court should have applied the provisions of the Occupying Claimant’s Act,
“A statute which is еnacted for the primary purpose of dealing with a particular subject, and which prescribes the terms and conditions of that particular subject-matter, prevails over a general statute which does not refer to the partiсular subject-matter, but does contain language which might be broad enough to cover the subject-matter if the special statute was not in existence.”
The record discloses that the property involved was apparently a part of the estate of O. F. Parks, which estate was apparently of considerable size, and while it does not disclose the date of O. F. Parks’ death, it does show that no taxes were paid upon the property involved by either the defendаnt or the trustee or executor of the estate after the year 1922, and up to the time of the filing of this action on December 11, 1947. The record does reflect a tender of delinquent taxes by defendant on February 21, 1949, in which defendant sought to tаke advantage of the provisions of 68 S. L. 1949, c. 11, p. 450, which waived and canceled delinquent ad valorem taxes for 1945 and prior years, if the taxes were paid on or before March 19, 1949. The county treasurer refused to accept the payment of taxes without penalties, according to the statement made in defendant’s brief, because of the pendency of this action, and for the reasons heretofore stated in regard to the waiver of penalty statutеs, we think the action of the county treasurer was proper. An additional reason for so holding is that the judgment in the instant case had been rendered prior to the date such tender was made.
The facts in the instant case, as outlined abоve, do not entitle the defendant to the relief provided under the various acts relied upon by him, which were not intended to apply to such situations. To permit their application in this case would be contrary to instead of consistent with the spirit and reasons which actuated their enact- *629 iment. The trial court did not err in refusing to apply them.
Affirmed.