85 Ga. App. 306 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1952
While it is true that “All persons who are interested in sustaining or reversing the judgment of the court below are indispensable parties in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and they must be made parties to the bill of exceptions” (Edwards v. Wall, 153 Ga. 776, 113 S. E. 190), this rule is on the theory that they are interested in sustaining or reversing the judgment excepted to; but where, as here, there is a suit
There is nothing in the case of Tillman v. Davis, 147 Ga. 206 (93 S. E. 201), to the contrary of what we now rule. That case was an action against several defendants, and a general demurrer was interposed by some of them, which demurrer went to the substance of the whole petition and challenged' the plaintiff’s right to any relief, thus enuring to the benefit of all the defendants. The demurrer was sustained and the petition dismissed as to all the defendants. The plaintiff, complaining of the judgment sustaining the demurrer, sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court, but he did not make the non-demurring defendants parties thereto, nor were they served with the bill of exceptions, nor did they acknowledge and waive service thereof. Those non-demurring defendants in the Tillman case were interested in retaining the judgment of the trial court in its existing status. With that judgment extant there was no case in the trial court in favor of the plaintiff against any of the defendants. The Supreme Court there held: “Where the judge sustains such demurrer and enters an order dismissing the whole case, such dismissal enures to the benefit of all the defendants, and they become interested in sustaining the judgment; and if
It follows that the motion of the defendant in error to dismiss this bill of exceptions is without merit and the same is hereby denied.
We come next to consider whether the allegations of the defendant in error here as to its negligence in the premises presented a jury question regarding the allegations of negligence. The plaintiff charges that the driver of the corporate defendant’s truck was operating the same on Decatur Street, meeting the plaintiff who was likewise driving his automobile along Decatur Street in the opposite direction; and that there were automobiles parked along both sides of Decatur Street at this point, and there was barely enough width for two lanes of vehicular traffic, and when the truck reached a point where it would ordinarily
Applying the foregoing rulings, the petition did not affirmatively show that the proximate cause of the damage to the automobile of the plaintiff was the negligent acts of the defendant Reeves, and the trial court erred in so ruling and in dismissing the petition as to the defendant, Stein Steel & Supply Company.
Judgment reversed.