{¶ 1} This timely appeal comes for consideration upon the record in the trial court, the parties’ briefs, their supplemental authority, and their oral arguments before this court. Plaintiffs-appellants, Glennda and Richard Parks, appeal from the decisions of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Premium Marcor Group, Inc., Westfield Insurance Company, Petro Stopping Centers, L.P., and Employers of Wausau A Mutual Company (“Wausau”). The Parks’s claims against the appellees are based on
Scottr-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
(1999),
Facts
{¶ 2} On December 16, 1998, Glennda Parks was driving Richard’s vehicle home from work when it was struck by another motorist, who had failed to yield at an interseсtion stop sign. At the time of the accident, Glennda was employed by Petro Shopping Centers and Richard was employed by Premium Marcor. Petro Shopping Centers had a commercial general-liability policy and a business auto-liability policy through Wausau, while Premium Marcor had a commercial general liability policy through Westfield. Glennda suffered injuries as a result of the accident and the Parkses eventually sued each of the appellees for uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM7UIM”) coverage. The Parks’s claims were based on
Scottr-Pontzer
and
Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am.
(1999),
{¶ 3} During the course of the litigation, the Parkses filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Wausau on the issue of whether they satisfied all the prerequisites for perfecting an underinsured-motorist claim against Wausau. Wausau responded to this motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Parkses’ partial motion for summary judgment, finding that the policy was a motor vehicle policy and that Glennda was an insured under that policy.
*193 {¶ 4} Each of the appellees then moved for summary judgment. The Parkses responded to each of these motions with cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to each of the appellees. The Parks have appealed from the two judgment entries granting judgment to the appellees. These cases have been consolidated for purposes of appeal.
Westfield v. Galatis
{¶ 5} As the parties freely acknowledge, the Parkses’ claims for underinsured motorist benefits from the appellees are based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
Scott-Pontzer
and
Ezawa.
In
Scott-Pontzer,
the court held that a person can recover underinsured motorist benefits from her employer’s automobile insurance carrier if the employer is the named insured and a corporation and the commercial automobile liability policy defines an insured as “you”. The court held that the “you” in the insurance policy was ambiguous, so it read the insurance policy against the insurance company and held that a corporation’s employees are insureds under these typеs of insurance policies. Id.,
{¶ 6} The Ohio Supreme Court recently limited the application of
ScottPontzer
and overruled
Ezawa
in
Galatis. Galatis
at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. “Absent specific language to the contrary, a policy of insurance that names a corporation as an insured for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage covers a loss sustained by an employee of the corporation only if the loss occurs within the course and scope of employment.
(King v. Nationwide Ins. Co.
[1988],
{¶ 7} “Where a policy of insurance designаtes a corporation as a named insured, the designation of ‘family members’ of the named insured as other insureds does not extend insurance coverage to a family member of an employee of the corporation, unless that employеe is also a named insured.
(Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am,.
[1999],
{¶ 8} As stated above, Glennda was driving home from work when the accident occurred. It has long been an established principle of Ohio law that an employee is generally not within the scope of her employment while she is trаveling to and from her place of employment. See
Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc.
(1998),
{¶ 9} At oral argument, the Parkses contended that this court should create a new standard for evaluating when an employee is within the scope of her employment for the purposes of UM/UIM coverage. We decline to do so. We see no reason to fashion a new rule of law when the established rule has worked so well for so long. Accordingly, we must conclude that Glennda was not in the scope of her employment when the accident occurred.
{¶ 10} Galatis statеs that an employee is not an “insured” for the purposes of UM/UIM coverage if the employee is not within the scope of her employment when she is injured unless the policy contains specific language to the contrary. Glennda was not in the scope of her employment when she was injured, and the insurance contracts do not contain specific language extending coverage to the Parkses. So if Galatis applies to the Parkses’ claims, then the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to thе appellees must be affirmed.
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage by Operation of Law
{¶ 11} The Parkses first argue that
Galatis
does not apply to corporate insurance policies that provide UM/UIM coverage by operation of law, citing
Mason, Executor v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am.,
5th Dist. No. 2003 CA 00029,
{¶ 12} In this case, the issue is not whether the policies’ language can restrict the coverage; it is whether the Parkses are insureds under the policies. The Parkses do not cite any authority supporting their argument that Galatis does not apply to corporate insurance policies that provide UM/UIM coverage by operation of law, and we can think of no reason why Galatis should not apply in these situations. The Parkses’ arguments to the contrary are meritless.
Validity of Galatis
{¶ 13} The Parkses next argue that we should not apply Galatis in this case bеcause it was wrongly decided. They argue that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Galatis failed to meet the third prong of the stare decisis test. They claim that parties have expended a significant amount of time, money, and resources litigating claims arising under Scott-Pontzer and Ezawa and that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Galatis creates an undue hardship upon those who have relied on those cases when litigating those claims.
*195 {¶ 14} We note that this same argument was made to the Ohio Supreme Court in the motions for reconsideration filed in Galatis and that the Ohio Supreme Court denied thosе motions for reconsideration. This demonstrates that the Ohio Supreme Court specifically considered and rejected this argument. And we emphasize that it is not our place to question the propriety of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision. In Galatis, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly overruled Ezawa and limited Scott-Pontzer and we must fоllow that binding precedent. The Parks’ arguments to the contrary are meritless.
Retroactivity
{¶ 15} Finally, the Parkses argue that this court cannot retroactively apply Galatis to this case for three reasons. First, the Parkses claim that doing so would violate Section 16, Article I of thе Ohio Constitution, which provides:
{¶ 16} “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.”
{¶ 17} According to the Parkses, once the Ohio Supreme Court decided
Scott-Pontzer
and
Ezawa,
it created a remedy for certain injured parties. And they argue that any subsequent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court cannot take away that remedy. But this is an improper understanding of what the Ohio Constitution means by “remеdy”. “ ‘ “Remedy” means the action or means given by law for the recovery of a right. It pertains more particularly to those modes of procedure and pleading which lead up to and end in the judgment.’ ”
Vogel v. Wells
(1991),
{¶ 18} In this case, the Parkses had a remedy for their injury. For instance, they had the opportunity to bring a cause of action agаinst the tortfeasor. But they do not have the constitutional right to recover from their employers’ insurers merely because Scott-Pontzer and Ezawa were once the law in Ohio. The right-to-a-remedy clause in the Ohio Constitution does not prevent us from applying Galatis retroactively.
{¶ 19} The Parkses’ second and third arguments against the retroactive application of
Galatis
have been considered and rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Parkses’ second argument is that retrospective application of
Galatis
*196
would violate the doctrine established in
Peerless Elec. Co. v. Bowers
(1955),
{¶ 20} Of course, this doctrine has exceptions. For instance, a decision will not apply retroactively in a case where contractual rights have arisen or vested rights have been acquired under the prior decision.
Peerless,
{¶ 21} The Parkses argue that the first of these exceptions applies. According to the Parks, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decisions in Scoth-Pontzer and Ezawa gave them the right to recover under the terms of their employers’ insurance policies. So they believe that their rights under those contracts “arose” under that caselaw and cannot be extinguished through retroactive application of Galatis.
{¶ 22} We dispute the viability of this argument. The reason why we do not retrospectively apply decisions in a case where contractual rights have arisen or vested rights have been acquired under the prior decision is because courts generally will not disturb the operation of contracts formed in contemplation of and reliance upon law that is later overturned by judicial decision. See
Royal Indemn. Co. v. Baker Protective Serv., Inc.
(1986),
{¶ 23} More importantly as to the Parkses’ argument, we are bound to reject it. Immediately after the Ohio Supreme Court decided
Galatis,
it resolved numerous other Scott-Pontzer-related appeals that were pending before it. See
In re Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage Cases,
*197
{¶ 24} In addition, the justices on the Ohio Supreme Court have even been more explicit in their decision to apply
Galatis
retroactively. In
Fish v. Ohio Gas. Ins. Co.,
{¶ 25} In the Parkses’ third argument, they contend that retroactive application of
Galatis
violates due process. In making this argument, the Parkses rely on
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
(1971),
Conclusion
{¶ 26} Under the new rule of law stated in Galatis, the Parkses have no claim against any of the appellees under the policies in question because Glennda was not in the scope of her employment at the time of the accident and the policies do not have specific language to the contrary. And although they make many arguments regarding why this court cannot or should not apply Galatis to this case, we are bound to follow the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court did not sрecifically state that its decision in Galatis would have only prospective application, and the court applied Galatis retroactively, even after arguments to the contrary. Accordingly, we must conclude that the Parkses are not insureds under the corporate insurance policies in question. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.