Lead Opinion
Cаrlton B. Parks (“Parks”), a former police officer with the Chattanooga Police Department (“Department”), filed suit against both the City of Chattanooga (“City”) and three officers employed by the Department, alleging that he was fired from his job as a patrolman due to his race and in retaliation for having expressed complaints of racial discrimination in the workplace. He further claimed that one of his supervisors created a racially hostile work environment and that the Department violated his due process rights when it allegedly failed to notify him properly of disciplinary charges made against him and withheld his final, post-termination paycheck until he returned some of the Department’s property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Parks did not produce sufficient evidence to support his claims. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Parks, an African-American male, served as a Chattanooga police officer from June 19, 1987, until March 13, 1998, when he was fired by the City’s Chief of Police, J.L. Dotson (“Chief Dotson”). Parks had a history of making complaints of racial discrimination within the Department. On June 5, 1995, while he was president of the Chattanooga Area Law Enforcement Association, an organization formed to advocate minority rights, he wrote a letter to then-Chief of Police, Ralph Cothran, which complained about the lack of minority representation within the Department. On December 13, 1997, he wrote a letter to a superior officer, Captain Skip Vaughn, requesting the inclusion оf a diversity clause in the Department’s transfer policy. On January 4, 1998, he sent a letter to another superior officer, Captain Charles Cooke (“Captain Cooke”), which suggested that he had various concerns about his treatment within the Department and believed that the Department was selectively enforcing its fa
On January 21, 1998, Parks became the subject of an Internal Affairs investigation, as well as a major criminal investigation, when an eighteen-year-old woman, LaShundra Brown (“Brown”), reported that he had entered her apartment without permission and sexually assaulted her while he was on duty. These investigations ultimately led to Parks’s termination from the Department and, on February 5, 1998, to his indictment on charges of rape, sexual battery, and official oppression.
Parks was interviewed on the day of the alleged assault by Officer Tim Carroll, the officer supеrvising the criminal investigation. Although Parks admitted that he had seen Brown on the day in question, he denied her sexual assault accusations. He alleged that he had seen Brown after he completed a stop at Belle Arbor Avenue and that he did not receive a call directing him to Arlington Avenue that day; the latter statement was supported by the Department’s dispatch records. Parks further claimed that Brown initiated their interaction, flagging him down outside her
The investigators took various steps, such as obtaining Parks’s fingernail clippings, using a rape kit on Brown, and administering a lie detector test to Brown (which she passed) and offering to administer such a test to Parks (which he declined to take), to ascertain the truth. These efforts were not immediately conclusive, however, as Chief Dotson acknowledged that the investigation essentially yielded Brown’s word against Parks’s.
Nonetheless, the Department immediately placed Parks on paid administrative leave and, in a February 9, 1998, report prepared by Captain Parks, recommended disciplinary aсtion for conduct unbecoming an officer, a recommendation reviewed and agreed with by the Department’s attorney. On February 19, 1998, Chief Dotson mailed Parks a notice that ordered him to attend a hearing “concerning allegations that on the morning of January 21, 1998, [he] entered the apartment of an 18 year old woman ... and committed unwanted and illegal sexual acts upon her.” Chief Dotson’s notice also advised Parks that he would have an opportunity to respond to Brown’s allegations, explained that he could have an attorney present during the hearing, and warned him that the situation was extremely serious and could result in his termination.
The Department held Parks’s pretermination hearing on March 10, 1998. Pri- or to the hearing, Parks’s attorney was permitted to review the criminal investigation file
By letter dated March 13, 1998, Chief Dotson informed Parks that he had been terminated for sexually assaulting Brown. More specifically, Chief Dotson told Parks that he had violated two rules of the Department: (1) engaging in conduct unbecoming an officer and (2) failing to cooperate with an investigation. Chief Dotson explained that “[a]s a result of these violations and [Parks’s] record with the Police Department,” Parks’s termination was effective immediately.
After his termination, Parks decided to keep his police uniform and other items belonging to the Department for use as evidence in the upcoming criminal trial concerning Brown’s allegations. The Department sent him a letter dated November 3, 1998, threatening him with criminal prosecution if he did not return the items and offering to hold separately any items he wanted to preserve as evidence. The Department also withheld Parks’s final paycheck for more than two years pending the return of its uniform and equipment, even though the 1998 W-2 form the City of Chattanooga sent to Parks included the still-withheld amount in Parks’s income. Parks finally received the withheld funds on August 17, 2000, when he returned the Department’s property.
B. Procedural Background
Parks filed this action on March 10, 1999. On December 1, 1999, he amended the complaint to allege that the City, Chief Dotson, and several of the officers involved in the investigations stemming from Brown’s allegations had violated his free speech and due process rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and had committed unlawful discrimination against him in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985(3); and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-101, et seq. On July 30, 2001, the defendants moved for summary judgment. On October 2, 2001, the district court granted the defendants’ motion. On October 17, 2001, Parks filed a timely motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e), which the district court denied on November 6, 2001. On November 30, 2001, Parks filed this appeal.
II. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. Bush v. Dictaphone Corp.,
III. Analysis
Parks’s appeal presents three questions: (1) whether the district court correctly concluded that he failed to present sufficient evidence of causation to sustain his retaliation claims; (2) whether the district court correctly concluded that he failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his racial discrimination claims; and (3) whether the district court erred in dismissing his due process claims.
A. Parks’s Retaliation Claims
The district court properly dismissed Parks’s First Amendment and Title VII retaliation claims. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, Parks was required to show, among other things, that he engaged in protected activity and that his protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in his dis
The district court also correctly found, however, that Parks did not present sufficient evidence to show that his termination was causally connected to any of his protected conduct. The only significant evidence of causation which Parks presented was that he was fired approximately two months after he sent his complaints to Chief Dotson and Captain Parks.
Parks counters that Chief Dotson had a pokey of giving police officers the benefit of the doubt in resolving charges of official misconduct and that the Department’s policy was to give an accused offi
As an initial matter, Parks misrepresents Chief Dotson’s “benefit of the doubt” policy. Chief Dotson testified that he generally gives police officers the benefit of the doubt when considering disciplinary action against them, depending on the severity of the accusations made against each officer; he did not say that he always gives officers the benefit of the doubt. Parks failed to present any evidence to the district court that Chief Dotson accorded a similarly situated police officer different treatment than he received. See Nguyen,
The district court also properly dismissed Parks’s claims of racial discrimination (i.e., disparate treatment and hostile work environment) under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985(3), Title VII, and the THRA,
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job and performed it satisfactorily; (3) despite his qualifications and performance, he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside his protected class. If the plaintiff is able to do so, a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action. If the defendant carries this burden, then the plaintiff must prove that the proffered reason was actually a pretext to hide unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson,
To establish an arguable case regarding pretext, Parks needed to present evidence that the proffered reason for his termination (1) had no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate Chief Dotson’s decision; or (3) was insufficient to justify Chief Dotson’s decision. See id. at 573 (citing Wheeler v. McKinley Enters.,
To establish a prima facie case in support of his hostile work environment claim, Parks needed to show: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he was subjected to unwelcome racial harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on race; (4) that the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with his work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) the existence of employer
Viewing the record in its totality and in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, this Court agrees with the district court’s conclusion that Parks’s allegations of racial harassment by Lieutenant Fuson were insufficient to support a finding that he had been subjected to an objectively hostile work environment. Parks alleged that Lieutenant Fuson enforced the Department’s facial hair policy against him one time in a selective fashion; favorably falsified the statistics of a white officer so that he could grant that officer preferential job assignments; “loaned out” Parks more than his fellow officers; and failed to offer Parks any seminar or training opportunities for two years. Parks failed to show how frequently such conduct occurred. None of Parks’s allegations involved claims of physical threats or intimidation, nor did they involve claims that Lieutenant Fuson forced him to endure ridicule or embarrassment. Furthermore, since Lieutenant Fuson’s alleged harassment did not prevent Parks from performing his duties as a police officer, but only denied him certain work assignments that Parks would have preferred, his conduct would not cause a reasonable person to believe that his work environment was abusive or hostile. Cf. Kelleher v. Flawn,
C. Parks’s Due Process Claims
Finally, Parks claims that his procedural due process rights were violated because he was not given sufficient notice of the charges against him during the March 10, 1998, pretermination hearing. He specifically alleges that he was not informed that he had been charged with failing to cooperate with the investigations into Brown’s allegations and was not told that his past record with the Department would be considered. Even assuming the truth of these allegations, however, Parks may not bring a Due Process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this case.
Furthermore, the district court properly determined that, even if he were entitled to bring a procedural due process action under § 1983 in this case, Parks’s procedural due process rights were not violated. Once a public employee acquires a property interest in his job,
Although Parks complains that his attorney was not given access to the Internal Affairs report рrepared by Captain Parks prior to or during the hearing, he does not deny that his attorney’s pretermination review of the criminal investigation file enabled him to gain a sufficient understanding of the Department’s evidence against him. Moreover, in light of Parks’s access to the criminal investigation file, the Department was not required to share its internal report with Parks in order to comply with due process. Cf. Derstein v. Kan
In his March 13,1998, letter terminating Parks, Chief Dotson explained that the reason he found Parks guilty of a charge of failing to cooperate with the investigation was that he believed Parks had refused to answer questions regarding Brown’s allegations honestly. We do not believe that due process required Chief Dotson to caution Parks further that dishonesty dining the heаring would warrant a separate charge of misconduct. To require the Department to have advised Parks of all of the types of misconduct during his hearing that could have resulted in additional disciplinary charges against him would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s interest in conducting efficient disciplinary proceedings and would not have significantly aided Parks in responding to Brown’s sexual assault allegations. Furthermore, the risk that Chief Dotson made an erroneous assessment of Parks’s credibility was adequately covered by the availability of post-termination proceedings in the City Council, which Parks chose not to use. See Leary,
Finally, to the extent that Parks claims that the withholding of his final paycheck until he returned the Department’s property was a violation of his substantive due process rights,
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The criminal charges against Parks were dismissed on September 8, 1998, after an assistant district attorney failed to realize that fingernail clippings taken from Parks con-tamed Brown’s DNA. Because the dismissal was with prejudice, the charges against Parks could not be reinstated under Tennessee law.
. According to Chief Dotson’s March 13, 1998, termination letter, the criminal file reviewed by Parks’s attorney included an initial incident report, Brown’s statement, a statement from a person who lived near Brown which supported Brown’s allegations, Parks's statement to Officer Carroll, and other unspecified reports.
. Although Parks claims that Chief Dotson denied his attorney’s request to examine the internal affairs report prepared by Captain Parks, nothing in the appellate record supports that assertion. Captain Parks averred that he was not aware of a request to see his report priоr to the hearing. Nonetheless, the Court accepts the appellant’s assertion for the purpose of this appeal.
. The court does not decide whether Parks's January 4, 1998, letter to Captain Cooke was protected under the First Amendment or Title VII.
. Parks's reliance on the close timing of events is undercut by the intervention of Brown’s complaint of sexual assault between his protected activity and his termination. Nonetheless, this court will take as facially valid his argument that the timing of events is suspect.
. In Cockrel, this Court reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of causation because the plaintiff there — a schoolteacher who taught her students about industrial hemp — had produced enough circumstantial evidence to support a jury verdict in her favor. See
. At the time of Parks’s termination, the DNA results on Parks’s fingernail clippings had yet to be received. Parks’s attorney asked for a continuance of the March 10, 1998, hearing until the DNA results were completed, a request which Chief Dotson denied. Parks has not shown that Chief Dotson’s denial of his attorney’s requеst was unusual and the court does not otherwise comment on the propriety of Chief Dotson’s decision.
. During oral argument, Parks’s counsel claimed that there was ample evidence before the district court that Chief Dotson wrongly chose to believe Brown’s allegations. Whether Chief Dotson exercised good judgment is not the issue, however; the issue is whether he exercised his judgment for an illicit reason. See Smith v. Leggett, 220 F.3d 752, 762 (6th Cir.2000) (citation omitted).
. Contrary to Parks’s assertion, the appellate record does not contain evidence that Chief Dotson normally allowed officers in Chattanooga to review an Internal Affairs report during a disciplinary hearing. Instead, Chief Dotson stated only that he followed such a practice in Houston — his former city of employment.
. Our conclusion that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge obviates the need to address whether the defendants would have made the same
. Claims under Title VII and § 1981 involve the same prima facie elements. Johnson,
. Our determination that the district court properly concluded that Parks failed to show pretext makes it unnecessary for us to decide whether the district court erred in its alternative holding that Parks failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.
. Parks could have appealed Chief Dotson's decision to the City Council pursuant to Chattanooga City Code, § 2-185. Parks decided not to perfect such an appeal, and thus waived his right to any such posttermination hearing. See Leary v. Daeschner,
. The parties do not dispute that Parks had a property interest in his job, as he could be terminated only “for cause.” See Leary,
. The specific dictates of due process are determined by considering factors such as the employee’s interest in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination. See Loudermill,
. In his brief, Parks also mentions that he was not told that his employment record with the Department would be considered during the March 10, 1998, hearing. Appellant's Brief at 9,23. He has not, however, presented any authority to suggest that such an omission was violative of procedural due process. There is no requirement that a government employer detail every factor or consideration whiсh may affect its disciplinary decisions; rather, the employer is required only to give notice of the charges made against an employee. See Loudermill,
. Although Parks has not clearly alleged a violation of his substantive due process rights, he relies on a case, Genusa v. Mumphrey,
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion as to the claims brought by Plaintiff, Carlton B. Parks, for race discrimination and denial of due process; however, because Plaintiff proffered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to his claim for unlawful retaliation, I respectfully dissent on that issue.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the evidence adduced by Plaintiff as to his retaliation claim amounts to more than a “generous construction” of Plaintiffs “timing” argument. In making this assertion, the majority fails to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the hght most favorable to Plaintiff in contravention of the summary judgment standard. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
In addition, the majority claims that Plaintiff failed to present evidence that Chief Dotson had any doubts about the truth of LaShundra Brown’s allegations. The majority dismisses Plaintiffs claims made at oral argument that there was ample evidence before the district court as to the validity of Brown’s allegations by noting that the issue is not whether Chief Dotson exercised good judgment in believing Brown, but whether his judgment was for an illicit reason. The majority’s conclusion in this regard begs the question because if the record indicates that Chief Dotson did not have a basis to believe Brown, then a factual issue is created as to whether he chose to believe Brown based upon an unlawful motive to retaliate against Plaintiff for his protected speech. See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist.,
Along these fines, evidence that Chief Dotson refused to await the DNA test results that may have proven or disproven Plaintiffs version of the events before proceeding with the hearing that led to Plain
In summary, circumstantial evidence of Chief Dotson’s decision not to give Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt as he had done for other officers under similar circumstances in the past; his decision to credit Brown’s testimony over Plaintiffs claims, despite evidence to indicate that Brown was not being truthful; and his decisions to deny Plaintiff a continuance for the purpose of awaiting test results that could have possibly еxonerated Plaintiff and to admit Plaintiff’s prior record despite informing Plaintiff otherwise, create factual disputes as to whether these decisions, which were made on the heels of Plaintiff’s complaints if race discrimination, were motivated by Plaintiffs protected speech in violation of his First Amendment rights. See id. These factual disputes are sufficient to establish a prima facie case even if claims regarding Plaintiffs paycheck are discounted. Thus, having established a prima facie case, the issue of whether Defendants would have discharged Plaintiff in the absence of Plaintiff’s protected speech is also a question for the jury to decide, as recognized by the majority. See Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati,
I would therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs retaliation claim on summary judgment, and remand the case for trial as to this issue.