111 Tenn. 302 | Tenn. | 1903
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The bill in this cause is filed to set up title to a three-tenths undivided interest in land in Hancock county, and to have the same sold for partition and division. The defendants claim title to the whole land, and the bill seeks to remove this exclusive claim as a cloud upon complainant’s title to the three-tenths interest.
The facts as found by the court of chancery appeals are that in 1886 William Parley conveyed the lands in controversy to Jno. Williams and wife, Catherine, by deed, which was soon thereafter registered. In 1889 Jno. Williams made a will, in which he devised the land to his wife, Catherine, for life, with remainder to his daughters Elizabeth and Nancy Ramsey, charging them with the payment of one-fifth of its appraised value to
The contention for complainants may be thus formulated: They claim that the widow had her husband’s will probated and claimed under it, and they bought in view of these facts, without objection from the widow, and that the widow and those under her are now es-topped to set up a different title. It is answered that, while this is so, the old lady was in ignorance of her true title, and so were the other parties. By an amendment to the original bill, complainants go a step further, and charge that the widow requested and urged complainants to buy the land. Upon this feature of the case the court of chancery appeals reports that it is
Under these facts, the first question is, was Mrs. Williams, the widow, estopped to claim under the joint deed to herself and husband after she was advised of her rights thereunder; and, if so, does such estoppel operate against her conveyee, Mrs. Ramsey? In Morris v. Moore & Hancock, 11 Hum., 433-435, it is said: “To justify this principle of estoppel, it is material that the party shall be fully apprised of his rights, and shall by his conduct or gross negligence encourage or influence the purchaser, for, if he is wholly ignorant of his rights, or if the purchaser knows them, or if his acts or silence or negligence do not mislead or in any manner affect the transaction, there can be no just inference of actual or constructive fraud upon his, part.” This principle is approved in a number of cases. We cite Moses v. Sanford, 2 Lea, 659; Askins and Wife v. Coe, 12 Lea, 672; Collins v. Williams, 98 Tenn., 525, 41 S. W., 1056;
In the case of Crabtree v. Bank, supra, the gist of the decision is that there will be no estoppel when there was a mutual mistake as to the effect of a court record to which the persons to he affected were parties, and that when the facts are known to both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there can be no estoppel; citing quite a number of cases.
Pomeroy says that, to make the doctrine applicable, the party having the estate must knowingly mislead the party purchasing, or be guilty of deceit or of such gross negligence as to amount to evidence of intent to deceive. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., section 807. To the same effect, see Estis v. Jackson (N. C.), 16 S. E., 7, 32 Am. St. Rep., 784; Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill., 294, 37 N. E., 1031; Mills v. Graves (Ill.), 87 Am. Dec., 314; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S., 20, 2 Sup. Ct., 10, 27 L. Ed., 359.
Now, as found by the court of chancery appeals, the most that can be said is that an old, illiterate woman, in utter ignorance of her title in fee to the land, and believing that she had only a life estate in it, expressed a willingness or wish for complainants to buy the remainder interest, when they had ready access to the records showing the true title, and, haying superior business experience and knowledge, could have formed a correct judgment as to her rights; and the court of chancery appeals finds that the evidence does not justify any inference that complainants relied upon any repre
Complainants concede the correctness of the law as laid down, hut insist that the facts as found by the court of chancery appeals show an active inducement to complainants to buy, in that Mrs. Willaims probated the will, claimed under it, talked with the purchaser about the purchase, suggesting.the purchase, and in that way inducing the purchase upon the idea that the- title vested under the will.
We are of opinion that the court of chancery appeals was correct in holding, notwithstanding these features, that Mrs. Williams and those claiming under her were ignorant of the true state of the title, and that complainants had equal, if not better, opportunity and chance to know the true-title, and that the purchasers were not influenced by her statements or acts, and hence they are not estopped to set up the true title. We are of the opinion that under the facts stated by the court of chancery appeals, and the law as laid down in the cases — especially Crabtree v. The Bank, 108 Tenn., 491, 67 S. W., 797, and cases there cited — the widow, .upon learning, as a matter of fact, for the first time, of her true title, was not estopped to set it up by the fact that she had ignorantly claimed under the will, and had told complainant, in effect, that much.
It is next said that Nancy Ramsey and those claiming under her elected to take under the will of Jno. Wil
Upon the whole case, we see no error in the decree of the court of chancery appeals, and it is affirmed.