Parkerson v. LynnParkerson v. Lynn
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Savoie, Carter, Alford
These cases present the issue of whether persons who commit felonies while on parole or probation lose their eligibility to receive increased diminution of sentence (known as double good time) under
FACTS
Gary Wayne Parkerson was on parole when he committed a second felony. His parole was revoked and he was sentenced to serve six years of imprisonment on the
Dennis Marx was on probation when he committed a second felony. His probation was revoked and he was sentenced to serve seven years of imprisonment on the second felony to run concurrently with the sentence on his prior conviction.2
As inmates in the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Parkerson seeks double good time on his six year sentence received in 1985 while on parole and Marx seeks double good time on his seven year sentence received in 1983 while on probation.
Parkerson and Marx filed civil suits through applications for writs of habeas corpus against Bruce Lynn, Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (hereinafter referred to as Department). The plaintiffs contested the Department‘s determination that they were not entitled to double good time regarding their second felony convictions under Regulation No. 30-9B(7)(A)(b) and (d).
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT
Commissioner Alan Bergeron of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court heard the plaintiffs’ applications and recommended to the court that Parkerson and Marx be declared eligible to receive double good time under
The Commissioner interpreted
An inmate who is serving a sentence for a crime which he committed and of which he was convicted:
(a) while in custody for a hard labor sentence,
(b) while on regular parole supervision,
(c) while on good time under parole supervision,
(d) while on probation for a felony,
(e) while on escape from a hard labor sentence.
Shall not be deemed eligible or approved to earn double good time on the aforementioned sentence(s).3
The Commissioner found that persons on parole and probation were not inmates serving a sentence under
The district court judge adopted the Commissioner‘s recommendations and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. From this judgment, the Department suspensively appeals.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
The Department urges the following assignments of error:
1. The district court erred in its determination that plaintiffs while on parole and probation were not inmates in the custody of the Department serving a sentence.
2. The district court erred in its determination that Department Regulation 30-9B, specifically sections 7(A)(b) and (d), fails to conform to the legislative grant of authority to the Department to establish rules and regulations regarding the earning of or failure to earn increased diminution of sentence by broadening the class of inmates excluded by LSA-R.S. 15:571.14 from eligibility to receive increased diminution of sentence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Whenever a prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary, and has not been released on bail or perfected a suspensive appeal, such sentence shall be considered as commencing on the day following the day on which such prisoner is sentenced without regard to the actual date of incarceration in the state penitentiary.
Thus, as to sentences of imprisonment, such as Parkerson‘s, execution of the sentence is not dependent upon actual incarceration.
We have reviewed the jurisprudence dealing with the expiration of a sentence. This issue is discussed frequently in regards to
C. This Section shall not be applicable in cases where more than five years have elapsed since the expiration of the maximum sentence, or sentences, of the previous conviction, or convictions, and the time of the commission of the last felony for which he has been convicted.
In State v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 311 (La. 1977), the supreme court interpreted the phrase “expiration of the maximum sentence” for the defendant‘s prior offense; the court found that the sentence expired when the defendant was actually discharged from custodial supervision, rather than on the date as initially contemplated by the imposition of sentence by the court. The court discussed the parole statutes,
The statutory intent, thus, is that a sentence expires when the prisoner is
discharged from state custody and supervision, not when the theoretical date arrives on which the initial sentence would have terminated. Thus, when the convicted person is discharged earlier (as well as later) than the expiration date of the sentence initially sentenced, then the actual maximum sentence is that determined by his date of legal discharge, whether extended through revocation of parole or shortened by law due to `good time’ diminution of the initial sentence. It is not until the date of actual discharge that the individual has fully paid his debt to society, insofar as owed because of an offense for which he has been convicted.
State v. Anderson, 349 So.2d at 314.
In State v. Vincent, 387 So.2d 1097, 1102 (La. 1980), the supreme court equated the date of discharge from parole with the expiration of the maximum sentence for defendant‘s prior felony conviction. See also State v. Baker, 452 So.2d 737, 746 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984). In several appellate court cases, the date of the defendant‘s discharge from probation was determinative of commencement of the five year cleansing period. See State v. Battista, 517 So.2d 1096, 1100 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987); State v. Mistretta, 490 So.2d 462, 464-465 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). Based on these statutes and cases, the commencement and termination of a sentence are not dependent upon incarceration, but rather upon whether the defendant is subject to penitentiary confinement and thus in custody and under supervision of the state.
A further analysis of the statutes concerning parole,
The parole term, when the board orders a prisoner released on parole, shall be for the remainder of the prisoner‘s sentence, without any diminution of sentence for good behavior. When the parolee has completed his full parole term, he shall be discharged from parole and shall be issued a final order of discharge by the board. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Department of Corrections to be made a matter of permanent record.
Similar to parole is probation.5 An offender convicted of a felony offense and
The Commissioner reasoned that offenders who committed crimes while on probation and parole were not serving sentences because, according to the statutes and Code articles on probation and parole, if these offenders’ parole or probation were revoked, they were not entitled to credit on their sentences for the time spent on parole or probation. He apparently reasoned that this result would not follow if the probation and/or parole was part of the sentence. We disagree with this reasoning.
The purposes of parole and probation are for the rehabilitation of the criminal and are acts of grace to one convicted of a crime. See State v. Gordon, 214 La. 822, 38 So.2d 794, 796 (La.1949). Because parole and/or probation are less restrictive on the offender‘s freedom than penal incarceration, and are acts of grace to the offender, violation of parole and/or probation has consequences such as no entitlement to credit against the offender‘s sentence for the time spent on probation and/or parole. Yet, the time the offender spends on parole or probation is still a part of his sentence since he is in the legal custody of the Department while on parole or probation and subject to custodial supervision at any time.
The plaintiffs in brief mainly contend that a sentence is only being served while an offender is physically incarcerated. As a review of the law has shown, a sentence is being served whenever the offender is in the physical or legal custody of the Department; an offender is in the legal custody of the Department when he is on probation or parole. If the plaintiffs’ contention were correct, only those offenders who commit a felony while physically incarcerated would be ineligible for double good time. Because an award of double good time provides an accelerated early release from physical incarceration it is illogical to make those offenders who have shown themselves on prior occasions to be poor prospects for release from physical incarceration eligible for double good time. Because good time has as one of its purposes to promote self improvement, it defeats that purpose to allow the plaintiffs, who are repeat offenders, to receive double good time. See McCormick v. Hunt, 328 So.2d 140, 143 (La.1976). For these reasons, Assignment of Error No. 1 has merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
We have determined that the plaintiffs are not eligible for double good time under
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The matters herein are res nova and litigation of same is equally advantageous to the Department and the plaintiffs. Since the plaintiffs are indigent, equity demands that the assessment of costs be against the Department. Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of
REVERSED.