OPINION
Case Summary
Arсhie Parker appeals the parole board's reinstatement of the balance of his sentence. We affirm.
Issue
Parker raises one issue, which we restate as whether the triаl court properly reinstated the balance of his sentence when it revoked his parole.
Facts
On December 3, 1999, Parker pled guilty to Class B felony dealing in cocaine and Class D fеlony possession of cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Parker to seven years in the Department of Correction ("DOC") on the dеaling charge and three years on the possession charge. The trial court ordered the possession charge to be served consecutive to the dealing charge.
On September 6, 2002, Parker was released from the DOC. On January 13, 2004, Parker's parole was revoked because he was convicted of Class D felony operating a vehicle aftеr being adjudged an ha *286 bitual traffic offender, Class C misdemean- or battery, and had urine screens that were positive for cannabinoids and cocaine. The parole board concluded that Parker "[ble assessed the balance of his sentence." Appellant's App. p. 28.
On June 23, 2004, Parker filed a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the trial сourt subsequently denied. Parker now appeals.
Analysis
Initially, we note the that State failed to file an appellee's brief. Under such circumstances, a less stringent standard of review applies and Parker need only establish prima facie error, which is error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. State v. Suggs,
Indiana - Post-Conviction - Relief Rule 1(c) provides that the rules do not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but if a petitioner applies for a writ of habeas corpus attacking the validity of a conviction or sentence the trial court shall treat it as a petition for relief under the Post-Convietion Relief Rules. Because Parker is challenging the sentence imposed by the parole board, we will treat his рetition for writ as if it was a petition for post-convietion relief See Wickliffe v. State,
On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, we will reverse a post-conviction court's decision only where thе evidence " 'is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion." Thomas v. State,
Parker relies on Meeker v. Indiana Parole Board,
Although Parker likens the facts of his case to the facts in Meeker, they are markedly different. Unlike Meeker, Parker did not have his parole revoked after having beеn paroled twice on the same convie-tions. More importantly, however, Meeker was clearly "turned over" to another sentence immediately by the parole bоard. Id. at 1109. We construed the "turn over" language against the State and concluded that under the facts of the case the parole board effectively discharged him from the rеmainder of the dealing sentences. Id. Here, however, contrary to his assertion, there is no indication that Parker was ever "turned over" by the parole board. Parker cites to a computer printout titled "Offender Information System Sentence Summary," which lists his three convictions, the sentences imposed, and several dates. Appellant's App. p. 28. The fоrm also includes many abbreviations and what appear to be internal notations. It is unclear whether the parole board, the DOG, or some other agency processеd this form. What is clear, however, is that this form does not contain "turn over" or any similar language. Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from Meeker.
The case is much more similar to Han-nis, in which the dеfendant was sentenced to eight years on one conviction and two years on several convictions. Id. at 873. The trial court ordered the two-year sentences to run cоncurrent with one another but consecutive to the eight-year sentence. Id. On November 22, 1999, Hannis was "turned over" to begin serving the two-year sentences. Id. On August 24, 2000, Hannis was paroled with a maximum еxpiration of sentence date of November 22, 2001. Id. On May 17, 2001, the parole board revoked his probation and reinstated the remainder of the eight-year sentence. Id.
On apрeal we distinguished Hannis from Meeker on the ground that Meeker dealt with two unrelated convictions, not a single judgment. Id. at 879. We also recognized that Meeker was effectively discharged when he was "turned over" from the dealing convictions to the new convictions. In Hannis, however, the only evidence of a "turn over" was a document prepared by the DOC. Therе was no evidence that the parole board discharged his sentence as required by Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-1(b). 1 Id.
*288 Like Hannis, there is no evidence that the parole board discharged, or even "turned over," his sentence. Accordingly, Parker has not made a prima facie showing that the trial court erred.
Conclusion
Because Meeker is distinguishable, and Parker has nоt established that the parole board discharged or "turned over" his sentence, the trial court properly denied his motion. We affirm.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-1 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), when a person imprisoned for a felony completes his fixed term of imprisonment, less the credit time he has earned with respect to that term, he shall be:
(1) released on parole for not more than twenty-four (24) months, as determined by the parole board;
(2) discharged upon a finding by the committing court that the person was assigned to a community transition program аnd may be discharged without the requirement of parole; or
(3) released to the committing court if his sentence included a period of probation.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d), a person released on parole remains on parole from the date of his release until his fixed term expires, unless his parole is revoked or he is dischargеd from that term by the parole board. In any event, if his parole is not revoked, the parole board shall discharge him after the period set under subsection (a) or the expiration of the person's fixed term, whichever is shorter.
(c) A person whose parole is revoked shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his fixed term. However, he shall again be released on parole when he completes that remainder, less the credit time he has earned since the revocation. The parole board may reinstate him on рarole at any time after the revocation.
(d) When an offender (as defined in IC 5-2-12-4) completes the offender's fixed term of imprisonment, less credit time earned with respect to that term, the offender shall be *288 placed on parole for not more than ten (10) years.