Parker v. StateParker v. State
We have for review a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Parker v. State, 386 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), which has been certified to this Court as being in direct conflict with an earlier decision of a different district court of appeal, Aylin v. State, 362 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We have jurisdiction.
Petitioner, Walter A. Parker, Jr., was charged by information with, among other things, conspiracy to possess more than 100 pounds of cannabis. His plea of nolo contendere to that charge was accepted by the trial judge and petitioner was sentenced to four years probation.
After serving one year of his probation, petitioner filed a motion contesting the four year length thereof. He argued that under the law controlling at the time that he was sentenced, possession of in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis was a third-degree felony and so the conspiracy to possess such was a first-degree misdemeanor. He further contended that since the maximum penalty for a first-degree misdemeanor is one year in prison and a $1,000 fine, it was illegal for the probation period imposed to exceed one year.
The trial court denied petitioner‘s motion and was affirmed, upon appeal, by the district court. The district court denied petitioner‘s motion for clarification, but granted his petition for certificate of direct conflict and certified such to this Court. Petitioner then invoked our discretionary jurisdiction.
Resolution of this matter, and of the conflict between the district courts, depends upon our interpretation of
Except as authorized by this chapter and chapter 500, it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance. Any person who violates this provision with respect to:
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A controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03(1)(c) [wherein cannabis
is named] is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.084; except that the sale, delivery, or possession of in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis as controlled in s. 893.03(1)(c) shall constitute a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Petitioner contends that in order to be convicted of a second-degree felony under
It is unlawful for any person to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance unless such controlled substance was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice or to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. Any person who violates this provision is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Petitioner‘s position is supported by several decisions from the first and second district courts. See Reinersman v. State, 382 So.2d 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Beasley v. State, 382 So.2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1980); Schueren v. State, 370 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Chewning v. State, 366 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); and Aylin v. State, 362 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
Respondent, the state, on the other hand, argues that
We agree with respondent‘s contention that
We think that the variation in the wording of the two clauses is a distinction with a difference. There is a marked difference between “possession with intent” and simple “possession.” The first clause of
Nor is this a situation justifying departure from the plain, literal meaning of the statute. Such departure is permitted when a literal interpretation would lead to an illogical result or one not intended by the lawmakers. State ex rel. Hughes v. Wentworth, 135 Fla. 565, 185 So. 357, 360 (1938). A literal reading of
Petitioner argues that when the word “possession,” as used in the last clause of the statute, is considered in light of the rules of statutory construction and is subsumed to and construed in pari materia with the rest of the statute, it is clear that possession really means “possession with intent.” Regardless, however, of the merits of petitioner‘s statutory interpretation language,
Resort to the rules of statutory construction supports our conclusion regarding the clear meaning of the statute. As always, legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided in interpreting the provisions of a law. See State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191, 116 So. 255 (1928). The legislature has evidenced an intent, in
One indicator of the legislature‘s intent is the title of the law enacting the statute. As we noted in Foley v. State, 50 So.2d 179, 184 (Fla. 1951):
[I]f the phraseology of the act is ambiguous or is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is the court‘s duty to glean the legislative intent from a consideration of the act as a whole, “the evil to be corrected, the language of the act, including its title, the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already in existence bearing on the subject“, ...
(Emphasis added.) The title to chapter 76-200, Laws of Florida, 1976, which amended
AN ACT relating to criminal penalties; amending s. 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, providing that the sale, delivery or possession in excess of 100 pounds of cannabis is a felony of the second degree; providing an effective date.
The clear import of the title to chapter 76-200 is that those possessing over 100 pounds of cannabis are guilty of a second-degree felony — no reference whatsoever is made to an intent requirement.
Petitioner argues that it is unreasonable to interpret chapter 76-200 as covering simple possession because a clause so doing would logically be located in
Also relevant here are any amendments of
Chapter 79-1, Laws of Florida, 1979, enacted
Petitioner counters that
In light of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the district court ruled properly in affirming petitioner‘s sentence.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.