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Parker v. Roth
278 N.W.2d 106
Neb.
1979
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*1 Penal Correctional Com- turned plex Nebraska period, pursuant Ne- for an indefinite respects, Sociopath Act. In all other Sexual braska trial court. affirm decisions we

Affirmed as modified. G. Terry Roth, Parker, appellant, v. Richard appellee. Douglas County, Nebraska, Sheriff 2d

278N. W. April 42561. No. Filed *2 Kenney, Douglas County Thomas M. Public De- appellant. fender, Hornstein, Bennett for and G. Smith, Sindelar, Smith Gooch, Sindelar & Tim curiae, Civil Nebraska Liberties for amicus Union. Terry Attorney General, Douglas, R. L. Paul Lynne Fritz; Hofmeister, Schaaf, Rae and Paul E. Douglas County Attorney, Knowles, L. Donald Meyer, appellee. Rockford G. J., Boslaugh, McCown,

Heard before Krivosha, C. JJ. White, Clinton, Brodkey, Hastings, (cid:127)Krivosha, C. J. Terry appeal appellant, Parker,

By G. attacks constitutionality I, section of Article Nebraska, as the same of the State Constitution people on November vote amended amendment). (1978 I, Article section *3 provides now as follows: Constitution Nebraska the by persons sureties, bailable sufficient shall be “All involving pene- except treason, offenses for sexual against by victim, of or the will the force tration presump- proof murder, or the the is evident where required, great. be bail shall not Excessive nor tion imposed, pun- fines nor cruel and unusual excessive inflicted.” The amendment added the ishment penetration involving by phrase offenses “sexual against or the of the victim” an will article force which has since the Nebraska Con- otherwise existed adopted. first For reasons set out was stitution herein, is in find that the 1978bail amendment all we respects the decision of the valid and we affirm Dis- County, Douglas denying Nebraska, trict Court bail appellant. constitutionality on the basis for his attack the As (1) appellant I, maintains of Article section That the excessive bail the 1978 bail amendment violates Eighth prohibition of Amendment United the (2) Constitution; 1978 bail amend- the States violates the Protection ment Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti- (3) ap- tution; that the 1978 bail amendment violates pellant’s presumption protected by of innocence the Process Due to the United States Clause the Fourteenth Amendment (4)

Constitution; appellant’s rights bail amendment violates to the ef- pre- fective assistance counsel and to freedom to pare his under Sixth defense and Fourteenth Constitution; Amendments to the United States (5) that the 1978 bail amendment violates Cruel Eighth Unusual Punishment and Amendment Clause of the to the United States Constitution. purposes appeal

For the facts have been parties. stipulated by Therefore, no factual dis- April pute 21, 1978, exists. On L. B. 553 was enacted Legislature, by proposing, subject the Nebraska approval electorate, I, that Article section the Constitution of to further exclude State of Nebraska be amended persons charged

from with involving penetration by offenses “sexual force or proof against the will the victim” where the was presumption great. or the evident Prior to that time I, under Article section of our State Constitution only treason and murder were nonbailable offenses proof presumption where evident or the great. people 7, 1978, On November of the State duly proposed of Nebraska enacted the amendment opposed. 355,949 79,179 vote of favor and Appellant charged having in this case was subjected person penetration by another to sexual implied force, decep- force, threat of coercion or January Appellant, entering on tion after *4 plea nicipal guilty, sought of not on release bail. The mu- City Omaha, Nebraska,

court for the of de- request I, 9, nied on the basis that Article section permit of the Constitution Nebraska did not bail in a case this nature.

Appellant petition then filed a for writ of Habeas County, Douglas

Corpus, District Court in the unlawfully being alleging im- Nebraska, he that was liberty by deprived of the prisoned virtue of his hearing, Following to set bail. refusal court’s County, Douglas Nebraska, con- Court for District I, of the Constitution Article section that cluded appellant. bail to valid and denied was Nebraska From that appealed denying appellant has bail order admitting guilt, appel- his this court. Without appeal purposes stipulated for of this has lant the great presumption proof or the was evident involving appellant a sexual offense committed against penetration of the victim. the will force Supreme has of the United States never Court The Eighth expressly Amendment to the Consti held the binding on the states of the United States tution through However, Amendment. the Fourteenth e Pilgrim, 156 N. 2d 182 Neb. W. w v. State prohibition against the federal excessive have held applicable See v. Hed to the states. Mastrian (8th 1964). man, Cir., We examine this 326 F. 2d 708 apply Eighth appeal if the Amendment did as states. appellant’s first to contention Article

We turn I, of Nebraska violates section of the Constitution Eighth to the United States Consti- Amendment reading provisions tution. Neither a Eighth ry nor an examination histo- Amendment Europe, country bail, or in leads either urged by appellant. to the conclusion Eighth States Con- Amendment to the United provides “Excessive bail shall as follows: stitution imposed, required, fines nor not be nor excessive Nothing punishments inflicted.” unusual cruel and contained single sustain in that sentence can an required argument case. that bail is Appellant attention to an exten- has directed our subject by two-part sive, on the review article law Coming Foote, “The Consti- Caleb entitled Professor

855 II,” I Pa. L. Rev. tutional Crisis in Bail: and U. (1965). 959 and Professor Foote therein main- early English history early tains that bail and history inescapable bail American lead to the con- Eighth language clusion that the of the Amendment requires granting the of bail case. After arguments careful review of the contained in Profes- reviewing Foote’s law review sor article and the his- tory Eighth opinion Amendment, of the we are of the a conclusion that such cannot be reached.

Certainly plain meaning the of the words of the Eighth support position Amendment does not required appellant bail is in all that knowledges cases. Even ac- appellant argues:

this. In his brief capital exception possibly offenses, ‘‘With the of and noncapital legisla- treason, murder wholesale denial of tive bail to an entire class of criminal de- charged any given fendants lesser offense is constitutionally impermissible.” Appellant ac- knowledges capital noncapital that offenses and may murder be made nonbailable. Yet we find nothing Eighth in the Amendment which would ex- capital noncapital offenses and clude murder. Ei- Eighth by language requires ther the Amendment its Eighth all bail in cases or the Amendment its lan- guage require plain does not bail in case. The Eighth merely of words Amendment stand for proposition legislative body if pro- that has bailable, vided certain offenses be the court may deny through not in effect defendant’s freedom imposing an excessive amount bail. That is not to say that the denial of bail in all instances not be provision violation of some other of either federal Constitution our state Constitution. It is say simply Eighth that the Amendment to thé fed- proposition eral Constitution does not stand for the one has a constitutional to bail. history Europe If one examines the bail as country adoption well as at the time ,of the amend- States and United Constitution thereto, further convinced one is ments Eighth guarantee not intended

Amendment and detailed For an extensive in all cases. two-part history bail, analysis see a article “Constitutionality Meyer, Detention,” Pretrial Right Duker, “The 1139and L. J. 60 Geo. *6 (1977). Inquiry,” Alb. L. Rev. 33 42 a Historical Bail: early summary, history of the an examination In particularly England, bail, in discloses that there of part concept being right bail, to not a of no such was legal system. history English English of the The the prisoners where were held indefinite Chamber Star ly in secret is well known to student of and tried Long Parliament, In law. which the initiated passed Revolution, the Cromwell an act to 16 the Court of the Star Chamber. Car. abolish 1,c.10(1640). per provided if a The act further by any exercising jurisdic imprisoned court son was person Chamber, to Star tion similar such could judges King’s Court of file a motion with Corpus or for Common Pleas a writ of Habeas Bench ordinary prisoner upon payment fees. The by brought before the court which law then was re quired justice by to examine the facts and do “either delivering, bailing remanding prisoner.” grant right however, not, absolute to act did an bail. provisions act, to In an effort avoid the ways persons imprison found indirect to Stuarts politically objectionable peri- for found ods of time considerable advantage taking of defects in the remedy Corpus defects, To Act. these the Habeas (1679). Act of 1679 was enacted. 31 Car. c. A reading Corpus discloses, Act of Habeas right grant however, that it to bail did merely prisoner, It enabled a before case. convic- felony, except tion, one for treason or to committed early appearance an before the chancellor or secure a discharge upon judge if bail the return bailable. In an law the offense was showed judges get Corpus Act, around the Habeas effort thereby again pre simply imposed bail, excessive persons charged venting with bailable the release By imposing judges bail, made excessive crimes. Corpus inoperative respect Act the Habeas prisoners King whom the did not want re those Corpus It was this abuse of the Habeas Act leased. Rights the Bill of of 1689 to be that caused enacted. Rights provided Bill of of 1689 “that excessive Said * * *." ought required M., not to be 1 & § bail W. (1689). 2c.

The framers of the Constitution were well aware problems England, quite and could easily provided permitted have that bail should be they They all offenses had so intended. were attempting provide right however, not, a new country, transferring new but instead were an accepted, recognized principle that if an offense was bailable, the individual’s to freedom could not by requiring defeated bail in be excessive amounts. by examining This is further established *7 history of bail as it existed in the colonies at the time being Constitution was the drafted. Some colonies providing early laws for enacted bail in their his- tory. Pennsylvania Massachusetts did so in in p. and New York in 1683. 60 Geo. L. J. 1140 at framers of the Constitution and the mem- Congress exactly pro- of the first knew bers how to leg- in for bail such cases as determined vide the body. knowledge they Yet with that islative made provision such in either no the Constitution or the History amendments. discloses that there was no right England, to bail in nor constitutional was there any right colonies, constitutional to bail in the nor guaranteed there ever been such had right an absolute any Anglo-American jurisprudence in known adoption prior Rights. of the Bill of Congress adopt Rights When met the Bill of in suggested June of an amendment was which * * required read: “Excessive bail shall not be imagination It would have taken little or draftsman- ship simply provide, provided as had earlier been colonies, in that “bail shall be certain allow- * * Having except in all able cases failed to do they so, it must be concluded that did not intend to every grant through provisions in case the Eighth Amendment. history event,

In of bail does not disclose exceptions, how or or what manner for murder treason, found in most state constitutions can be Eighth recogni- read into the Amendment. Once a legislative right tion that bodies had the to exclude capital murder, treason, or offenses from bail inescapable made, one is left conclusion Eighth simply prohibited Amendment ex- guarantee cessive bail where allowed and did instance. to'bail capital country What was a offense at the time this founded is far different from that which is so in- today. example, capital cluded As an laws of co- idolatry, Massachusetts witchcraft, lonial included blasphemy, slaying anger murder, willful or cruelty passion, poisoning, beastiality, sodomy, adultery, attempting stealing, conspiring witness, false man' or public

invasion, insurrection, or rebel- against treacherously Commonwealth, lion or at- tempting the alteration or subversion of the frame of government, years cursing a child over 16 old or smiting parent, rebelling against his a son over 16 parents, rape. his cerning See Laws and Liberties Con- Massachusetts,

the Inhabitants of 5 M. Far- (1648). nothing history rand, There in the of our including govern laws, the ordinance to the North- (an Territory west Ordinance the Government of , Territory of the United States Northwest of the *8 ii), July. Ohio,. 13, 1787, sup- River art. which would port historically the claim that bail had and tradi-

859 tionally guaranteed right been a constitutional or was right Eighth to be such a under the Amend- intended ment to the Constitution of the United States.

Though country years more 200 now than appears directly old, there to have been no case de Supreme the United States cided issue. Court on this Supreme

In 1951 United States Court de Boyle, cases, 1, two Stack v. S. 72 cided 1, U. S. Ct. Landon, 96 L. Ed. Carlson v. S. U. Appellant argues 72 S. Ct. 96 L. Ed. 547. Boyle, supra, principle

Stack v. established the constitutionally guaranteed right. bail is While it language true that one is tained find comfort in con supra, reading decision, in the Stack a careful that, best, the decision discloses at the declaration unsupported by is obiter dictum and Stack law.. not involve the did question denial bail. It involved the any language bail; therefore, excessive opinion announcing right in “traditional legal support freedom before conviction” is without opinion spe not at and was issue in the case. The cifically recognizes right pro to bail is as by law and vided right. not inherent constitutional Vinson, therein,

Mr. Chief Justice said: passage Judiciary “From the Act of present 73, 91, to the Stat. Federal Rules of Criminal (a) (1), Procedure, Rule 46 law un has federal provided equivocally person that a arrested for á non-capital (Em offense shall be admitted to bail.” supplied.) phasis kept It must therefore be. mind recognized right the Chief Justice that had to bail inception Judiciary its in the Act of and either Constitution of the United States or the thereto. For that reason amendments we do not be Boyle, supra, authority that Stack v. lieve for the proposition that a constitutional to bail exists. supra, Landon, v. hand,

Carlson on the other did opinion by the denial to involve bail. In an Mr. Jus- joined, Reed tice which Mr. Chief Justice Vinson *9 argu Eighth Amendment the court addressed the slight saying was lifted with “The bail clause ment Rights English changes Act. In Bill of the from thought England to been ac has never that clause merely pro cases, right to but to bail in all a cord in those cases shall not be excessive that bail vide where was proper grant bail. When this clause it to nothing Rights, Bill of was over into our carried concept. indicated different that said prevented Congress Eighth Amendment has not defining bail shall the classes of cases which from country. in criminal in this Thus cases allowed be may punishment compulsory the be not where bail is very language Indeed, Amend death. say be bailable. We fails to all arrests must ment think, clearly, Eighth Amendment does here that require that bail be allowed under circum not Hedman, v. cases.” In Mastrian of these stances denied, 84 S. Ct. 11 L. cert. 376 U. S. supra, question right a constitutional to Ed. 2d Eighth addressed. “Neither Amend bail requires Amendment nor the Fourteenth that ment given everyone charged a offense must be state pending liberty trial. While it on bail is inherent his liberty concept right that to American in our generally exist, this has never been held to shall bail every must make criminal offense that state mean right right provided subject or that the to such a as subject to bail must be made so offenses to always accused will be able administered liberty pending Traditionally trial. his secure acceptably, offenses of a nature there are as to may properly provi to make refuse a state which right See, also, to bail.” Turco v. for a State sions (D. 1971). Supp. Maryland, Md., In 324 F. view of of these reject appellant’s authorities, we must con violates the that the 1978bail amendment ex tention Eighth prohibition Amendment. cessive appellant’s contention second We turn then to is in violation of the 1978 bail amendment of the Fourteenth Amendment to in Protection Clause kept It States Constitution. should be the United examining are here the constitution- mind that we ality provision ap- of a of the Nebraska Constitution overwhelming people. proved an vote We “ liberty, recognize life, ‘one’s ** * rights property and other fundamental they depend vote; on the outcome of be submitted no elections.’ ” can a citizen’s Nor constitutional simply majority infringed rights be because a *10 people that it be. Lucas v. Colorado choose General Assembly, 713, 1472, 377 U. S. 84 S. Ct. 12 L. Ed. 2d it Yet we have said is incumbent on reasonably possible court, when and consistent with rights, to resolve all doubts as to constitutional a validity. pos- in favor its constitutional If statute way sible, a statute should be construed in such a as negative infirmity. constitutional Prender- gast Nelson, 97, v. 199 Neb. 256 N. W. 2d 657. If such properly applies adopted by to a rule Legislature, statute apply

all the more should it to an approved by to the Constitution amendment an over- majority whelming people. years Supreme

Over United States Court developed specific determining rules for has wheth- deny any equal protection laws citizen the er state the der guaranteed by law the federal Constitution. Un- judicial the traditional standard of review of action, presump- a state’s laws are accorded state constitutionality. Only where the tion state action impinges upon the exercise of fundamental constitu- rights or tional liberties must state be found to chosen the least restrictive have alternative so acting. The traditional standard of review of a state Equal law under the Protection Clause the Four- only requires teenth Amendment state law relationship rational be shown to bear some to San Antonio School legitimate purposes. state See

862 Rodriguez, 1, 1278, District v. U. S. 93 Ct. S. 36 L. Ed. 2d 16. Supreme

The decisions of the United States Court reviewing state action as it related Pro tection Clause United States Constitution dis basically that there are closes two tests. If the mat right” guaranteed by ter involved is a “fundamental States, the Constitution of the United then the court engage judicial scrutiny will a strict of the act in question. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 307, 2562, 427 U. S. 96 S. Ct. L. 49 Ed. 2d 520. hand, the other if

On the state action under exam right” guaranteed by not a ination is “fundamental States, the Constitution of the United the court mere ly question examines the matter to determine there is a rational whether tion which basis for the classifica

, does not involve either a “fundamental constitutionally guaranteed right” involve “suspect Shapiro Thompson, class.” See v. 394 U. 618, 1322, 600; 89 S. Ct. S. L. Ed. 2d Griswold v. Connecticut, 479, 1678, 381 U. S. 85 S. Ct. 14 L. Ed. 2d 510; Carr, 186, Baker v. 691, 369 U. S. 82 S. Ct. 7 L. Chicago, 663; 2d 1, Ed. Ct. U. S. Terminiello v. 337 U. S. 69 S. 894, 1131; 93 L. Massachusetts, Ed. Prince v. Nyquist 645; 64 S. Ct. 88 L. Ed. v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 97 S. Ct. 53 L. Ed. 2d *11 Richardson, 365, Graham v. 403 U. S. 1848, S. Ct. Loving Virginia, 534; 29 L. Ed. 2d Ct. 1, v. 388 U. S. 87 S. Bolling Sharpe, 1817, 18 L. Ed. 2d v. 347 U. 693, See, 74 S. Ct. 98 L. also, S. Ed. 884. Voich City Island, ahoskev. of Grand 194 Neb. 231 N. W. 2d history

In view what we have said about the Eighth bail under the Amendment to the Constitu- States, tion of the United right we must conclude that the right guaranteed to bail is not a fundamental say under Constitution. That is not to that under every circumstance a denial of bail will have a rational basis and therefore not be violative of right equal protection case, to of the law. In this right however, we are unable to conclude constitutionally guaranteed fundamental requiring right scrutiny strict on review no rational for the there is basis action taken. Supreme United States Court has held that it province not the of that court to create substantive rights guaranteeing in the name

constitutional equal protection of the laws. If there is to be such a right, it must be fundamental found to be either ex- implicitly guaranteed by plicitly or the Constitution. Rodriguez, supra. Antonio School San District v. We in the find nowhere Constitution that a to bail is guaranteed. scrutiny inappli- The strict test is thus present case. cable

If, circumstances, scrutiny under the strict applicable, legislatures pre rule is not state will be sumed have acted within their constitutional power despite practice, that, the fact their laws inequality. statutory result some A discrimina not be tion will set aside if state of facts rea sonably may justify be conceived to it. See Mc Maryland, v. Gowan 366 U. S. 81 S. Ct. 6 L. Ed. 2d 393.

The fact the bail amendment affect particular person charged class of with a crime dif- ferently persons charged than it affects other guarantee other crimes does not of itself violate the equal protection of the laws. proposition “The standards under [the which this Clause] Protection is to be evaluated have many [the set forth times been United States Supreme] Although precise Court. no formula has developed, been court has held that the Four- permits scope Amendment teenth the States a wide enacting of discretion laws which affect some groups differently of citizens than others. The con- safeguard only stitutional is offended if the classifi- grounds wholly cation on rests irrelevant to *12 864 legisla objective. State of the State’s

achievement presumed to have acted within their con are tures practice, despite power that, the fact stitutional statutory inequality. A in some laws result their not be set aside if state of will discrimination justify reasonably may be conceived to it.” facts Riverport Maryland, supra; Kotch v. v. McGowan Comrs., 552, 910, L. 330 U. S. 67 S. Ct. 91 Ed. Pilot Metropolitan Brownell, 580, 1093; Co. v. 294 U. S. 55 Lindsley 538, v. 79 L. Ed. Natural Car S. Ct. 337, Co., 31 S. Ct. 55 L. 220 U. S. Ed. Gas bonic require things Constitution does which The opinion in fact or to be treated in different law are they Tigner though Texas, the same. v. were as Ct. 84 L. Ed. 1124. 60 S. Evils U. S. may pro field be of different dimensions and same requiring Legis portions different remedies or so the may Maryland, supra. think. McGowan v. lature may step time, “[T]he take one at a reform addres phase problem sing itself which seems * * * legislative legisla acute to the mind. The most phase apply select one of one field and ture remedy neglecting

there, the others.” Williamson Optical Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 75 S. Lee Ct. v. 461, finicky conformity L. Ed. 563. ‘‘No or exact required legislation. correlation is abstract legislature responds if a Constitution is satisfied The practical living facts with which it to Through peting deals. precise points many in a

what field of com might pressures legislature suitably most question judicial its is not a drawn lines have re enough satisfy It examination. Constitution drawing principle them the reason has not disregarded.” Maryland, supra. McGowan v. been provisions Constitution, other ‘‘Unlike Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties. Clause, rather, function Protection simply validity to measure ere- classifications *13 hardly by the a law on There is state laws. ated differently people some that does not affect books Equal But the basic concern from others. legislation whose state Clause is with Protection objec- purpose tively discrete and is to create or effect respect to such And with classes. identifiable Equal long legislation, that it has been settled only by that are offended laws Protection Clause is invidiously discriminatory—only by classifications capricious.” wholly arbitrary See con- are that Stewart, curring opinion San Antonio of Mr. Justice Rodriguez, supra. District v. School recognized that distinctions and likewise We have appropriate. may Such distinc be classifications themselves, not, result a denial of do tions protection. appropriate equal examination The operates single out a class of statute state when people special the classifi for treatment is whether relationship legiti rational bears some cation legislation. purposes Botsch v. Reis mate dorff, 2d 121. A class need 193 Neb. 226 N. W. Legislature free to rec be all inclusive. The is not may ognize degrees it confine its re of harm and the need is to those classes of cases where strictions deemed may be, to be clearest. The classification arbitrary nature, extent, in its but it is diffi to some not to re to draw the line. The court does sit cult Bridgeford legislative v. the wisdom of acts. view Co., 195Neb. 238 N. W. 2d 443. The U-Haul require a state must Protection Clause does not problem attacking every aspect between of a choose problem enough attacking all. It or not at is rationally from be based and free the state’s action Reisdorff, Botsch v. su invidious discrimination. Prendergast pra; Nelson, 97, 256 N. W. 2d v. 199Neb. require per Equal protection that all does not require identically, dealt with but it does be sons relevance to the have some that the distinction purpose made. State is for which classification 2d 847. Little, 261 N. W. 199 Neb. v. principles in mind we examine these various

With I, provisions of the Nebraska section of Article if a rationale to determine as amended Constitution Legislature’s action as ratified for existed people. recognized clearly the 1978 bail be

It should prohibit bail case does not amendment charged a sexual offense an individual where against involving penetration force or the will of charged ineligi- for one so to be In order the victim. appear bail, must to the trial court that ei- it ble ther pre- charge proof is evident or the sumption great. In in which the court instance proof that either the is evident or convinced *14 pro- great, presumption not then court is granting A from bail. claim mere hibited filing liberty charge the individual his of a denies by reading supported a of the 1978bail not is only It is clear that bail can be denied amendment. great. presumption proof or the A if the is evident charge in an will not result individual be- frivolous ing long a bail as he demands hear- incarcerated so ing. question of whether therefore left with the

We are people Legislature instance, and the in the first the thereafter, reasonably rationally and con- acted pre- cluding proof that, or the was evident where sumption great had committed that an individual by involving penetration force or offense sexual person against individual, such should the will pending trial. free on bail not be Certainly not in the record before us would the classification was unrea- disclose that manner rape recognized as a Forcible has been sonable. seeking one committed not sexual heinous crime disposed gratification one to violence but rather upon seeking to inflict harm and violence and “Rape: Anger, Power, Groth, al. et victim. See Sexuality,” Psychiatry, p. J., Harper and 134 Am. (1965).

Gebhard, Offenders,” “Sex and Rowe rape easily The victim of a violent forceful Rape emotionally rehabilitated. victims are often long periods Rape time, scarred for if not for life. ugliest very is one of the humiliating of crimes. Its nature is frequently to the victim and it is ac- companied by sodomy, violence, forced and similar additionally acts traumatize and humiliate. necessarily The victimization of the woman does not cease with the termination of the attack itself. Pregnancy, hospitalization, disease, venereal loss of employment, imputations of wantonness and even by family neighbors may ostracism follow. See “Rape Report Victims, Citizens, and its Health Agencies,” Facilities and Criminal Justice National Institute of Justice, Law Enforcement and Criminal Administration, Law Enforcement Assistance U. S. (1975). Department Rape of Justice is a violent normally force, crime because it involves or the force, threat of or intimidation to overcome the will capacity Rape and the of the victim to resist.

very accompanied by physical injury often to the fe- psychological male and can also inflict mental and damage. See, Rape Note, The Victim in a Forcible View, Case: A Feminist’s 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev. Rape Rape 335; Comment, and Laws: Sexism So- ciety Law, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 919. The nature of injury, physically emotionally, both often rape committed on a state. victim is of concern to *15 Rape victims often are unable to return the mainstream life and more often than not re- therapy quire counseling. extensive and The state legitimate does have a concern in this area. Nor say can we either under the record as we have it or by knowledge, Legislature common that wrong believing rapists repeat in that violent their crimes, motivated emotional forces over which they p. Sell, no control. See State v. have ante view, it not without 2d 256. In our is N.

277 W. people Legislature and rational basis for removing per- protect society therefrom want rape proof evi- is accused of violent where sons presumption great. balance, such On or the is dent appear can- decision does not unreasonable. We a say Legislature not that the in the first instance people rational thereafter were without suggesting person in a who has committed basis that psychologically violent, not as motivated crime is a likely to a crime while free on bail. commit similar totally reject rape not

We the notion that is a serious crime. Next to murder there is none which higher; and for al- ranks reasons which we have ready perhaps noted, cases, in some death itself be easier for the victim to handle than con- would may Appellant argues life. that denial of tinued noncapital acceptable murder, in a be rape. Appellant’s but position for

basis is that punishable by are crimes which are there far more yet penalties rape, than but are crimes which severe accept argument. bailable. We do not are penalty is not the issue minimum determination rape, proof where the is that violent evident or the great, presumption is not be should bailable. The repeated possibility and further real acts victims Society pending trial issue. deserves more. penalty statutory noncapital In murder be years of as little as and actual in- sentence carceration 1943. Would something 28-402, § less. R. R. S. anyone suggest the denial of bail merely charged including murder, one is where degree, be a in the second would violation of murder the not, Protection Clause? We think think it cannot be said that there is likewise we no rape the denial of bail a forcible rational basis for presumption proof evident or the case where I, great. that Article section therefore hold We as amended does not vio- Constitution the Nebraska

869 the Constitution Clause of Protection late the United States. 1978 bail Appellant maintains appellant’s further presumption in- of violates amendment protected Clause the Due Process nocence States Consti- to the United Amendment Fourteenth agree. position Pre- do not we With tution. nothing sumption to do with con- has of innocence Presumption prior to trial. or release finement only recognition that, under our a innocence American charged jurisprudence, a one with crimi- proven guilty presumed innocent until offense is nal beyond Fisher, 190 doubt. State v. a reasonable plea of not 2d 568. Where N. W. Neb. interposed by trial, guilty in a criminal defendant presumption of innocence he is clothed with pre- favor. Such as evidence his which stands sumption state, the evidence it remains until the guilty beyond presents, a rea- shows defendant to be proof furnishing such sonable doubt. burden prosecution throughout the trial and is with Hizel, 139 N. W. never shifts. State v. 179 Neb. State, N. 173. Bourne v. 116 Neb. 216 W. 2d It is rely of a defendant constitutional require presumption upon of innocence and to (1) charged; prove act that he committed the state (2) legal culpability, an issue. his if that is also Simants, N. W. 2d State v. 194 Neb. pending is released on bail

Whether defendant presumption relationship of in- trial has no charged murder, he is clothed in. One nocence presumption enjoys offense, nonbailable eligible Likewise, who can- for bail one innocence. enjoys presumption bail, innocence. not make jail loses a confined are unable to see how one We presumption incarcera- of his of innocence because reject appellant’s that the claim tion. We therefore presump- appellant’s amendment violates 1978 bail tion of innocence. amend- the 1978 bail argues further

Appellant to the effective assistance rights his ment violates under freedom to his defense prepare and to counsel Amendments to the United and Fourteenth the Sixth *17 does not The Sixth Amendment Constitution. States the unlim- to the accused guarantee manner defense, the including his own prepare ited right have and as he As we go pleases. to come right in this the most serious opinion, out pointed crimes, murder, is not granted defendant If it is a constitutional as right to bail. indeed would it not all the more be by appellant, suggested of one charged in the case with murder and required execution conviction? subject possible upon follow, yet this would no such Clearly requirement be said of those may The same individuals exists. with lesser crimes who are unable to make charged In the absence of such we must requirements, bail. claim with to the denial appellant’s regard find that effective assistance counsel is without support. maintains Finally, appellant the 1978 bail constitutes cruel and unusual punish- amendment that detention early recognized ment. It was every feature of case of arrest on a usual criminal an person even when innocent charge, wrongfully accused; not imprisonment but it is in a legal sense. States, 228, Wing v. United 163 U. S. Wong 16 S. Ct. Confinement, 41 L. Ed. 140. where the proof is presumption great or the evident individual a sexual offense has committed involving penetra- victim, force or by against tion will is not punishment and unusual because at point cruel system jurisprudence our it is not punish- under punishment ment. It cannot constitute unless and defendant, been having guilty, until found is sen- Royster, tenced. See McGinnis v. 410 U. S. 93 S. Likewise, 35 L. Ed. 2d 282. Ct. re- of movement or liberty punish- straint constitutes See, also, laws, ment. Nebraska sexual sociopath §§ seq.; 83-306, Little, et 29-2901 supra. R. R. S. State v. carefully thoughtfully We have examined the 1978bail amendment to the Nebraska Constitution in light by appellant. of the attack raised We be- lieve that there does in fact exist a reasonable and Legislature rational basis for the action people of the State of Nebraska. While there may disagreement among groups ques- be as to this tion and there be those who would take issue proposed scope effect, with the solution it or the of its be cannot said that no rational basis exists. In light legal said, of what we view have here principles under decided, which this matter must be find that the we ka 1978bail amendment to the Nebras-

Constitution, respects I, Article section is in all proper. valid and It therefore meets all the consti- tutional tests under both the Constitution of the State of Nebraska and the Constitution of the United upon stipulation *18 States. Based entered into in appellant eligible case, this judgment was not for bail and the Judgment

of the trial court was correct. affirmed. Affirmed. concurring J., in result. McCown, majority opinion “right The asserts that a to bail” right” guaranteed not does involve a “fundamental by the Constitution of the United States. It is clear any “right necessity, bail,” of that a denial involves to of liberty a loss of and that the constitutional guaranty person deprived liberty that no be shall of process right.” of without due is a “fundamental .law Supreme States The United Court said: “From * * * Judiciary passage pres- Act of 1789 * * * Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ent eral arrested fed- provided unequivocally person law has that a non-capital for a offense be shall admitted right This traditional to to bail. before con- freedom preparation permits unhampered of a viction de- fense, of punish- to the infliction prevent and serves supplied.) (Emphasis ment conviction.” prior L. U. Ct. Ed. 3. Boyle, 342 S. S. Stack v. to bail is a “fundamental right” The right legislative or enact- constitutional person, it be construed. dealing strictly with must ment I, Constitution, section of the Nebraska Article state, inception always granted has since the all a bail and for offenses with every person right Constitution, The even as specified exceptions. amended, bail in all prohibit granting does cases murder, treason, the specified sexual of- fenses. It does not authorize the denial of bail in all treason, murder, specified and the sexual cases The authorizes offenses. Constitution denial proof where the only in such cases evident or the great. judge having jurisdiction The presumption deny for bail must make that de- grant request termination and he cannot make such a determina- simply charge tion because has been filed. Any such attempted restriction on a constitutional strictly must be construed. necessarily critical stipulated facts were here.

Case Details

Case Name: Parker v. Roth
Court Name: Nebraska Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 3, 1979
Citation: 278 N.W.2d 106
Docket Number: 42561
Court Abbreviation: Neb.
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