128 Iowa 496 | Iowa | 1905
The evidence on behalf of plaintiffs •tended to show the following facts, which we shall consider without discussing the competency of the evidence or the. materiality of the facts which it tended to establish: The testatrix, Sarah Ellen Parker, the mother of Arthur W. Parker and Telia McBride, who are plaintiffs, and of Minnie Lambertz and Mattie Lykins, who are defendants, resided on a farm in Montgomery county, about five miles from the residence of Arthur W. Parker, who is designated in the record as Dr. Parker, and ten miles from the residence of the I^ambertzes. The other daughters were nonresidents of the State. On the 1st of March, 1902, Dr. Parker took his mother from the home of the Lambertzes, where she was temporarily visiting, if we understand the record, to the city of Bed Oak, about twelve miles distant, and brought her back on the evening of the same day. After he had gone his mother said that she “ never tvas so proud of her boy in her
Even if these so-called admissions were competent, the evidence, taken as a whole, is insufficient to make out a case of either fraud or undue influence. Giving to the evidence all the weight which the jury could possibly have accorded to it there is nothing which amounts to more than a suspicion that Mrs. Lambertz may have poisoned the mind of her mother against the brother, and thus .brought about the execution of the new will. There is no evidence that the statement inpugning the disinterested kindness of Dr. Parker, to his mother was fraudulently made, nor is there any evidence that this statement had any effect in determining the disposition which testatrix made of her property. The sister of testatrix who testified to the conversations and relations of the parties at the Lambertz home was evidently quite zealous in her efforts to make such a showing as would justify the setting aside of the will, and yet she does not detail a single circumstance or remark indicating such undue influence as would justify the interference of the court with the exercise of judgment on the part of' testatrix in her will. Testatrix, according to testimony of this witness, regretted the execution of the- second will, and feared that she made a mistake; and [yet she was entirely away from the influence of the Lambertzes, safe in her own home, within a few miles of her son, and'evidently in friendly relations with him, for nearly a year after the execution of the second will, and before she went back to the Lambertzes on the occasion of her last illness, and during this time she made no efforts to revoke the will whiqh, as it is claimed, she so deeply regretted, and which she regarded as having been made under
The burden of proof is on the party seeking to establish the fact of undue influence for the purpose of having a conveyance or a will set aside, and the evidence must show that the influence was such, as to overcome the will of the grantee, and to destroy to some extent, at least, his free agency. . . . And it must appear that the undue in'fluence was exercised at the time that the act referred to was done. . . . The mere fact that the disposition made by a parent of his property among his children appears unreasonable or unjust will not alone establish undue influence, and prior declarations of an intention contrary to the subsequent disposition cannot be shown to establish undue influence in respect to the disposition finally made. . . . Even if it appears that the deed or will is executed at the suggestion or request of the grantee or .devisee, and is prompted by the influence which such person has acquired by business confidence or the showing of an affectionate regard, this will not prove undue influence, unless the freedom of the will has been .in some way impaired or destroyed. Mallow v. Walker, 115 Iowa, 238.
We reach the conclusion that there was no evidence on which' the question of fraud or undue influence in the execution of this will could properly he submitted to the jury, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.