120 Ky. 145 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1905
Opinion by
Affirming.
The father of appellee, John H- Catron, conveyed to him and his brother, Isaac Catron, a tract of land in Knox county. Thereafter a creditor of the father levied an execution upon the land for a debt due him from the father, and the land was sold under the execution. John and Isaac Catron, the two sons, got appellant, William Parker, to bid in the land for them at the execution sale. The amount of the debt was between $500 and $600. John H. Catron afterwards redeemed the land from Parker, and subsequently Isaac Catron died, with the title in this condition. Suit was filed to settle the estate of Isaac Catron, and his half was ordered sold in that suit for the payment of his debts. John Catron procured Parker again to buy in the land for him, which Parker did in his own name, at the price of $25. The equity of redemption was then sold, and Parker bought this for $5. The land was not redeemed, and at the end of the year Parker, over Catron’s objection, caused a deed to be made to himself for the land; that is, Isaac Catron’s half of the tract. John Catron then filed this suit in equity against Parker, setting up the facts, and alleging that Parker held the title in trust for him, and praying that he be required to convey the land to him; he having been all the time in the actual possession of it. The court decreed him the relief sought, and the defendant appeals.
Parker denied that he bought the land for John Catron, and denied that Catron made any arrangement with him by which he was to buy it for hm, but the weight of the evidence sustains the chancellor’s
It is earnestly maintained that the agreement of Catron, being in parol, is within the statute of frauds. In Stark’s Heirs v. Cannaday, 3 Litt., 399, 14 Am. Dec., 76, it was held that where an agent verbally employed to purchase land for his principal does so with the money of the principal, but makes the contract in his own name, a trust for the principal will result by implication, which is not affected by the statute of frauds. The reason given by the court for its conclusion is as follows: “For the statute only forbids the enforcement of a trust or equity created by contract, and not such as results from the nature of the transaction by implication of law.” The doctrine of this case was followed in Lisle v. Lisle’s Administrator, 4 Ky. Law Rep., 990; where the purchase was made at a judicial sale by one for another who paid the consideration. Appellant insists that these cases are not in point, because here appellee did not pay the consideration. Still, he offered to pay it, and was kept from paying
Catron was allowed to testify to certain transactions with his brother Isaac, who was dead, and to prove in his own behalf, statements made by him not in the presence of Parker. This was error. He could, not .testify for himself as to matters occurring with his dead brother, nor could he make evidence for himself. But if we eliminate all this, and regard only the testimony admittedly competent, the clear weight of the evidence sustains the chancellor’s conclusion. So the error in the admission of evidence was harmless.
Judgment affirmed.