MEMORANDUM OPINION
On April 1, 1976, this Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), entered an Order
*791
awarding plaintiff attorneys’ fees of $8,727.50 plus expenses for counsel’s work both at the administrative level and before the Court in this Title VII ease.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed the Supplemental Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees now before the Court. In this motion, plaintiff seeks: (1) enforcement of this Court’s initial award of $8,727.50 attorneys’ fees plus $42.86 expenses; (2) interest on the initial award at 6 per cent per annum, which would equal $526.22; (3) attorneys’ fees for the hours expended (8-V4 hours) after plaintiff filed her initial motion for attorneys’ fees, but before the Court issued its Order and Memorandum Opinion on April 1, 1976; and (4) attorneys’ fees and expenses for counsel’s work on appeal and in preparing the instant motion.
Defendant does not сontest plaintiff’s entitlement to enforcement of this Court’s initial award. Nor does he contest plaintiff’s entitlement to reasonable compensation for the work performed by counsel in the appeal of this case and in the preparation of the instant motion. Defendant does оbject, however, to a number of aspects of plaintiff’s supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the Court will consider these objections seriatim.
I. COMPENSABLE HOURS
Defendant’s first objection is to the number of hours claimed by plaintiff’s counsel both on the appeal and on the preparаtion of the instant motion for fees. Of course, the Court is not bound by the number of hours claimed by counsel.
See
Berger,
Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is “Reasonable’’?,
126 U.Pa.L.Rev. 281, 319 (1977). Rather, the Court itself must “weigh the hours claimed against [its] own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities.”
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
Counsel’s affidavits indicate that attorneys Linda R. Singer, James Altman, and Lydia N. Wegman respectively spent 117-3/4, 35-%, and 64-V4 hours on the appeal of this case. Their affidavits further indicate that attorneys Singer and Wegman respectively spent 13 and 71-V2 hours preparing the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. Upon consideration of counsel’s affidavits, and based on its review of plaintiffappellee’s appellate brief and the instant attorneys’ fees motion, the Court concludes that plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for the full number of hours claimed by counsel.
(a) The Appeal. The Court finds plaintiff-appellee’s appellate brief to bе the product of superlative legal research and writing. In view of the indisputable significance of the legal issues decided by this Court and reviewed by the Court of Appeals, 1 *the Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all but a few of the hours claimed by counsel for work on the appeal.
Consistent with the Court’s initial fees award,
see
(b) The Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. While the Court finds plaintiff’s pending motion for attorneys’ fees also to be of the highest quality, the Court concludes that the hours claimed for work on this motion, unlike the hours claimed for work on the appeal, are not fully warranted. As noted above, attorneys Singer and Wegman respеctively expended 13 and 71-V2 hours preparing the instant motion for fees. A number of factors lead this Court to conclude that the claimed number of hours should be discounted.
First, this is the second motion for attorneys’ fees in this case, and, as evidenced by a comparison of plaintiff’s first motion (filed November 25, 1975) with the instant motion, much of the basic research with respect to the standards for attorneys’ fees awards was completed for the original motion and compensated for in this Court’s initial fees award of $8,727.50. Second, though Attorney Wegman spent I8-V2 hours researching additional points and authorities for the instant motion, this substantial сommitment of time resulted in the inclusion of only 12 cases in this motion that were not in the initial motion, and a number of these cases are quite well-known. Third, Attorney Wegman spent 53 hours and Attorney Singer 13 hours in writing the 16-page supplemental fees motion. Nothing in this motion, however, is so novel or complex as to warrant this number of hours of work. Indeed, the supplemental fees motion now before the Court is, by any standard, quite routine. Finally, Attorney Singer’s experience and expertise in the Title VII area and her work on attorneys’ fees issues in other cases should have resulted in a minimization of the number of hours necessary to prepare the supplemental fees motion. In view of all of the above factors, the Court concludes that the number of hours claimed by plaintiff’s counsel for work on the supplemental attorneys’ fees motion now before the Court is appropriately discounted by 50 per cent. The Court will therefore require defendant to compensate plaintiff for 6-V2 hours of Attorney Singer’s time and 26-V2 hours of Attorney Wegman’s time for their work on the supplemental fees motion, which the Court finds to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this case.
II. PRE-APRIL 1976 HOURS
Defendant’s second objection to plaintiff’s supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees is that plaintiff is not entitled to recover on this motion fees for hours expended prior to this Court’s Memorandum Opinion of April 1, 1976, because only fees incurred on or after appeal are properly compensated for at this time. Counsel’s affidavits indicate that attorneys Singer and Altman respectively worked 7-% hours and V2 hour on this case before this Court between the time plaintiff’s initial attorneys’ fees motion was filed and the time this Court issued its Order and Memorandum Opinion on April 1,1976. Plaintiff has never been compensated for these hours, and the Court finds that counsel’s decision not to file any supplemental fees motions until the case was completed in its entirety was perfectly reasonable. There being no just reason for denying plaintiff compensation for these hours, the Court will require defendant to compensate plaintiff for the 7-% and V2 hours worked respectively by attorneys Singer and Altman between December 1, 1975, and April 1, 1976. The *793 Court will, however, value these hours at the previously-awarded rate: $60/hour for Attorney Singer, $35/hour for Attorney Altman, plus 25 per cent incentive fee.
III. HOURLY RATE
Defendant’s third objection to plaintiff’s supplemental attоrneys’ fees motion is the hourly rate sought by counsel. Plaintiff seeks compensation for her counsel’s work at the rate of $80/hour for Attorney Singer, $60/hour for Attorney Altman, and $55/hour for Attorney Wegman. In its initial attorneys’ fees award to plaintiff, this Court compensated plaintiff for Attorney Singer’s time at $60/hour and for two of Ms. Singer’s associates at $35/hour and $30/hour respectively.
(a) Attorney Singer. The Court finds that the high quality of Ms. Singer’s work has remained constant throughout the duration of this litigation. Thе nature of the work she performed during the appeal of this case does not, however, differ measurably from the work she performed at the administrative level and before this Court in 1975. Accordingly, the Court does not believe that the dramatic increase sought by plaintiff for Ms. Singer’s work is warranted. The Court concludes that an increase in the compensation for Ms. Singer’s work to $65/hour is warranted because of her increased experience and expertise, and the Court further concludes that it is fair and reasonable to attribute a higher value to Ms. Singer’s more recent work as compared with her 1975 work because of inflation. Multiplying the $65/hour rate by the current Gross National Product deflator factor for 1975 — 1.110—results in a current value of $72/hour, which the Court finds to be fair and reasonable compensation for Ms. Singer’s work in the present case.
(b) Attorney Altman. Based on Mr. Altman’s legal education and priоr experience in attorneys’ fees issues in civil rights litigation, the excellence of the papers filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals, and in view of the prevailing rates in this city for attorneys of Mr. Altman’s background and experience, the Court concludes that $45/hour is fair and reasonable cоmpensation for the work performed by him in this litigation.
(c) Attorney Wegman. Based on Ms. Wegman’s legal education, the excellence of the papers filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals, and in view of the prevailing rates in this city for attorneys of Ms. Wegman’s background and experience, the Court concludes that $35/hour is fair and reasonable compensation for the work performed by her in this litigation.
IV. INCENTIVE FEE
In its initial award of attorneys’ fees in this case, the Court, after considering four factors set forth by the Court of Appeals in
Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel,
While, as previously emphasized, the quality of counsel’s work has remained constant throughout this litigation, the attorneys’ fees issue presented to the Court оf Appeals was not unusually complex. Since plaintiff’s discrimination complaint was settled, the only risk of nonrecovery on the appeal of this case was plaintiff’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees, and, despite the novelty of this issue, plaintiff’s position had substantial support both in legal prеcedent and in policy. Thus, “the contingent nature of ultimate success in this litigation,”
Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company,
V. EXPENSES
Plaintiff seeks to recover $380.89 in expenses incurred for photocopying, transportation, postage and telephone costs, law clerk research, and the like. Defendant opposes the award of such compensation on the ground that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides only for the award of attorneys’ fees and costs which on appeal can be awarded only as provided by Fed.R.App.P. 39. Defendant does not, however, oppose the award of compensation for the reasonable amount of law clerk research time at $3.00 per hour.
In its initial award of attorneys’ fees, the Court compensated рlaintiff for the expenses incurred by counsel for photocopying, transportation, and the like. There appears to the Court to be no sound reason in law or in policy why attorneys’ fees should be narrowly interpreted to exclude counsel’s reasonable out-of-pocket еxpenses, and the majority of courts have approved the award of such out-of-pocket expenses.
See, e. g., Davis v. County of Los Angeles,
8 E.P.D. ¶ 9444 (C.D.Cal.1974),
aff’d,
12 E.P.D. ¶ 11,219 (9th Cir. 1976);
Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R. R. Co.,
3 E.P.D. ¶ 8274 (E.D.Tex.1971),
aff’d,
VI. INTEREST ON INITIAL ATTORNEYS’ FEES AWARD
In addition to seeking the enforcement of the Court’s Order of April 1, 1976, requiring defendant to compensate plaintiff for $8,770.36 in attorneys’ fees, plaintiff now seeks an award of interest at 6 per cent per annum on the previously-awarded sum. Plaintiff cites no provision in Title VII which would authorize the assessment of interest against the United States on the April 1, 1976, award of attorneys’ fees. Nor does she cite any authority that would except this case from the well-established rule that interest cannot be assessed against the United States “in the absence of an express provision to the contrary in the relevant statute or contract.”
Richerson
v.
Jones,
VII. METHOD OF PAYMENT
Defendant’s final objection to plaintiff’s supplemеntal motion for attorneys’ fees is the proposed method of payment. Defendant opposes plaintiff’s suggestion that payment of the attorneys’ fees award in the amount determined by the Court should be made directly to plaintiff’s counsel. Notwithstanding defendant’s attempt to infer from the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) some limitation on the permissible method of attorneys’ fees payment, it is clear that the method of payment proposed by plaintiff is reasonable, consistent with the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and fully within this Court’s authority. In its initial award of attorneys’ fees, this Court ordered defendant to make payment directly to plaintiff’s counsel,
VIII. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court will award plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,427.45, computed as follows:
*795 APPEAL
Linda R. Singer, Esquire 117% hours x $72/hour $ 8,478.00
James Altman, Esquire 34% hours X $45/hour 1,563.75
Lydia N. Wegman, Esquire 52 hours X $35/hour 1,820.00
Subtotal 11,861.75
Incentive Pee (10%) 1.186.18
Subtotal $ 13,047.93
SUPPLEMENTAL FEES MOTION
Linda R. Singer, Esquire &Á hours x $72/hour 468.00
Lydia N. Wegman, Esquire 2616 hours X $35/hour 927.50
Subtotal $ 1,395.50
PRE-APRIL 1.1976 WORK
Linda R. Singer, Esquire 7% hours X $60/hour 465.00
James Altman, Esquire Vi hour X $35/hour 17.50
Subtotal 482.50
Incentive Fee (25%) 120.63
• Subtotal $ 603.13
EXPENSES 380.89
TOTAL $ 15,427.45
The Court will thus order defendant to pay to counsel for plaintiff thе sum of $24,197.81, representing the sum of this Court’s initial award of attorneys’ fees ($8,770.36) and the present fees award.
An Order in accordance with the foregoing will be issued of even date herewith.
Notes
. The Court notes that plaintiff’s successful defense on appeal of this Court’s initial award of attorneys’ fees has resulted in the Government’s acquiescence in the result reached therein and the withdrawal of the Government’s contrary argument in Fischer v. Adams, No. 77-1264, now pending before the First Circuit, and Abrams v. Cleland, No. 77-3029, now pending before the Sixth Circuit.