3 Blackf. 411 | Ind. | 1834
Parker brought an action of assumpsit against Bussell before a justice of the peace, on a written statement of his cause of action by him filed before the justice, in substance as follows: — 1. That Bussell, for and in consideration of a horse, promised him, Parker, to execute and deliver to him a good and sufficient warranty deed for a certain half quarter section of land, which is described, and that he the said Bussell has wholly failed so to do; and further, that he the said Bussell had no
The defendant appeared in his own proper person before the justice of the peace, and pleaded in abatement “that the justice of the peace in this behalf ought not to have or take further jurisdiction of the action aforesaid, because he says that the consideration of the horse mentioned in the plaintiff’s declaration, and for the price of which this suit was commenced, was a deed
To reverse that opinion of the Circuit Court the plaintiff has prosecuted this writ of error.
There was something said in the argument of this case, about the plaintiff’s statement of his cause of action being defective. In answer to that, it is sufficient to say that no formal pleadings are required before a justice of the peace.. If the statement oí the plaintiff’s cause of action, or the defendant’s defence, contain the substance of the facts and matters relied on in such form as to be fairly understood, it is sufficient. In this case that is done.
The question to be decided- by this Court is, whether the Circuit Court erred in ousting the justice of the peace of his jurisdiction of the case?
The 18th section of the act regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, Rev. Code, 1831, p. 297, expressly declares, that justices of the peace shall have no jurisdiction “in any case where the title to lands or tenements shall come in question.” This language seems to be clear and conclusive, and appears to be broad enough to extend to every case that can arise. The plaintiff in error, however, insists that it
Massachusetts, JYezo-Yor/c, JYezo-Jersey, and perhaps all the states in the Union, have the same prohibition on the jurisdiction of justices of the peace; and their adjudications are good landmarks for us. The case of Wood v. Prescott, 2 Mass. 174, was an action of trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s close, and doing injury to the fencing, &c. commenced before a justice of the peace. The defendant pleaded in bar, that at the time when, &c. he was seized and possessed of á certain close next adjoining the plaintiff’s, &c.; and that when, &c. he entered into his own close, &c. as was lawful for him to do, <fcc. The justice supposed the title of land would come in question, and refused to proceed any further; and the case finally reached the Supreme Court; and that Court said that the defendant had not put the title of land in question, but had pleaded a distinct fact, viz. that he did not enter the plaintiff’s close, but that he entered a close of his own adjoining the place in question, &c. The case of Bispham v. Inskeep, 1 Coxe, 231, was an action of trespass done to land, commenced before a justice of the peace, and the defendant pleaded liberum tenementum. That plea the Court said put an end to the jurisdiction of the justice. The case of Spear v. Bicknell, 5 Mass. Rep. 125, was an action of trespass upon land, commenced before a justice of the peace. The defendant pleaded in bar that the place in question was a common highway, &c. The justice conceived
The counsel for the plaintiff in error .insists that the plea of the defendant is insufficient; that it is not possible for the statute to be so construed, as to authorise defendants in all cases before justices of the peace, to oust the. justice of his jurisdiction, by .simply saying that the title of lands will come in question. ' As to the plea of the defendant in this case, if it stood alone without the agreement entered into, it would be wholly deficient. In no case can the defendant oust the justice of his jurisdiction by simply saying that the title of lands will come in question. A plea to the jurisdiction of the Court is either to the Court itself, to the person of either the plaintiff or the defendant, to the declaration, to the'.writ, or to the action itself in bar thereof, and cannot in any case be bottomed on the defence which the defendant may say that he intends to make. Whether the title to lands will come in question, is a point which the Court must determine from the issue which may be absolutely made between the parties, or from the facts which may be developed by the evidence, and not from the.defendant’s simply saying so. If the action is an action of disseisijn, ejectment, writ of .right, &c. the nature of the action is-sufficient to show, the Court that the title-of land will come in question, but if the action only sounds in damages; it does -not necessarily follow that the title to the place in question will be put in issue. .
The construction and-meaningof the statute are plain. Justices of the peace are wisely' prohibited from investigating the titles to real estate; and in all suits instituted before them, their jurisdiction ceases the instant it is discovered that the .title to “lands and tenements” must come in question. That fact may be disclosed by the statement of the cause of action, or it may be disclosed by the facts which the defendant,.by his plea in bar to the action, may put in issue, or it may not be disclosed by the pleadings, but may afterwards be disclosed on the trial Of the case by the evidence introduced; .and as to the effect it
In the present controversy there can be no difficulty. The parties have settled the question themselves.; they have expressly admitted by their voluntary agreement, that the. title to land will ‘come in. question, and they have made that agreement a part of the record; which brings the case expressly within the letter and meaning of the statutory prohibition, and puts an end to the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs:
Vide Smith v. Harris, the next case.