Parker v. AngeloneParker v. Angelone
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Doumar
FINAL ORDER
DOUMAR, District Judge.
This matter was initiated by petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tommy E. Miller pursuant to the provisions of
The Court, having examined the objections filed by the petitioner to the United States Magistrate Judge’s Report and having reviewed the Report de novo, hereby adopts and approves the findings and recommendations set forth in the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge filed February 25, 1997. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on the grounds stated by the Magistrate Judge, and therefore the Court hereby adopts Magistrate Judge Miller’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety as the Court’s own opinion.
To make the most salient point in the Report and Recommendation abundantly clear, that point is restated here: a decision by a state court summarily dismissing a petitioner’s claim as “frivolous” is an adjudication on the merits within the meaning of
It is, therefore, ORDERED that the petition be DENIED and DISMISSED and that judgment be entered in favor of the respondent.
Petitioner has also filed a Motion for Discovery. Petitioner can only conduct discovery in a habeas action with leave of court.
See
Rule 6 of Rules Governing
Petitioner may appeal from the judgment entered pursuant to this Final Order by filing a
written
notice of appeal with the Clerk of this Court, United States Courthouse, 600 Granby Street, Norfolk, Virginia 23510, within 30 days from the date of entry of such judgment. For the reasons stated in the Magistrate Judge’s Report, the Court, pursuant to
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to petitioner and counsel for respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MILLER, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter was initiated by petition for writ of habeas corpus under
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Background
Petitioner Kenneth L. Parker was initially convicted of two counts of burglary on January 13,1988 in Newport News Circuit Court, and was given a ten (10) year sentence. Petitioner was released on mandatory parole on July 21,1995.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habe-as corpus with the Supreme Court of Virginia on May 20,1996. The petition was dismissed as frivolous on July 1,1996.
Petitioner, presently in the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections at the Indian Creek Correctional Center in Chesapeake, Virginia, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
B. Grounds Alleged
The petitioner now asserts in this Court that the following entitle him to relief under
(a) denial of due process and equal protection of the law by the Virginia Parole Board’s revocation of petitioner’s good time credit;
(b) denial of due process when the Department of Corrections took away petitioner’s good time credits at the direction of the Virginia Parole Board;
(c) violation of the ex-post facto clause of the Constitution as a result of the change in application of state law on parole violations.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As petitioner filed his federal habeas petition after the effective date, the standard of review in this case is governed by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which was signed into law on April 24, 1996. Title I of the AEDPA provides for habeas corpus reform in both capital and non-capital cases. Section 104 of the AED-PA-amends
The new
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
In general,
When the issue tendered to the federal court in a habeas proceeding is the application of a settled principle to the facts of the
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ease, under the new amendments, the petitioner must show that the state court’s determination was not merely incorrect, but “unreasonable.”
it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect. In other words, we can grant habeas relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.
Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 768 (5th Cir.1996).
In this case, petitioner’s state habeas petition was denied and dismissed as frivolous. This Court must determine whether the Virginia Supreme Court’s dismissal of a case as frivolous qualifies as an adjudication on the merits, as contemplated by
It can be argued that without an explanatory decision from the state supreme court, a reviewing federal court cannot determine what factors the state court relied upon in rendering its decision, and that a summary denial of relief may not suffice under the new statute. See Liebman, James S., “The New Habeas: The Standard for Adjudicating Legal Questions,”
New Developments in the Federal Law of Habeas Corpus,
Federal Judicial Center, Sept. 12, 1996, p. 221-23. However, the starting point in statutory interpretation is “the language [of the statute] itself.”
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1935, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). Courts must “assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982). With the language of
Frivolous may be defined as meaning “of little weight or importance; having no basis in law or fact.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
913 (3d ed.1986). To be “frivolous” is to be “without merit”, and the two phrases are often used interchangeably.
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1,
486 U.S. 429, 438, n. 10, 454, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, n. 10, 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988);
Barefoot v. W.J. Estelle, Director, Texas Dept. of Corrections,
463 U.S. 880, 894, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3395, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). A claim determined to be frivolous is not only without merit, but it utterly lacks merit to the extent that it may potentially be trivial or insignificant. To determine if a claim is frivolous, it is necessary for a court to closely examine the alleged merits of the claim. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia had to reach the merits of the petition to deter
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mine whether it was frivolous. Therefore a dismissal of a state habeas petition as frivolous qualifies as an adjudication on the merits under
The Supreme Court of Virginia, by unpublished opinion dated July 1, 1996, dismissed petitioner’s state habeas petition as frivolous. This Court construes that ruling as one on the merits, and accordingly recommends the petition be DENIED pursuant to
Petitioner has demanded an eviden-tiary hearing on his claims. However, no evidentiary hearing is required where purely legal issues are presented. See, e.g., Bradley v. Cowan, 500 F.2d 380, 381 (6th Cir.1974). The facts needed to decide the legal issues here are not in dispute, and can be gleaned from the records before this Court. See, e.g., Foster v. Barbour, 613 F.2d 59, 60-61 (4th Cir.1980). Therefore, this Court DENIES petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, as well as the Petitioner’s motion for discovery.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED.
Pursuant to
Further, petitioner’s request for an eviden-tiary hearing is hereby DENIED.
In addition, it is recommended that the Court decline to issue any certificate of ap-pealability as required by
IV. REVIEW PROCEDURE
By copy of this Report and Recommendation, the parties are notified that pursuant to
1. Any party may serve upon the other party and file with the Clerk written objections to the foregoing findings and recommendations within ten (10) days from the date of mailing of this report to the objecting party,
see
2. A district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of this report or specified findings or recommendations to which objection is made.
The parties are further notified that failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations set forth above will result in waiver of right to appeal from a judgment of this court based on such findings and recommendations. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Carr v. Hutto, 737 F.2d 433 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1019, 106 S.Ct. 567, 88 L.Ed.2d 552 (1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, *324 467 U.S. 1208, 104 S.Ct. 2895, 81 L.Ed.2d 352 (1984).
Norfolk, Virginia
February 25,1997