1 Lans. 263 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1869
Present — Miller, Ingalls and Hogeboom, JJ.
By the Court
The only question presented in this case arises as to the competency of Corbin to testify on the trial of the prisoners.
The act concerning “ crimes and their punishment ” (2 R. S., 701, § 23), provides that, “No person sentenced upon a conviction for felony shall be competent to testify in any cause, matter or proceeding, civil or criminal, unless he be pardoned by the governor,” &c. A subsequent provision (§ 30) declares what is meant by the term felony in the following language: “ The term ‘ felony ’ when used in this act,
or in any other statute, shall be construed to mean an offense for which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law to be punished by death or by imprisonment in a State prison.” From these provisions it is manifest that in order to disqualify Corbin as a witness, he must have been convicted of a crime for which he was liable to imprisonment in the State prison. He had been convicted for the offense of burglary in the third degree, and the punishment provided for this offense is imprisonment in a State prison; but being under the age of sixteen years, he was sentenced and removed to the house of refuge, established for the reformation of juvenile delinquents in the city of New York, where he was confined until discharged. The sentence being thus changed from imprisonment in the State prison to a different form of punishment, it remains to be considered whether this change in any way affects the competency of the witness. This involves a consideration of the various statutes under which the modified form of punishment was imposed.
In 1824, the legislature of this State passed- “ An act to incorporate the Society for the-Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents in the City of New York,” (S. I. of 1824, chap. 126; 5 Edmond’s ed. of Statutes, 206.) In 1826, this act was
It is essential, however, to examine some other statutes in in tills connection. In 1846, the legislature passed an act for the establishment of a house of refuge for juvenile delinquents in western Hew York. (Chap. 143 of S. L. of 1846.) The sixteenth section of this act provided that the courts in particular counties, to be designated by the governor, should sentence to said house of refuge, every male under the age of eighteen, and every female under the age of seventeen, “who should be convicted of any felony,” and left it discretionary to send offenders, who should be convicted of petit larceny or vagrancy.
Chap. 24, of the Laws of 1850, makes it the duty of the courts, in certain judicial districts, to order all juvenile delin
In the same year, by chap. 304, the sixteenth section of the act of 1846 was amended, and' again, by chap. 387, of the Laws of 1852. It would thus appear, from these recognitions of the legislature of the sixteenth section of the act of 1846, that they understood that it still remained in force, and that they did not intend to repeal it. The construction thus placed upon it, tends strongly to show that the “juvenile delinquents” embraced in the act of 1850 were not intended for any juveniles convicted of a felony, who were already provided for; but related to offenders of a less grade. The term “ delinquent,” in its ordinary signification, implies one who has been guilty of some slight offence, of a very light grade, and not a felon or criminal; and it may well be claimed, in view of the legislative construction referred to, that only such were embraced in the act. There are also strong reasons for such a position, because there is no repealing clause of the sixteenth section of the act of 1846, before referred to. Nor is the provision of the Revised Statutes (5 Edmonds, Stat., p 574, § 17) expressly amended, as would no doubt have been done, if it was intended to alter it. The rule is well 1 settled that a repeal by implication is not favored, and courts are bound to uphold the prior law if the two acts may well subsist together. The earliest act remains in force unless the two are manifestly inconsistent with and repugnant to each other, or unless, in the latest act, some express notice is
This view. of the subject appears to be consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the various acts of the legislature referred to. The statute defining the word felony was designed to give a definition of the offense which embraced all cases wherein the offender was liable to imprisonment in the State prison, and includes the crime of burglary in the third degree for which Corbin had been convicted.
The subsequent provision, in the humanity which the law extends to persons of immature years, was intended after the conviction had been had, and the liability incurred of imprisonment in the State prison, upon its being ascertained upon
It is evident that the court erred in admitting the witness to be sworn and to testify, and for this error the conviction must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.