[¶ 1] Steve Parizek appealed from an order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. Parizek was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of methamphetamine. Parizek appealed those criminal judgments to this Court challenging an order denying suppression of evidence and we affirmed in
State v. Parizek,
I
[¶ 2] On September 4, 2002, officers from the Devils Lake Police Department were dispatched to a mobile home park to check on a disturbance at Ryan Miller’s home. Miller had informed police someone was repeatedly knocking on his door. When the officers arrived at the mobile home park just after midnight, they approached with their vehicle lights turned off. The officers parked their vehicle some distance from Miller’s home. There was a blue van in Miller’s driveway. One person was inside the van and two people were standing by the mobile home door talking to Miller. One officer approached the people standing by the door and the other officer remained near the van. Pari-zek was one of the individuals standing by the door. Officers grew suspicious of Pari-zek when he became “jumpy” and continuously reached into his pockets. The officers were able to see directly into the back
II
[¶ 3] In his application for post-conviction relief, Parizek alleged numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and claims of prosecutorial misconduct. No supporting documentation was 'filed with Parizek’s application. An attorney, subsequently appointed for Parizek, filed a supplement to Parizek’s application for post-conviction relief. The State opposed the application for post-conviction relief. The district court found Parizek’s seventeen statements to be nothing more than conclusory comments that were not supported. The district court found Parizek did not set forth factual specifics and did not provide details about the allegations. The district court found Parizek failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact which would justify an evidentiary hearing and summarily dismissed Parizek’s application for post-conviction relief.
III
[¶ 4] This Court reviews an appeal from a summary denial of post-conviction relief as it reviews an appeal from a summary judgment.
Berlin v. State,
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition if the application, pleadings, any previous proceeding, discovery, or other matters of record show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[¶ 5] “The statute does not expressly allow the court to dismiss on its own motion an application for post-conviction relief.”
Berlin v. State,
[¶ 6] “A trial court may summarily dismiss an application for post-conviction relief if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Vandeberg v. State,
[¶ 7] “A movant may discharge his burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact by pointing out to the trial court there is an absence of evidence to support a petitioner’s ease.” Id. at ¶ 6. “Once the movant shows the trial court there is no record evidence to support the petitioner’s claim and, therefore, there is nothing the State can point to in support of its assertion no such evidence exists, ‘the movant has put the petitioner on his proof and a minimal burden has shifted to the petitioner to provide some competent evidence to support his claim.’ ” Id. “The State is permitted to shift the burden in this manner only in those cases in which it would otherwise be required to prove the complete absence of any evidence supporting the nonmovant’s claims and allegations in order to meet its initial burden of showing there are no contested issues of material fact.” Id. “Otherwise, the moving party’s initial burden must still be met before the burden can be shifted to the nonmov-ant to produce evidence prior to the hearing to support his claim.” Id.
[¶ 8] Here, the State did not file a motion for summary dismissal of Parizek’s application for post-conviction relief but only filed an opposition to the application for post-conviction relief which appears to be in the nature of an answer to the application. The State did not move for nor did it ask for summary dismissal of Parizek’s application. Rather, the district court summarily dismissed Parizek’s application on its own accord. We review its decision in that light.
[¶ 9] In its opposition to the application, the State argued Parizek’s application was not supported by proper documentation and Parizek’s two citations to the trial transcript were not relevant to the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The State did not contend it was impossible for Parizek to prove a claim for which relief can be granted or that there was an absence of evidence to support Parizek’s claims. As in
Vandeberg,
“the State did not argue, as it did in
Weaver [v. State,
[¶ 11] In Berlin, we concluded the petitioner’s claims presented a problem for summary dismissal because the district court did not conclude they were facially invalid, but, rather, the district court merely concluded the “ ‘[petitioner provides no evidence to support his claims.’ ” Id. at ¶ 9. We held Berlin should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing because “a petitioner need not provide evidence with an application.” Id. Here, the district court’s order denying Parizek’s application for post-conviction relief concludes Parizek did “not set forth factual specifics nor provide detail about his accusations and conclusions.” The district court also concluded Parizek “offered nothing but hollow conclusions about the prosecutor” and the record did “not establish any prosecutorial misconduct.”
[¶ 12] The district court did not conclude Parizek’s claims were facially invalid but reviewed the record to determine whether there was evidence supporting Parizek’s claims without giving Parizek an opportunity to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact. This is not a case where the court found the allegations facially invalid, thus justifying summary dismissal similar to a judgment on the pleadings. It was error to summarily dismiss Parizek’s claims without an evidentia-ry hearing and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.