39 App. D.C. 184 | D.C. Cir. | 1912
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This is not the case of a creditors’ bill to enforce a lien created by a decree of court as was Price v. Forest, 173 U. S. 410, 43 L. ed. 749, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434. It is an original suit on written contracts with attorneys to prosecute a certain claim against the United States to final determination, for stipulated fees equal to 20 per cent of the amount that might be collected, and with an express lien to secure the payment of the same. Setting out the contracts, the bill alleges the prosecution of the claim before Congress to the passage of a relieving act; the diligent, but unsuccessful attempt to obtain payment under said act from the Secretary of the Treasury; and a readiness and willingness to continue the performance of the contract until prevented by the wrongful acts of the said claimant, and of his executrix, who succeeded to the legal control of the claim after the death of the claimant, December 26, 1904. Upon the allegations of the insolvency of the executrix, and her intention to remove the funds from the jurisdiction of the court, an injunction to prevent her receiving the fund was obtained. It cannot be controverted that contracts like those set out in the bill—in so far at all events as they attempt to assign, or create a lien upon, a claim against the United States,—are prohibited by sec. 3477, Rev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2320, and thereby made absolutely void. Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12-21; 50 L. ed. 348—353, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216; National Bank v. Downie, 218 U. S. 345, 54 L. ed. 1065, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89, 20 Ann. Cas. 1116. It was said, however, in Nutt v. Knut, supra, that the provision of a contract evidencing an agreement to pay the attorney a fixed portion of the sum that might be recovered through his services might stand alone notwithstanding the illegality of the provision for the lien; such provision giving the attorney no interest in the claim itself and creating
It is contended that the allegations of the bill are sufficient to show that complainants had an attorneys’ lien upon the fund finally adjudged to the claimants’ executrix, which could be enforced by the equity court. The bill alleges that complainants rendered the services that procured the act of Congress, and also made diligent efforts to secure payment under that act by the Secretary to the time of his final refusal; that they were ready and willing to continue the prosecution of the claim to final determination, and could have done so had not the claimant during the remainder of his life, and 'his executrix thereafter, refused to continue their services. Assuming for the present that these facts were proved as alleged, the fact remains that after dispensing with their services, the executrix employed other attorneys, who instituted and prosecuted the mandamus proceeding which resulted in the final judgment, under a special contract for a liberal fee. The executrix had the right, nevertheless, to dispense with complainants services at any stage of the proceeding and retain other counsel (Re Paschal [Texas v. White] 10 Wall. 483, 19 L. ed. 992); though she could not thereby defeat their right to compensation for the
The allegation of the insolvency of the executrix, and her intention to remove the fund from the jurisdiction upon its receipt, furnish no foundation for a creditors’ bill to enforce a simple contract. They were pertinent allegations in the bill for the purpose of obtaining the injunction prayed. It was not a creditors’ bill founded on a simple contract, invoking the interposition of equity under extraordinary conditions to prevent certain and irreparable injury, so as to bring it within some of the exceptional cases in which a creditors’ bill has been entertained
Ignoring the claim of the void contract lien, there was nothing on the face of the bill to confer jurisdiction in equity. Hence the court might, in the exercise of its discretion and of its own motion, have dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction, and should have sustained an objection thereto if presented. Were there nothing else in the case, this court would in the exercise of its discretion under such conditions direct the dismissal of the bill.
It remains, therefore, to consider the effect claimed for the interlocutory decree entered by consent of the parties. The decree was entered before the answer was filed, and no objection was raised therein to the jurisdiction. There is no question but that one consenting to a final judgment or decree in a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter will not be heard to complain of error therein on appeal or writ of error. United States v. Babbitt, 104 U. S. 767, 26 L. ed. 921; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. United States, 113 U. S. 261-266, 28 L. ed. 971-973, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460; Ganss v. Goldenberg, post, 606. An interlocutory decree hy consent may also be binding, and work an estoppel in cases where it is expressly made for the particular purpose and to procure some benefit. Re Metropoli
The restraining order in this case stopped the payment of the entire fund of $181,358.95 in the hands of the Treasurer of the United States. It may be readily inferred that the ¡.consent to the decree was given to retain a sum sufficient to safely cover the full claim of complainants, namely $41,000, in order that the remainder of the fund might be withdrawn at once from the Treasury. It is true that the defendant profited by the decree modifying the restraining order and releasing the remainder. But that would seem no more than she was entitled to demand of the court in any event; for even if the complainants’ lien had been valid and enforceable, they could not insist upon retaining more, subject to the process of the court, than enough to satisfy their lien and the costs of suit. The suit was upon the contract, as we have seen, and to enforce the lien created thereby. It was upon that contract, and lien that the equity jurisdiction was invoked and assumed; and it was upon the assumption of that jurisdiction that the interlocutory decree was founded.
The answer of the defendant, filed after the entry of the decree, shows that she regarded the suit as based solely upon the entire contract. She attacked the contract as illegal and void, and submitted that issue for determination. She also sought to avoid it by alleging the failure of complainants to prosecute the claim to final determination; and also charged its voluntary abandonment. She presented no objection to the jurisdiction, and none was necessary under the allegations of the bill, as the case presented turned upon the validity of the contract and would be disposed of by its determination. Certain recitals of the decree, supplemented by the answer, would
Under the views expressed, this decree and pleading fur
The original contract was with Jonas H. McGowan, who was thereby given control of the prosecution of the claim. An interest of one third in the fee contracted for was subsequently assigned by McGowan to complainant Brookshire. Later, another contract was entered into between Parish and Brookshire, whereby the latter was to receive an additional fee of 5 per cent. It seems to be a settled rule of law that an attorney who is retained generally to conduct a cause is under obligation to conduct the proceeding to its termination. Nicholls v. Wilson, 11 Mees. & W. 106, 2 Dowl. N. S. 1031, 12 L. J. Exch. N. S. 266; Tenney v. Berger, 93 N. Y. 524-529, 45 Am. Rep. 263. This, however, McGowan expressly promised in the concluding paragraph of his contract. The evidence shows that McGowan and attorneys acting under and in co-operation with him labored long and earnestly in procuring an acknowledgment by Congress of this ancient claim, during which period there was complete harmony with the claimant. McGowan himself drafted the bill which became a law February 17, 1903. Just as the troubles seemed to have ended, they began afresh. The act was an ambiguous one, and the Secretary of the Treasury hold that it vested him with discretion to examine and pass upon the right of the claimant to an assessment of damages. Although complainants diligently prosecuted the demand before the Treasury Department, the Secretary rejected it on May 31, 1904. It appears that shortly after the Secretary’s decision a conference was had—Parish being present—to consider what
Committee On Claims,
House of Representatives, H. S.
Washington, D. C. Sept. 15, ’04.
Hon. J. H. McGowan,
My Dear Sir and Eriend:—
Tour letter of the 25th ult. received in due time and contents-
Some time next Congress I propose to organize a practicable method and resurrect the claim from its unfortunate condition, and I must have unrestricted and unrestrained control. If an attorney is required after I get the matter advanced in Congress there will be no trouble to find one. Furthermore I said that I would reimburse those who had advanced money to promote the case thus far, and will do very much better for you than you expressed yourself to Mr. Brookshire, to wit, “that you would be glad and well satisfied to get the money advanced me” returned. My past record as to compensation—who had rendered me service you have not surely forgotten which was generous and as I remember very satisfactory to all concerned as living witnesses will testify. I am in the best of health and my time profitably employed in assisting an Illinois firm who is doing business here and in New York.
Yours hastily,
J. W. Parish, 211 A. Str., S. E.
This letter either recited the truth as to McGowan’s surrender of the case before going to Ontario, or a deliberate falsehood. A slight circumstance supporting its truth is the letter asking the return of the power of attorney and McGowan’s consent thereto. Another circumstance is found in the testimony of McKee, an impartial witness, who had been journal clerk of the House of Representatives, and in the year 1904 had resigned to practice law. About a week before his death Parish asked witness to take up his claim, and several conversations were had. Witness called upon McGowan and asked him who
Sunday, October 9, 1904.
Dear Mr. Parish:—
I called at your house to-day but failed to find you. I am extremely anxious to see you, as I have some very important news concerning your case, and therefore ask that you call at my office to-morrow morning without fail. However, if for any reason you do not care to call at my office, telephone me and I will meet you at any place you suggest.
Tours truly,
E. P. Morey.
The letter to McGowan, above recited, remained unanswered. If its recitals were true, no reply was necessary; if untrue it should have been replied to promptly. The parties apparently met no more. On November 19, 1904, the following letter was mailed to Parish and received by him:
November 19, 1904.
Mr. J. W. Parish,
217 A. Str. S. E. City. Dear Sir: •—•
We have done what we could to secure an interview with you
Yours truly,
J. H. McGowan,
E. P. Morey,
E. Y. Brookshire.
Parish promptly replied to what he characterized as an “impudent and discourteous” letter, giving notice that he would not submit to methods which he called “bulldozing.” There was also a sarcastic allusion to the ability displayed in the proceedings before the Secretary. Parish’s letter of September 15 indicated that his plan was to apply for relief at the coming session of Congress. At any rate he began no litigation if he may have contemplated any. He died December 26, 1904, leaving a will but no property save the expectancy of this claim. The executrix took no substantial action looking to the collection of the claim, though she had some conversation with McKee and others relating to it, which resulted in nothing, until on November 5, 1905, she entered into a contract with Mr. Holmes Conrad for the prosecution of the claim. He and his associate, Mr. Robinson, filed the petition for mandamus against the Secretary of the Treasury on May 2, 1906. Defeated in the trial court and the court of appeals, they obtained a reversal of the adverse decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States on May 17, 1909. See United States ex rel. Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U. S. 124, 53 L. ed. 936, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556.
The executrix knew the former history of the claim and that complainants were the attorneys engaged in it to the time of its failure in the Treasury Department; but she had no knowledge of the written contracts. No legal steps had been taken by complainants under the ample authority claimed in their letter of November 19, 1904, before mentioned, before the death of Parish. Knowing of his death and the qualification of defendant as his executrix, they gave her no notice of their contracts
The executrix could readily have supposed from her father’s letter to McGowan, and the latter’s failure to reply thereto, that he had regarded the prospect for the collection of the claim such as not worth further efforts on his part, and was willing to let others undertake it. He said to McKee in December, 1904, that he did not care who collected it. That he also stated that he wanted his fee out of it is of no importance. He was entitled to no fee unless he prosecuted the case to final determination. Nor was he entitled to have the reasonable value of his services before rendered, without showing his willingness and readiness to proceed diligently, and the rejection of such tender by the executrix. The burden was upon the complainants to show this tender of their services, and there is no evidence of it. Now that the claim has been collected by others acting independently as attorneys for the executrix, it seems a great hardship to complainants to receive no compensation for the effective services that they rendered in obtaining the legislation on which the successful litigation was founded; but it is the result of their own action or inaction at the critical time.
Several questions of evidence were raised at the hearing, relating to statements made by the deceased, Parish. So far as these were testified to by one of the complainants they are inadmissible by virtue of the provisions of the Code (sec. 1064 [31 Stat. at L. 1357, chap. 854]) and have not been considered. While there may be some doubt as to the competency of similar evidence given by the attorneys, who were associated with the complainants and under contract with them for participation in their fees, we have considered the evidence without passing upon the question of its admissibility.
For the reasons given we will reverse the decree, with costs, and remand the cause with direction to dismiss the bill. It is so ordered. Reversed arvd Dismissed.
An application by appellees for allowance of an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was denied January 13, 1913, Mr. Chief Justice Shepard delivering the opinion of the Court:
Appellees, Josephine P. Me Gowan et al., pray for an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, basing their right thereto upon the ground that the construction of a law of the United States is drawn in question by the defendant Emily E. Parish.
The defendant relied upon sec. 3477, Rev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2320, as prohibiting the lien claimed by the plaintiffs, and on that rests the contention that the construction of a law of the United States is drawn in question.
The right to appeal is one of substance, and not of mere form. The question of the validity of the lien is one that had been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States in construing sec. 3477, and was no longer an open one. The construction of the act could not, therefore, be drawn in question. Kansas v. Bradley, 26 Fed. 289; Harris v. Rosenberger, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 762, 76 C. C. A. 225, 145 Fed. 449-452.
We are constrained to refuse the allowance of the appeal.