Opinion by
In this personal injury action, plaintiff, Kiara Vanderstoep Paris, by and through her mother and next best friend, Krist Paris (mother), appeals from the judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of defendants, Terry and Inka Dance, and Dream Power Animal Rescue Foundation. We affirm.
On August 23, 2008, plaintiff, who then was two and a half years old, was bitten by the Dances' dog while accompanying her mother on a visit to the Dances' home. Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging negligence against the Dances, as owners of a dangerous animal, and against Dream Power, the shelter from which the Dances adopted their dog, for failing to warn the Dances that the dog had a bad nature and might have bitten or attempted to bite before. In turn, the Dances, and subsequently Dream Power, designated *406 mother as a nonparty at fault for failing to properly supervise plaintiff during the visit.
A jury found the Dances not negligent and found that Dream Power had acted negligently but its negligence did not cause plaintiffs injuries. The jury made no apportionment of negligence between defendants and mother, as an alleged nonparty at fault.
Plaintiff appeals, contending primarily that the trial court erred by permitting defendants to designate mother as a nonparty at fault.
I. Designation of Mother as a Nonparty at Fault
Pursuant to section 13-21-111.5, C.R.S.2007, in a civil action based on negligence or strict liability, plaintiffs and defendants may designate nonparties as being wholly or partially at fault, with the finder of fact ultimately considering the percentage of a nonparty's negligence in apportioning la-bility. See Inland/Riggle Oil Co. v. Painter,
Prior to trial, plaintiff moved to strike defendants' designation of mother as a non-party at fault, arguing, as she does on appeal, that the negligence of a parent cannot be imputed or considered if it will bar a child's recovery. The trial court disagreed, and plaintiff contends that this was error.
We review de novo as a question of law whether the trial court properly allowed non-party designation of plaintiff's mother. See Pedge v. R.M. Holdings, Inc.,
A. Is the Question Moot?
As an initial matter, we address and reject defendants' argument that, even if nonparty designation was improper, the error is harmless because the jury attributed no fault to mother.
If the designation of a nonparty is improper, it is error to admit evidence of the fault of the improperly designated nonparty. See Chavez v. Parkview Episcopal Med. Cir.,
An error is harmless unless it affects justice or the substantial rights of the parties. C.R.C.P. 61; see Waneka v. Clyncke,
Here, the record shows that at the close of evidence, the jury was provided with two special verdict forms, A and B. It was instructed to use Special Verdict Form A if it found no defendant responsible for any damages sustained by plaintiff, Alternatively, the jury was instructed that if it found any defendant at fault and that such fault was the cause of plaintiff's injuries, it was to apportion damages between defendants and non-party mother as set forth on Special Verdict Form B.
The jury returned Special Verdiet Form A, finding that plaintiff had injuries, but that neither of the Dances was at fault for the injuries, and that although Dream Power was negligent, it did not cause any of plaintiff's injuries. Pursuant to instruction, the jury did not fill out Special Verdict Form B and, accordingly, made no percentage allocation of fault to defendants or nonparty mother.
Because mother had been designated as a nonparty at fault, the jury heard a significant amount of evidence and argument as to how mother's failure to supervise was a cause of plaintiff's injuries. However, because it was unnecessary for the jury, based on the instructions for use of Special Verdict Form A, to proceed to apportion fault under Special Verdict Form B, we cannot ascertain from the record whether the jury's decision to find no negligence or proximate cause on the part of defendants was influenced by evidence of mother's negligence in supervising her child.
Therefore, the absence of a jury finding on Special Verdict Form B of any fault of the mother does not, as defendants argue, definitively show that the nonparty designation was of no consequence, and we cannot assume that any error in the designation of *407 mother as a nonparty was necessarily harmless. Thus, we will address the issue.
B. Is Nonparty Status of a Parent Prohibited?
Plaintiff contends that in a simple negligence action brought on behalf of his or her child, the parent cannot be designated as a nonparty at fault pursuant to section 18-21-111.5. We disagree.
1. Section 18-21-111.5
Section 18-21-111.5 was enacted in Colorado in 1986 as part of comprehensive tort reform. It states, in relevant part:
(1) In an action brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or property, no defendant shall be liable for an amount greater than that represented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or fault attributable to such defendant that produced the claimed injury, death, damage, or loss, except as provided by subsection (4) of this section.
(2) The jury shall return a special verdict ... determining the percentage of negligence or fault attributable to each of the parties and any persons not parties to the action of whom notice has been given ... to whom some negligence or fault is found and determining the total amount of damages sustained by each claimant. ...
(8) (a) Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the finder of fact in a civil action may consider the degree or percentage of negligence or fault of a person not a party to the action, based upon evidence thereof, which shall be admissible, in determining the degree or percentage of negligence or fault of those persons who are parties to such action.
(Emphases added.)
By its plain and unambiguous terms, the statute provides that no defendant shall be liable for the negligence or fault of anyone else. Other than for co-conspirators, the statute contains no exceptions. See § 18-21-111.5(1). The statute further provides that the percentage of negligence or fault is to be determined for all parties and nonparties with proper notice. In addition, it applies in every simple negligence action, "[alny provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding." See Moody v. Corsentino,
The legislative policy announced in this statute is clear: A defendant in a negli-genee suit will not be made financially responsible for any fault that is not the defendant's own. See Bohrer v. DeHart,
2. Parental Immunity Does Not Bar Designation as Nonparty Under Section 18-21-111.5
Colorado has adopted the qualified parental immunity doctrine, which provides that a child is barred from suing a parent for simple negligence. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Dotson,
The purposes of the doctrine are the "preservation of family harmony, the maintenance of legitimate parental authority and control,
*408
and the safeguarding of family assets by protecting against asset depletion resulting from a judgment in favor of the child against the parent." Schlessinger v. Schlessinger,
Although plaintiff suggests otherwise, we perceive no conflict between the parental immunity doctrine and the legislative goals of the pro rata statute. As relevant here, both deny a child's recovery for injuries attributable to the simple negligence of a parent. It does not undermine the policy of qualified parental immunity to forbid the allocation of financial responsibility for the otherwise nonrecoverable negligence of that parent to another defendant. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport,
3. That Negligence of Parent Is Not Imputable to Child Does Not Bar Parent's Nonparty Designation Under Section 18-21-111.5
Nonetheless, even though in Colorado a child may not recover against a parent for simple negligence, plaintiff points out that Colorado law also precludes imputing a parent's negligence to his or her minor child. See, eg., Francis ex rel. Goodridge v. Dahl,
However, as the trial court correctly determined, nonparty designation concerns the independent negligence of a parent; it does not attribute the negligence of the parent to the child. Indeed, here, the jury was instructed that the negligence of nonparty mother was an affirmative defense and that plaintiff, as a child under seven, was "incapable of negligence." Cf. Tucker v. Gorman,
Moreover, to the extent plaintiff contends that designation of an otherwise immune parent as a nonparty under section 18-21-111.5 is improper because the practical effect may be to bar a child's recovery against other tortfeasors because of his or her parent's negligence, we disagree. As discussed, the plain terms of the statute precisely require that the determination of a nonparty's fault may completely or partially deny a plaintiff recovery, even if the plaintiff is, as here, a minor child. See Barton,
II. Premises Liability
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider the Dances' lability under the premises lHability statute, section 18-21-115, C.R.S. 2007, rather than under a theory of negli-genee. However, a plaintiff may recover against a landowner for injury occurring on that land only as provided under the premises liability statute, and not under any common law theory. See Vigil v. Franklin,
Here, because the dog's biting of plaintiff was either an "activity conducted" or a "cireumstance existing" on the Dances property, the premises liability statute was the exclusive remedy under which plaintiff could recover against the Dances, and, therefore, the court properly so instructed the jury. See Wilson v. Marchiondo,
We do not address section 13-21-124, C.R.9.2007 (creating statutory civil action against dog owners for death or serious bodily injury), because it is effective only for acts occurring on or after April 21, 2004 and, therefore, inapplicable here.
III. Evidentiary Rulings
A trial court's rulings on evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Wark v. McClellan,
A. Mother's Alleged Alcohol Consumption
Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of mother's alleged alcohol consumption on the day plaintiff was injured. We disagree.
Evidence that logically tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue or that sheds light upon a matter contested is relevant, and the trial court has considerable discretion in determining the logical relevance of evidence. See CRE 401; Wark,
Evidence of alcohol consumption may be relevant to an individual's ability to assess a potentially dangerous situation or to remember events leading up to an incident. See Wark,
Here, plaintiff filed a motion in limine before trial to exclude evidence of mother's alleged use of aleohol on the day of plaintiff's injury. The trial court postponed ruling on the motion until after presentation of possible evidence as to mother's lack of supervision of plaintiff. At trial, after Terry Dance testified that he had seen plaintiff in differ *410 ent parts of his home and backyard which were neither near to nor visible from where mother was seated, the court allowed defendants to introduce evidence of mother's alleged aleohol consumption.
Under these cireumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
B. "Character" Evidence of the Dog
We also disagree with plaintiff that the court erroneously admitted evidence of the dog's "good character."
In order for the Dances to be liable under the premises liability statute, the jury was required to find that their conduct constituted an "unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care with respect to dangers created by the landowner of which the landowner actually knew." $ 183-21-115(8)(b)(D), C.R.S. 2007, Wright v. Vail Run Resort Cmty. Ass'n,
At trial, the parties disputed whether the dog was vicious or dangerous. Thus, evidence relating to the dog's temperament was relevant to that issue. See Sandoval,
Also, evidence of the dog's nature prior to the biting was properly admitted to determine whether the Dances knew of the dog's alleged propensity to be violent. See Wilson,
Plaintiff asserts, nevertheless, that because CRE 406 and 608 prohibit character or habit evidence, the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine. In that motion, plaintiff requested that the trial court preclude evidence of the dog's "good character" to counter evidence of its prior bad behavior. We disagree.
CRE 406 and 608 are inapplicable here. As the trial court pointed out: "Waldo is a dog. The rules of evidence pertaining to witnesses and parties do not apply." See CRE 406 ("Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice." (emphasis added)); CRE 608 (regarding character evidence and conduct of a wit-mess ); see also CRE 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witmess except as otherwise provided in these rules, or in any statute of the State of Colorado." (emphasis added)).
IV. Punitive Damages Request
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend the pleadings to include a claim for punitive damages against Dream Power for failing to disclose two incidents of bad behavior by the dog that occurred before the Dances adopted him.
However, because the jury ultimately found Dream Power was not at fault and, thus, owed no actual damages to plaintiff, we conclude any error in refusing plaintiff's motion was harmless. See § 18-21-102(1)(a), C.R.S.2007 ("The amount of such reasonable exemplary damages shall not exceed an amount which is equal to the amount of the actual damages awarded to the injured party."); see also White v. Hansen,
The judgment is affirmed.