Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc.Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Pfaelzer
OPINION
PFAELZER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Parfums Givenchy, Inc. (“Givenchy USA”) brought this copyright infringement action against defendant C & C Beauty Sales, Inc. (“C & C Beauty”) pursuant to Section 602(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which prohibits the “[i]mportation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright . . . of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States.”
The Court now grants Givenchy USA’s motion for summary judgment except insofar as it seeks reimbursement of attorney’s fees. The court denies Givenchy USA’s motion for statutory damages.
FACTS
Givenchy USA, a New York corporation, is the exclusive authorized distributor of Givenchy perfume products in the United States. The products are manufactured in France by Givenchy USA’s parent company, Parfums Givenchy, S.A. (“Givenchy France”). Givenchy USA is the only party authorized to import these products into the United States for consumption in this country. One of the products manufactured by Givenchy France and distributed in the United States by Givenchy USA is a perfume marketed under the name “Amarige.” Each bottle of Amarige perfume is packaged in a box, the outside of which displays a two-dimensional artistic design (the “Amarige Box Design”). Employees of Givenchy France created this design in 1991.
On February 27, 1992, Givenchy France sold the United States rights to the copyright in the Amarige Box Design to Givenchy USA. Givenchy USA recorded the copyright in the design with the United States Copyright Office, which issued a registration certificate to Givenchy USA effective March 24, 1992.
During 1992, Givenchy spent over five million dollars advertising Amarige perfume throughout the United States and promoting its image as a high-quality, high-prestige luxury item. The Amarige Box Design is prominently featured in the advertising and is an important part of the overall Amarige perfume product.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Givenchy USA’s present suit against C & C Beauty is closely connected with an earlier suit brought by Givenchy USA in this Court against Drug Emporium, Inc., one of C & C Beauty’s largest customers. In that case, Givenchy USA claimed that Drug Emporium had infringed Givenchy USA’s exclusive right to distribute the copyrighted design that appears on the packaging of Amarige perfume, in violation of
On September 17,1992, this Court preliminarily enjoined Drug Emporium from continued distribution of the Amarige Box Design. On November 23, 1992, on Givenchy USA’s motion for summary judgment, this Court entered a permanent injunction against Drug Emporium and awarded Givenchy USA its reasonable attorney’s fees
2
and costs.
Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.,
No. CV 92-4206 MRP, 1992 WL 532166 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 23, 1992). The Court held,
inter alia,
that the “first sale” doctrine did not shield Drug Emporium from liability under
The same day that this Court entered a preliminary injunction against Drug Emporium, C & C Beauty filed suit against Givenchy USA in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. C & C Beauty sought a declaratory judgment that its importation and distribution of the Amarige Box Design did not violate
On December 18, 1992, Givenchy USA filed the present action. On January 20, 1993, C & C Beauty moved to dismiss this action, or, in the alternative, to transfer it to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. C & C Beauty based its motion on the pendency of the declaratory judgment action it had filed in Florida.
On January 28, 1993, the Florida court issued an order transferring C & C Beauty’s declaratory judgment action to this District. See C & C Beauty Sales, Inc. v. Parfums Givenchy, Inc., No. 92-2157 CIV-MARCUS (S.D.Fla. Jan. 27, 1993). C & C Beauty subsequently withdrew its motion to dismiss or transfer, and has filed an answer to Givenchy USA’s complaint. Givenchy USA now moves for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
Givenchy USA’s claim arises under
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501.
The legislative history of this section makes clear that, in enacting it, Congress intended to protect copyright owners against the unauthorized importation of copies acquired outside the United States even when such copies are lawfully made:
Section 602 . . . deals with two separate situations: importation of “piratical” articles (that is, copies or phonorecords made without any authorization of the copyright owner), and unauthorized importation of copies or phonorecords that were lawfully made.
H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5785 (emphasis added).
The history further states that “the mere act of importation . . . constitute^] an act of infringement.”
Id.
at 170. This is confirmed by Section 501(a) of the Act, which states that “[a]nyone . . . who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of
By its terms,
C & C Beauty makes three arguments in its attempt to defeat summary judgment. First, it argues that Givenchy USA has failed to establish that it has standing to bring a claim under
I. Standing
At the outset, C & C Beauty attacks Givenchy USA’s standing to bring its claim under
A. Liability for Distribution of an Infringing Work
It is well settled that the distribution of an infringing work subjects the distributor to liability. See, e.g., Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 778 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir.1985); Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 975, 989 (D.Minn.1986); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc., 569 F.Supp. 47, 48-49 (E.D.Pa.1983), aff‘d without op., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir.1984). Furthermore, a copyright owner may sue “any member of the distribution chain.” Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 207 (D.C.Cir.1981).
As discussed elsewhere in this opinion, C
&
C Beauty’s unauthorized importation of Amarige perfume products, including copies of the Amarige Box Design, constitutes copyright infringement under
B. Scope of the Assignment
In addition, Givenchy USA has standing to bring this action — for both the initial importation and the subsequent distribution of Amarige perfume — because it received, by assignment from its parent company, • not only the Amarige Box Design copyright but also the right to sue for previously accrued infringement claims.
Although an assignment of a copyright ordinarily is presumed not to convey the right to sue for prior causes of action, this presumption is not conclusive, but instead depends on the particular circumstances of the assignment. See SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Development Corp., 921 F.2d 360, 363 (1st Cir.1990); Custom Decor, Inc. v. Nautical Crafts, Inc., 502 F.Supp. 154, 157 (E.D.Pa.1980). Here, the assignment from Givenchy France to Givenchy USA purports to transfer “all right, title, and interest” in the United States copyright for the Amarige Box Design. The subject matter of the assignment was a new product that had been introduced into the United States market less than a month before the assignment. In addition, Givenchy USA is a subsidiary of Givenchy France and thus it must be assumed that Givenchy USA would not bring a lawsuit without the authority of the parent company.
Given these circumstances, it would be unreasonable to conclude that Givenchy France had reserved to itself causes of action accruing during the short time period between the product’s introduction into the United States and the date of the assignment. See SAPC, Inc., 921 F.2d at 362-63; cf. Rohauer v. Friedman, 306 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1962) (finding that assignment of all “right, title and interest” included assignment of right to renew copyright, in light of “circumstances suiTOunding its execution”). If there were any doubt about this point, it would be dispelled by a declaration submitted by Givenchy USA in support of its motion. In that declaration, Jean Courtiere, the person who executed the assignment, states that Givenchy France intended to and did transfer to Givenchy USA the right to pursue claims for infringement of the United States copyright in the Amarige Box Design accruing before the time of the assignment. Thus, the Court is satisfied that Givenchy USA is the assignee of not only the Box Design copyright but also the right to sue on claims previously accrued by the assignor.
C & C Beauty’s principal defense in this case is the “first sale” doctrine, which is codified at Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act. Section 109(a) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion in BMG Music v. Perez
The Ninth Circuit addressed precisely this issue in
BMG Music v. Perez,
952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir.1991),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2997, 120 L.Ed.2d 873 (1992). The plaintiffs in that case owned the United States copyright in various sound recordings; the defendant purchased phonorecords of these sound recordings that had been manufactured abroad, and, without the plaintiffs’ consent, imported them into the United States and sold them. The plaintiffs sued, claiming that the defendant had infringed their copyrights under
The court disagreed, and held that the first sale doctrine does not provide a defense to an infringement action under
Defendant’s contentions would be more persuasive were it not for the phrase— lawfully made under this title — in§ 109(a) . I conclude that the section grants first sale protection to the third party buyer of copies which have been legally manufactured and sold within the United States’ and not to purchasers of imports such as are involved here. The protection afforded by the United States Code does not extend beyond the borders of this country unless the Code expressly states. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, statutory language must be recognized as conclusive.
Scorpio, 569 F.Supp. at 49 (citation omitted).
Second, the court in
BMG Music
reasoned that “‘[cjonstruing
Construing§ 109(a) as superseding the prohibition on importation set forth in the more recently enacted§ 602 would render§ 602 virtually meaningless. Third party purchasers who import phonorecords could thereby circumvent the statute, in every instance, by simply buying the recordings indirectly. Moreover, declaring legal theact of purchasing from a United States importer who does not deal directly with a foreign manufacturer, but who buys recordings which have been liquidated overseas, would undermine the purpose of the statute. The copyright owner would be unable to exercise control over copies of the work which entered the American market in competition with copies lawfully manufactured and distributed under this title. This court cannot construe the statute so as to alter the intent of Congress, which has set restrictions on the importation of phonoreeords in order that rights of United States copyright owners can be preserved.
Scorpio, 569 F.Supp. at 49-50.
The facts in this ease are virtually identical to those in
BMG Music,
and this Court is, of course, bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Copyright Act in that case.
3
Moreover, for reasons that will be set forth below, this Court believes that the Ninth Circuit in
BMG Music
reached the proper result, and agrees with the courts’ observation in that case and in
Scorpio
that construing
“Lawfully Made Under This Title”
The
Scorpio
court seems to have conflated two separate grounds for finding that
Absent a clearly expressed statutory intent to the contrary, courts should presume that the United States Code applies only to actions “occurring within, or having effects within,” the United States. Beechwood Music Corp. v. Vee Jay Records, Inc., 328 F.2d 728, 729 (2d Cir.1964). However, the unauthorized importation into and distribution within the United States of copyrighted goods clearly has an effect within the United States — it prevents the United States copyright owner from realizing the full value of each copy released into the United States market with his authorization. Thus, the judicial presumption against the application of United States statutory law does not apply in cases such as BMG Music, Scorpio, or the present case.
As for the second proposition, interpreting the words “lawfully made under this title” to mean “legally manufactured in the United States” would contravene Congressional intent. Such an approach “would withhold the first sale defense from any goods lawfully manufactured abroad even if they were imported with the authority of the United States copyright owner — a result that contradicts the policy behind
Furthermore, nothing in the legislative history supports this interpretation of
In sum, the legislative history of
B. Reconciling the Importation Right and the First Sale Doctrine
As discussed above, this Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
BMG Music
and believes that the result in that case was correct. As stated, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals’ statement that to construe
1. Statutory Language
At the outset, the Court notes that the language of several provisions of the Act suggests that
Second,
Third,
2.
Legislative History and Policy Underlying
The legislative history and policy underlying
(a) The Distribution Right and the First Sale Doctrine
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending----
The distribution right is not absolute. Once the copyright owner has voluntarily released his work to the public, the distribution right is no longer needed to protect the underlying copyright; at that point, the policy favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way to policies disfavoring restraints of trade and limitations on the alienation of personal property, and the first sale doctrine takes effect. 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.12[A] (1993).
The first sale doctrine is codified at
(b)
Prior to enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright owners could not prevent the unauthorized importation of their work into the United States. See Staff of House Comm, on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision: Report of the Register of Copyright on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 125-26 (Comm.Print 1961). The 1909 Act prohibited only the importation of piratical copies of copyrighted works; it did not restrict the importation of articles that were initially sold or manufactured under the authority of the copyright owner. See id.; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 30, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909) (amended 1976) (“[T]he importation into the United States of any article bearing a false notice of copyright when there is no existing copyright thereon in the United States, or of any piratical copies of any work copyrighted in the United States, is prohibited.”). Copyright owners relied on contract law, unfair competition law, or trademark law to discourage unauthorized importation of their work. Feingold, supra, at 134-35.
Very frequently you run into a situation where there is a copyright proprietor in the United States and copies of the same work — whether it’s a book, or a piece of music, or something else — produced in a foreign country, may be shipped over here without violating any contract of the U.S. copyright proprietor. This is either because . . . the [overseas] publisher sold it to an individual who in turn shipped it over here — that obviously doesn’t violate the contract between the [overseas] and the American publisher . . . but, as far as I am concerned, it is clearly infringement of the copyright of the U.S. proprietor.
Staff of House Comm, on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision Part 2: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 213 (comment of Sidney A. Diamond).
By providing that the unauthorized importation of copies or phonorecords infringes the distribution right,
It should be clear, then, that the first sale doctrine cannot apply to actions such as the present action for infringement under
Furthermore, it would be inconsistent with the text of the Copyright Act. As discussed earlier, the distribution right encompasses the right to control not only the “sale or other transfer of ownership” of copies or phonorecords, but also their disposition “by rental, lease, or lending.”
In the present ease, the Amarige perfume products at issue were manufactured and first sold in France with the authorization of Givenchy USA’s parent company, Givenchy France. Under
III. Separability
C & C Beauty’s final argument is an attack on the eopyrightability of the Amarige Box Design. C & C Beauty contends that the design is not entitled to copyright protection because it is inseparable from the useful article to which it is attached. See Norris Indus., Inc. v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 923 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818, 104 S.Ct. 78, 78 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983). This conten-’ tion also lacks merit.
The certificate of registration issued by the United States Copyright Office for the Amarige Box Design is
prima facie
evidence of the validity of the copyright.
See
It is well established that an artistic packaging design or label is entitled to copyright protection.
See Abli, Inc. v. Standard Brands Paint Co.,
323 F.Supp. 1400, 1403 (C.D.Cal.1970);
Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
326 F.2d 87, 93 (9th Cir.1963), ce
rt. denied,
377 U.S. 907, 84 S.Ct. 1167, 12 L.Ed.2d 177 (1964);
Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc.,
646 F.Supp. 975, 987-88 (D.Minn.1986). Indeed, the Copyright Office regulations make clear that a copyright may be issued for “a print or label that
Moreover, the Amarige Box Design is physically separable from the perfume with which it is associated and thus does not even raise an issue of “conceptual separability.” Section 101 of the Copyright Act provides that “the design of a useful article” or a work of art that embellishes a useful article is copyrightable to the extent that it is capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article.
IV. Relief
A. Injunctive Relief
As discussed previously, Givenchy USA has spent more than five million dollars advertising Amarige perfume nationwide and promoting its image as a high-quality, high-prestige luxury item. The Amarige Box Design is prominently featured in the advertising and is an important part of the overall Amarige perfume product. Moreover, Givenchy USA distributes Amarige perfume only to select, upscale retailers.
C & C Beauty’s unauthorized importation of Amarige perfume, and its distribution of such perfume to unauthorized retailers such as Drug Emporium, threatens to cause Givenchy USA irreparable harm by eroding its exclusive market and undermining the image of the Amarige perfume product as a high-quality, high-prestige luxury item. Cf. Judscott Handprints, Ltd. v. Washington Wall Paper Co., 377 F.Supp. 1372, 1380 (E.D.N.Y.1974).
Given these circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to issue a permanent injunction prohibiting C & C Beauty from infringing Givenchy USA’s copyright in the Amarige Box Design and from publishing, selling, marketing, or otherwise disposing of any reproductions of the Amarige Box Design in the United States.
See
B. Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees
Givenchy USA’s motion for statutory damages requests an award of $100,000 pursuant to Section 504, which provides that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by [the Copyright Act],” a copyright owner who prevails on an infringement claim may elect to receive statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits.
Section 412(2) provides that [i]n any action under [the Copyright Act] . . . no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees, as provided bysections 504 and 505, shall be made for . . . any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration . . . unless such registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work.
In this case, the certificate of copyright registration issued to Givenchy USA for the Amarige Box Design states that the work was first published on September 2, 1991 in France, 13 and that registration became effective on March 24, 1992. Givenchy USA has alleged that C & C Beauty infringed its copyright by purchasing Amarige perfume products abroad, importing them into the United States, and reselling them without Givenchy USA’s authorization. Givenchy USA has also presented evidence that the infringing purchases and sales began in February 1992 and continued without interruption through March 1993. Plaintiffs Motion for Statutory Damages, Declaration of Caroline M. Brown, ¶ 5. Thus, it is clear that the copyright in the Amarige Box Design was registered more than three months after first publication, and that the infringing importation first occurred after the date of first publication and before the effective date of registration.
Givenchy USA nevertheless contends that
Givenchy USA’s argument is unpersuasive. Numerous courts have rejected it, and held that the first act of infringement in a series of ongoing separate infringements “commenee[s]” one continuing “infringement” under
This Court finds such a distinction immaterial. The Copyright Act defines copying, or the creation of a derivative work, as an infringement separate from that of distribution,
see
Furthermore, the reasoning in these cases is consistent with the plain language and legislative history of
The word “infringement” can be used in two senses. As noted, it can mean both a single act of infringement, and it can also mean several or continuous or repeated acts of infringement. However, it would be peculiar if not inaccurate to use the word “commenced” to describe a single act. That verb generally presupposes as a subject some kind of activity that begins at one time and continues or reoccurs thereafter.
Id.; see also Mason, 741 F.Supp. at 1286 (“The plain language of the statute does not reveal that Congress intended to distinguish between pre- and post-registration infringements.”).
The court in
Singh
further noted that the legislative history supports a construction based on the ordinary meaning of the text of
Section 412 . Registration as Prerequisite to Certain Remedies
The need forsection 412 arises from two basic changes the bill will make in the present law.
(1) Copyright registration for published works, which is useful and important to users and the public at large, would no longer be compulsory, and should therefore be induced in some practical way.
Under the general scheme of the bill, a copyright owner whose work has been infringed before registration would be entitled to the remedies ordinarily available in infringement cases: an injunction on terms the court considers fair, and his actual damages plus any applicable profits not used as a measure of damages. However,section 412 would deny any award of the special or “extraordinary” remedies of statutory damages or attorney’s fees where . . . infringement commenced after publication and before registration (unless registration has been made within a grace period of three months after publication). These provisions would be applicable to works of foreign and domestic origin alike.
.... With respect to published works, clause (2) would generally deny an award of [statutory damages and attorney’s fees] where infringement takes place before registration. As an exception, however, the clause provides a grace period of three months after publication during which registration can be made without loss of remedies; full remedies could be recovered for any infringement begun during the three months after publication if registration is made before that period has ended. This exception is needed to take care of newsworthy or suddenly popular works which may be infringed almost as soon as they are published, before the copyright owner has had a reasonable opportunity to register his claim.
This passage makes clear that because registration would no longer be compulsory under the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress sought to induce it by denying the “extraordinary” remedies of statutory damages and attorney’s fees where copyright owners fail to register their work in a timely manner. Allowing such remedies where an infringing act occurs before registration and recurs after registration would defeat this purpose. See Singh, 680 F.Supp. at 586; Mason, 741 F.Supp. at 1286.
Here, Givenchy USA failed to register the copyright in the Amarige Box Design within the three-month grace period permitted under
CONCLUSION
Givenchy USA has established C & C Beauty’s liability under
Givenchy USA’s motion for statutory damages is hereby denied.
Notes
. “Gray market” goods are goods that are intended to be sold outside the United States but which are imported into this country without the consent of the owner of the United States trademark or copyright associated with the good.
. It is unclear from the record in the earlier lawsuit whether Drug Emporium‘s infringing activity “commenced” before the effective date of registration of the Amarige Box Design, in which case it could have been argued that Givenchy USA would not have been entitled to an award of attorney‘s fees.
See
In the present case, C & C Beauty did not even challenge Givenchy USA‘s entitlement to attorney‘s fees until it filed a “Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” on August 9, 1993, over four months after Givenchy USA had filed its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment.
. A number of other district courts have also refused to apply the first sale doctrine to actions under
.
. Section 1(a) of the 1909 Act provided that a copyright owner had the exclusive right “[t]o print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work.” Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1909) (amended 1976).
. The words “lawfully obtained” in Section 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act did not refer to the locality of the first sale.
. In addition, the distribution right supplements the reproduction right,
.
The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) do not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.
. In Platt & Munk, for example, the court considered, under the 1909 Act, “whether an unpaid manufacturer of copyrighted goods, which are alleged to be defective by the copyright proprietor who has ordered them, may sell them in satisfaction of his claim for the contract price without infringing the ‘exclusive right’ of the proprietor to ‘publish . . . and vend the copyrighted work.’ ” 315 F.2d at 849 (quoting Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1909) (amended 1976)). The court held that the “first sale” which terminates the exclusive right to vend patented or copyrighted objects need not be a truly voluntary one, but can consist of some reasonable and recognized form of compulsory transfer, such as a judicial sale or court-compelled assignment. In such cases the ultimate question embodied in the “first sale” doctrine— whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee [or copyright proprietor] has received his reward for the use of the article — is answered in the affirmative, since the proprietor or patentee has received from his creditor some value for which the copyrighted or patented article is now demanded unless the debt is paid.
Id. at 854 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
. See Staff of House Comm, on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision Part 2: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 212 (Comm.Print 1963) (comment of Horace Manges: “When a U.S. book publisher enters into a contract with a British publisher to acquire exclusive U.S. rights for a particular book, he often finds that the English edition, for instance, of that particular book finds its way into this country. Now it’s all right to say, ‘Commence a lawsuit for breach of contract.’ But this is expensive, burdensome, and, for the most part, ineffective.”); id. at 213 (comment of Sidney A. Diamond), 232 (comment of American Book Publishers Council, Inc. and American Textbook Publishers Institute), 275 (comment of Walter J. Derenberg), 327 (comment of Horace Manges).
. The House Report accompanying the 1976 Act states:
Section 602 deals . . . with two separate situations: importation of “piratical” articles (that is, copies or phonorecords made without any authorization of the copyright owner), and unauthorized importation of copies or phonorecords that were lawfully made. The general approach ofsection 602 is to make unauthorized importation an act of infringement in both cases....
Section 602(a) first states the general rule that unauthorized importation is an infringement merely if the copies or phonorecords “have been acquired outside the United States”....
The second situation covered bysection 602 is that where the copies or phonorecords were lawfully made but their distribution in the United States would infringe the U.S. copyright owner’s exclusive rights.... [T]he mere act of importation in this situation would constitute an act of infringement and could be enjoined.
H.R.Rep. No. 1476, at 169-70, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5785-86.
. This rationale does not apply where copies or phonorecords of a copyrighted work are manufactured and first sold in the United States, exported, and then brought back into the United States. See Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enterprises, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344, 1985 WL 2209 (S.D.Fla.1985). In such a situation, the copyright owner has voluntarily released the copies into the United States market and has received the full value to which she is entitled for them.
.
. Givenchy USA is, of course, entitled to seek actual damages and profits.