89 P. 572 | Wyo. | 1907
Lead Opinion
On May 18, 1903, Charles Kuster made and executed his will containing among others the following recital, viz.:
*378 “Second — As to my property, both real and personal, I make the following disposition to take effect upon my death, viz.:
“To my beloved son, Charles F. Kuster, I do give, grant and bequeathe all of my property, both real and personal, within the State of Wyoming; he, the said Charles F. Kus-ter, however, not to have possession, manage or control of the same for two years after my demise * *
It is alleged that on the following day he signed an instrument, in form a deed, with covenants of warranty; purporting to convey to the plaintiff a house and lot situated in the City of Laramie, Wyoming, which instrument contained the following provision: “This instrument is to be in full force and effect from and after my death.” On May 21, 1903, two days after the date of the purported deed, the testator made a codicil to his will as follows: “I, Charles Kuster, of Laramie, Wyoming, having made my last will and testament bearing date the 18th day of May, A. D. 1903, do make this codicil to be taken as a part of the same:
“First — I hereby ratify and confirm said will in every respect, save so far as any part of it is inconsistent with this codicil.
“Second- — -In case Charles F. Kuster, my son, should die within t-vyo years after my death, I give and bequeathe to my beloved half-brother, Frederick Reinsberg, of Germany, and to (his) heirs and- assigns forever, unconditionally and without reserve, all the real and personal property belonging to me at my death.
“In testimony whereof, etc.”
The deed was never delivered, and upon the death of the testator it could not be found. The testator died on July 14, 1903, and on the 16th day of August following the will, executed on May 18, 1903, and the codicil thereto, executed on May 21, 1903, was duly admitted to probate and the defendant, Abrams, who was nominated’in the will, was duly appointed and qualified as executor. On July
The defendants object to the consideration of any of plaintiff’s assignments of error on the ground that her petition filed in the court below does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The sufficiency of her petition was raised by demurrer in that court and although it was overruled the defendants are not barred from raising the question here, for if such petition was not sufficient to support a judgment in her favor she cannot be heard to say that she was prejudiced by the entry of the judgment complained of. The will, codicil and deed are set out in the petition and the sufficiency of the latter turns upon the construction of these instruments considered together and thus constituting, as alleged by her, the last will of the testator.
By the terms of the will and the codicil all of the property, both real and personal, of which testator died seized was devised to his son, Charles F. Kuster. By the terms of the deed title to the house and lot should vest in the plaintiff on the death of the grantor, who is the same person as the testator in the will. The theory upon which this case was brought is that the deed never having been delivered to plaintiff no title passed by deed, and that the latter by its terms having held the title in abeyance until the death of the grantor that the deed was in effect a will or specific bequest of the property therein described. There is no question that the legal' title of the property was in testator up to and at the time of his death; he therefore died seized of the same. Conceding that the contention of the plaintiff is correct, that the deed was in fact executed
Upon the facts alleged in the petition and in this view of the case it becomes unnecessary to discuss the evidence the sufficiency of which is in dispute and upon which the court found for the defendants; nor is it here necessary to discuss the rules governing the establishment of lost wills, for as already indicated if the evidence was sufficient for this purpose still by the rules of construction the finding and decree of the court was right and should not be disturbed.
The judgment will be affirmed. Affirmed.
Rehearing
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
The plaintiff in error has filed her petition for a rehearing upon the ground that the defendants in error filed no
The case is analogous to Fell v. Muller, 78 Ind., 507, in which it was said: “The real question for discussion in this case is: Did the appellant’s complaint state a cause of action in their favor against the appellee? If it did not state a valid or sufficient cause of action against the appellee, and we think it did not, then it is clear that the appellants were not harmed by any of the rulings of the trial court adverse to them and the judgment below must be affirmed.” In that case there was no assignment of cross error and the decision turned 'on the provisions of the civil code of that state to the effect that no judgment shall be reversed by reason of any error or defect in the/ proceedings which does not effect the substantial rights of the .adverse party. Sec. 3744, R. S. Wyo., 1899, is as follows: “No exception shall be regarded unless it is material and prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party excepting.” In order that the exception may be considered, it must be material to a substantial right. It is just as essential to show a substantial right either by the pleadings or the record as it is to preserve the exception. A failure to do either would furnish no basis for a review of an alleged error. That there is no substantial right upon the whole case may appear from the allegations of the petition, though where there has been a trial it is not generally so, and in most cases that question involves an .examination of the entire record. If the party complaining shows by his petition that no valid cause of action exists in his favor against the defendant, then he has failed to show a substantial right, and in such case any and all of his exceptions should be disregarded because
The defendants in error asked no affirmative relief — they had obtained a judgment in the court below with which
The plaintiff in error has presented a brief upon her contention as to the construction which should be placed upon the documents construed together as the last will of the testator. We discussed the question in the opinion filed and after considering the authorities cited in her brief we find nothing in conflict with that opinion. We are still of the opinion that the reference in the codicil is not merely by date, but by other words which clearly indicate that it was the document executed on May 18, 1903, by itself which was within the contemplation of the testator. (McLeod v. McNabb, App. Cases (1891.) It may be conceded that when A. devises to B. and over to C., the latter upon the accrual of his right takes all of the property which B. would have taken under the will. By the codicil the testator substituted Reinsberg as devisee in case of his son’s death. It was evidently the intention of the testator to provide that the devise of his property as contained in his will should not lapse and as relating back and showing the extent of that devise the language used in the codicil is material. It is from the context of the will-and the codicil thereto that this question must be determined. It will be
Rehearing denied.