*1 10—1—18(b) charges. (65 Section of the Illinois Municipal Code ILCS 5/10—1—18(b) (West 2000)) contains similar notice language again investigations refers to serving basis removal or dis- charge. This statute does not refer investigations. to criminal The last statute, (50 section 3.2 Uniform Peace Officers’ Disciplinary Act (West 2000)), ILCS again provides certain requirements 725/3.2 notice prior 2(d) to an interrogation employee. of an Section of the same act expressly refers to an investigation in connection alleged with an violation of the agency’s rules, or unit’s not criminal laws. 50 ILCS 725/2(d) (West 2000).
Thus, the arbitrator’s requiring award compliance with article 7 for criminal investigations public violates the policy of effective law enforcement. light holding, our we need not address argument
that the arbitrator’s public award violates the policy equal protec- tion.
III. CONCLUSION For stated, the reasons we grant reverse the trial court’s of sum- mary judgment and remand with directions for the grant trial court to plaintiff summary judgment and vacate the arbitration award.
Reversed and remanded with directions. TURNER, JJ.,
McCULLOUGH and concur. PAPPAS, PETER Plaintiff-Appellant, WALDRON, v. DONALD Indiv. and Northgate Company, Amusement Defendants-Appellees. d/b/a
Fourth District No. 4—00—0848 —Opinion filed Argued July March 2001. *2 MYERSCOUGH, J., dissenting. Young (argued), Young,
Duane D. Springfield, appel- of LaBarre & for lant. Pavlik, (argued), Offices, PC.,
Thomas C. Jr. Springfield, of Delano Law appellees. JUSTICE opinion KNECHT delivered the of the court: Plaintiff, Peter Pappas, declaratory filed a against action defendants, Waldron, Don individually and doing business as North-. gate Amusement Company. alleged Plaintiff defendants a 90- day option-to-buy period agreement a lease plaintiff had executed Vono, with Joseph party who is not a to this lawsuit. Defendants claimed 90-day option period triggered. was not Both filed summary judgment motions for trial granted defendants’ motion. Plaintiff did copy judge’s ruling not receive a the circuit clerk mail copies parties, failed to of the docket and, therefore, plaintiff timely appeal. failed to file a notice appeals the trial ruling granting court’s defendants’ motion for sum- *3 mary judgment. We dismiss the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND Pappas Plaintiff Peter entered a agreement into lease with Joseph Vono, whereby agreed Vono to lease Pappas’ bar and restaurant. Originally, acquire Vono was unable to financing purchase Pappas’ property, so the parties agreed five-year option to a lease with an purchase during one-year with written notice the last 90 of each period.
During negotiations lease, for the plaintiff Vono mentioned to he might money defendant, Waldron, pay- borrow Don for a down purchase plaintiffs ment to property. any Plaintiff did not desire to do business with defendant if Waldron and insisted defendant Waldron (defendant purchase became involved in the of his property, he Wal- dron) pay property would have to for the in full. To evidence his inten- tions, plaintiffs attorney drafted a paragraph agree- into the lease giving 90-day option buy ment defendant Waldron a property occurred, if certain conditions if did defendant Waldron any not exercise the he option, rights prop- would lose future to the erty. Defendant a party agreement, Waldron was not to the lease but sign he did “approved.” lease as
After, lease, plaintiff and Vono entered into the defendant Pappas and, thereafter, money loaned to Vono sometime Vono as- Waldron signed Pappas assign- the lease to defendants. Plaintiff believed this 90-day ment and filed an action option-to-buy period (1) seeking declaratory judgment, asking the court to find defendants had a right option purchase contractual to exercise the as outlined lease, in paragraph 90-day period six of the for a after defendants (2) gained a lien claim property; to the leased defendants failed to timely rights lease; exercise their in accordance with the terms of the (3) option to purchase expired. had dismiss,
Defendants filed a motion to the trial granted plaintiff allege failed to a precedent option. condition Plaintiff filed complaint, again an amended filed a mo- defendants tion to dismiss. The trial court denied defendants’ second motion to dismiss, finding alleged plaintiff triggering option, a circumstance and the existence of the circumstance an of proof. issue
Defendants and summary judg- both filed motions for ment. arguments The trial court heard April on 2000. The court granted motion, defendants’ finding question no material of fact on whether defendants had any part “not claimed a lien on of the busi- premises.” Accordingly, ness the trial court denied plaintiffs motion and entered in favor of defendants.
The record is unclear as to whether the trial court ruled on the motion in open court in the presence attorneys of the or took the mat- ter under advisement and ruled later. Plaintiff asserts the took the matter under advisement and did not in open rule court. Defendants do not address this issue their brief and we do not have transcript proceedings of the to consult. The 14 docket reads: [mjotion
“This [s]um- cause comeson for consideration on the mary judgment party. present by filed each Both Arguments Judgment heard. counsel. is entered for defendant. There question [d]efendant exists no material of fact that has not any claimeda lien part premises. The lack of a demand or precludes claim of a lien 90-day option the commencement of the period. THE CLERK IS DIRECTEDTO A SEND COPYOF THIS DOCKET ENTRY TO MR. PAVLIKAND MR. CAUSE YOUNG. STRICKEN.” *4 copies clerk did not send entry party. docket to either attorney
Plaintiffs
did
up
not follow on the case until more than 30
days
entry
after
judgment.
lapse arguably
of the final
This time
precludes
timely filing
appeal
required by Supreme
a notice of
303(a)(1) (155
303(a)(1)).
25, 2000,
Court Rule
July
Ill. 2d R.
On
plaintiff
expand
entry
filed a motion to
the docket
and for other relief
regarding
entry
judgment.
sought
expand
of a final
Plaintiff
14, 2000,
entry
April
docket
to reflect the
matter was taken under ad
not ruled
upon
open
visement
court. Plaintiff also
14, 2000,
requested
entry
docket
be reentered because “due
process
requires notice
opportunity
rights
of law
and the
to exercise
entry
judgment.”
attendant
to the
of a final
14, 2000,
September
arguments
On
the trial
heard
and on
September
plaintiff’s
September
denied
motion. The
entry
reads as follows:
[p]laintiff
for
[m]otion
“Cause comes on
consideration on
s
parties
present by
[r]elief. Both
counsel. While the court did
hearing
it
mail
not announce at the conclusion of the
that would
certainly
parties,
an order to the
that was and is
the usual
[c]curt.
of the
The record further shows that the court ordered the
[c]lerk
mail the
and that the
failed
[c]lerk
[o]rder
squarely
finds that the facts here are not
[c]curt
to do so.
so
[Board,
point
Firefighters[’]
Graves v. Pontiac
Pension
with
(1996)]
App.
distinguish
Ill.
N.E.2d 136
this action
3d
Fiat-Allis, Inc.[,
from Mitchell v.
This followed.
II. ANALYSIS (1) to hear appeals, arguing jurisdiction Plaintiff this court has (2) granted trial court erred when it defendants’ appeal; this mail a summary judgment. find the clerk’s failure to motion for We filing not excuse late of his no- copy of the docket does should be dismissed. appeal, appeal tice of
A. Jurisdiction ap- to hear this jurisdiction Defendants contend we do not have Court Rule 303. comply Supreme failed to with peal agree. We 303(a)(1)) 303(a)(1) (155 provides Ill. 2d R. Supreme
(cid:127)1 Court Rule be filed judgments final in civil cases “must appeal the notice of after the the circuit court with the clerk of within from.” judgment appealed final copies clerk failed to mail contends because the circuit appeal notice of should entry, filing the late of his
the docket *5 335 the fact an Supreme excused. The Illinois Court is clear on this issue: rul attorney does not receive actual notice of a trial court’s order or ing, by oversight, “even if caused clerical does not excuse counsel’s closely enough failure to monitor his case to become aware that the 151, Mitchell, circuit court had ruled.” 2d at 632 at 158 Ill. N.E.2d Mitchell, In the trial hearing complaint court held a on a administrative of an review Industrial Commission decision and took 10, 7, the matter under January February advisement on 1991. On 1991, the signed setting court an order aside the Commis- Industrial sion’s decision. This order also directed circuit the clerk to send notice parties, to all but the clerk failed to mail the notice. April 25, 1991,
On
plaintiffs attorney learned of the trial court’s
decision.
judge suggested plaintiffs
The trial
counsel should file a mo-
vacate,
tion to
ultimately
which the trial
granted,
court
and then
reentered
timely
the same order. This
allowed
file a notice
appeal.
of
argued
appellate
Defendant
the
court
jurisdiction
lacked
because more than 30
elapsed
had
since the circuit court entered
its
appellate
final order. The
jurisdiction
court ruled
would
upheld
grounds
of equity,
plaintiffs
counsel relied on the circuit
court’s incorrect directive to file a motion to vacate to correct
circuit clerk’s
mailing
error of not
notice of the
ruling.
trial court’s
court understood the concern
appellate
expressed but nevertheless stated “neither the trial court
ap
nor the
pellate court has the ‘authority
compliance
to excuse
filing
with the
”
requirements of the supreme
governing appeals.’
court rules
Mitch
ell,
150,
1012,
Smith,
In the supreme holding court discussed in its a similar case, party where one did receive notice of the trial court’s order not through and, result, the mail as a failed file a timely ap notice of “ peal: ‘actual notice is not required, long appealed so as the order expressed from was publicly, proceed words and at the situs of the ” Mitchell, ing.’ 1012, quoting at 632 N.E.2d at Granite City Lodge Loyal No. City City, Order the Moose v. Granite of (1990). 122, 123, 141 2d case, Ill. In present N.E.2d the trial judge’s ruling words, expressed publicly, at' proceeding courthouse where the occurred. Plaintiff, however,
(cid:127)2
by
present
contends the
case is controlled
Graves,
App.
Graves,
281 Ill.
3d
In
late of a notice of where the did receive However, Graves, expressly of the trial court’s order. the trial court stating entered an order the case was taken under advisement and Graves, App. IS[.E.2d court would rule mail. 281 Ill. 3d at case, entered an order present at 141. In the the trial court never such mail, it rule nor does the record show or told would fact, the trial court trial court took the matter under advisement. plaintiffs expand denied motion to under ad the trial took the matter
include assertion stated, fact, merely after the it was the usual visement. The trial court parties. copies the court to send of the docket “stan urges (cid:127)3 Plaintiff next us to find his reliance on the court’s sufficient, under operating procedures” dard to mail notice was filing appeal. of his notice of principles equity, to excuse the late *6 Comdisco, Corp., App. Dun & Bradstreet 306 Ill. Plaintiff cites Inc. v. 698, (1999), in District 197, 202, 713 which the First 3d N.E.2d operating procedure held the trial court’s failure to follow its standard equitable an mailing parties in its final to the warranted tolling filing appeal. of the time for an judge The present Comdisco to the case. trial
We decline to extend in relied on the court’s standard expressly plaintiff Comdisco found 202, Comdisco, 713 N.E.2d at procedure. App. 306 Ill. 3d at operating timely file plaintiffs failure to 700. The record before us fails to show reliance on the court’s standard appeal his notice of was due to his failure to monitor his case. operating procedure opposed as to his par to mail notice to the trial indicated it was his usual timely file his notice ties, failure to but he did not indicate following not its usual appeal the direct result of the court was courthouse, Also, he never indicated called practice. plaintiff any way, other entry, up on his case checked the docket followed April between the elapsed in the more than three months that 25, 2000, expand motion to docket entry July docket and his words, at the publicly, was recorded entry. docket plaintiff held. Had day proceeding the same courthouse on case, addressing this issue his we would not be properly monitored today. holding in
Further, court’s we find Comdisco erodes attorney profes- a Mitchell, an has premise was based on the failure to do so monitor or her cases and responsibility sional his who exception parties results. Graves carves an could lead to harsh mail. rule judge’s order he or she will specifically rely on a trial Mitchell is rendered point to the where exception Comdisco widens this usually if notice is essentially means virtually meaningless. Comdisco mail, monitoring their cases through sent are excused not mailed. 30-day allegedly rule be extended if notice is will Mitchell, myriad the door for a only opens This not contradicts but it operating proce- of other excuses to be carved out of “standard harsh, it may under Mitchell exception. though dure” Even results encourage attorneys to monitor their provides bright-line rule to guards against cases and abuse. case, and the circuit clerk’s present
We find Mitchell controls the copies failure to mail untimely filing appeal.
does not excuse his of a notice of B. Motion for Summary Judgment improperly granted Plaintiff contends the trial court defendants’ summary judgment motion for a genuine because there is issue of ma- terial fact option period as to whether the as described in paragraph assigned six the lease was when Vono the lease to disagree. defendants. We
(cid:127)4 The standard of review in involving summary judgment cases is de novo. Ragan Co., v. Columbia Mutual Insurance (1998). Summary N.E.2d judgment should be granted only when “the pleadings, depositions, file, and admissions on together affidavits, with the if any, show that there genuine is no issue any as to material fact and that the moving party judg is entitled to a 5/2—1005(c) (West 1998). ment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS Defendants contend assignment Vono’s of the lease to them does trigger not 90-day option period they did not “demand or lien,” claim a required by language. the contract Plaintiff contends defendants acquired “some sort an property interest” when assigned Waldron, lease was thereby triggering 90-day op- period. tion
The trial court found question there was “no material of fact that [defendants have] not claimed a any part premises. lien on of the lack aof demand or claim of a lien the precludes commencement of 90-day the option period.” Plaintiff contends the trial court erred very because “it is clear paragraph generously that the reads more in terms of the in obtaining [defendants] some sort of an interest the [p]laintiff property entitling s rights.” [them] to some sort of contends the language use of certain in the second of sentence paragraph six renders paragraph ambiguous urges the and us to consider extrinsic evidence to determine in the including his intent financing option in the lease. (cid:127)5 The commonly basic rule of contract interpretation, known as “ rule,”
the “four-corners requires following: agreement, the ‘[a]n writing, presumed speak
when reduced to must be to the intention signed speaks itself, who it. It and the intention with which it was executed must be determined from the language used. It ” changed by is not to be Air Safety, extrinsic evidence.’ Inc. v. Teach 457, ers Realty Corp., (1999), 185 Ill. 2d 706 N.E.2d quoting Thompson, Western Illinois Oil Co. v. 26 Ill. 2d (1962). N.E.2d First, guidelines apply
Courts use several
the four-corners rule.
they
language
language
look to the
of the contract alone. If the
of the
unambiguous,
contract
a matter
interpreted
is
the contract is
If, however,
language
law without the aid of
paroi evidence.
open
meaning,
ambiguity
present
contract is
to more than one
an
is
only
may
and
paroi
help
ambigu
then
evidence be used to
resolve the
ity.
462-63,
Air
Safety,
at
The contract is found “Financing is entitled of Lessee”: Option [ljessee may Waldron, financing help doing “The seek from Don Co., Northgate corporation business as Amusement or with a or an business which Don Waldron has the interest. the event that any [l]essee becomes indebted to said Don or such Waldron business, corporation any or and Don Waldron or such business any premises equipment demands or claims a lien on herein, or any option Don Waldron or such business will have the purchase premises property herein for the total balance (90) [o]ption [plurchase, ninety [l]ease due on this asserting [l]essor written notice to after said lien or claim. Failure option any of Don Waldron or such business to exercise said shall any rights any corporation terminate or claims of Don Waldron or [l]ease or business in which he has an interest. Endorsement of this acceptance be an of the terms herein.” Don Waldron will added.) « (Emphasis contract,
(cid:127)6 two conditions must occur before According to (1) trigger 90-day option period: defendants Vono must be indebted (2) defendants, defendants must demand or claim a lien on property equipment subject question, or to the lease. Without Vono not demand or became indebted to defendants and defendants did Defendants, therefore, property. against premises claim a lien Plaintiff, 90-day option period. argue they have not a lien” is inconsis- however, phrase contends the “demands or claims claim,” later in the lien or which occur tent with the words “said same sentence. brief, along with his one
Plaintiff submitted two affidavits attorney prepared the lease and the other from the who himself intent never to for him. These affidavits state contract *8 was included Waldron, paragraph six defendant do business with acquired any interest if ever in the lease to insure defendant Waldron property the pay have to for defendant Waldron would property, in the According plaintiff, to property. any future interest to the in full or lose “some sort lease, acquired the defendant Waldron assigned when Vono lease, which, paragraph under six property, in the of interest” 90-day option period. The “said unambiguous. clear and language find the contract is We claims a the “demands or language simply lien or claim” refers to definitions of occurring in the Two language lien” earlier sentence. “[a] “lien” as a “claim”: Dictionary in Black’s refer to a “lien” Law debt, claim, encumbrance, payment for of some charge property or interest duty”; “[r]ight against or claim some obligation or Dic- an Black’s Law property by created law as incident contract.” (6th 1990). Therefore, prop- if one “claims a lien” on tionary 922 ed. or a erty, it to refer to the lien as either a “claim” proper would “lien,” lien” near the end explains and this the use of “said claim or paragraph language paragraph of the second sentence of six. The and, unambiguous, accordingly, interpret six is clear and we will paragraph -without reference to extrinsic evidence.
Further, we will not consider extrinsic evidence because contract an integration [a]greement contains clause: “This constitutes agreement parties relating subject the entire between the mat hereof, superseding prior agreements, may only ter all be modified parties.” a instrument executed all written stated, parties formally integration has include an clause “where contract, they manifesting protect their their intention to explicitly might against misinterpretations themselves arise Safety, extrinsic evidence.” Air 185 Ill. 2d at at 885. N.E.2d goes great lengths persuade paragraph us six reads very generously, language “said lien or claim” means a “claim,” “lien,” trigger 90-day option. in addition to a could Plaintiff further in defen- assignment asserts of the lease resulted However, dant acquiring property. Waldron a “claim” to the provides authority supporting proposition assignment no an of a may property, lease a and our research against be considered “claim” authority. rendered no such paragraph
Even if to construe six to mean defendants’ we were period, the trigger 90-day option demand of a lien or claim would A assignment against property. of a lease cannot be considered a claim “[djemand action,” generally “claim” is defined as cause of “[a] money Black’s property right,” “[rjight payment.” as of or a (6th 1990). lease, Dictionary assigned Law de- ed. When Vono fendant Waldron actually became lessee and acquired a contractual duty pay plaintiff word, rent. Even in the broadest sense of the acquired defendants never against plaintiffs a “claim” property when assigned Vono the lease to them.
Paragraph six is clear and unambiguous and meaning its can be gleaned language from the contract alone. Even if the contract *9 is interpreted broadly to include proposition a “claim” could trigger the 90-day option period, acquired defendants never a “claim” against plaintiffs property. We also note plaintiffs attorney drafted contract, such, and as it interpreted against should be Sy him. Bank, manski v. First National 242 App. Ill. 3d 609 N.E.2d (1993). 989, 992 easily could have written paragraph six of the lease to assignment include an of the lease a trigger to the 90- day option period if such Accordingly, was his intent. He did not. trial court properly granted summary judg defendants’ motion for ment.
III. CONCLUSION Plaintiff failed to timely appeal file a notice of within 30 after entry judgment, and, therefore, of final we the appeal. dismiss dismissed.
Appeal
COOK, J., concurs. MYERSCOUGH, JUSTICE dissenting: respectfully I request dissent and that the court revisit Mitchell, a case in which I trial In judge. was the neither the accurately case at bar nor Mitchell could the appellants have given monitored their cases the multitude of in the mistakes circuit occur, clerk’s office. Where these ministerial errors trial courts should be able to correct those errors. here, Mitchell, actually mistake as in was fault of the
circuit clerk. The only way accurately counsel could have monitored this case constantly, daily, parte was to initiate ex communica- .even judge or, tions with the perhaps, reporter secretary, or her court his if enough certainly he is fortunate to have one. Such communication is Attempts undesirable. through monitor case the circuit clerk’s office, malfeasance, futile, in the face of obvious would be as well as nearly physically given overworked, traffic in our impossible, understaffed, underpaid clerks’ offices.
Moreover, Mitchell, monitoring through the case the clerk’s of- fice not have of the order because it was not would uncovered by the misplaced had been sheet or the file but entered in the docket to find the or- was, fact, period unable for a of time The clerk clerk. situation, the circuit clerk the Mitchell response I requested. der system to ensure that County established Sangamon system required the out as ordered. This and orders were sent entries that of service each time certify proof file and a written circuit clerk to by mail as the trial court ordered. is sent out a docket or order on at least three in the case at bar This followed was following April 14, 2000, and one occasions, prior two attorneys of record: upon by relied and was “PETER PAPPAS 99 MR 000273
VS DONALDWALDRON
PROOF OF SERVICE undersigned foregoing, together certifies that service of herein, made copy with a of the 9-15-99 docket referred to enclosing copy envelope plainly in an addressed to: a true thereof
Atty Young Duane
1330 S. 8th St.
Ste. 2
Spfld, Illinois postage pre-paid in the Mail on the depositing the same U.S. Sept[.], day
16th 1999.
Anthony R Libri Circuit Clerk JB_ Deputy Clerk Libri[,] Jr.[,] 16[,] Anthony ([stamped] Sep[t.] FILED 1999 CIV-7 E Clerk the Circuit Court * CIRCUIT COURT
[certified] [of the] SEAL 7th JUDICIAL *)” CO., ILL SANGAMON
“PETER PAPPAS 99 MR 000273
VS DONALDWALDRON
PROOF OF SERVICE foregoing, together undersigned certifies that service herein, referred to was made copy with a of the docket 10-26-99 enclosing copy envelope plainly thereof in an addressed to: a true D[J
DUANE YOUNG LABARRE, YOUNG & DIETRICH ST[.], 1330 S. 8TH SUITE
SPRINGFIELD!,] IL 62703 C[J
THOMAS PAVLIK
1 SE OLD STATE CAPITOL
SPRINGFIELD!,] IL 62701 and depositing the same in postage pre-paid the U.S. Mail on the day Oct[.] 27th
Anthony P[J Libri Circuit Clerk _B_ Deputy Clerk ([stamped] 27[,] FILED Anthony Libri[,] Jr.[,] Oct[.] 1999 CIV-7 P Clerk of the Circuit Court *
[certified] [of the] SEAL 7th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT *)” CO., SANGAMON ILL
“PETER PAPPAS
VS 99 MR 000273 DONALD WALDRON
PROOF OF SERVICE undersigned certifies that foregoing, together service of the a copy herein, with of the docket 9-19-00 referred to made enclosing copy a true in an envelope plainly thereof addressed to: D[J
DUANE YOUNG LABARRE, YOUNG & DIETRICH ST[J, 1330 S. 8TH SUITE [,]
SPRINGFIELD IL 62703 C[.]
THOMAS PAVLIK
1 SE OLD STATE CAPITOL
SPRINGFIELD!,] IL 62701 depositing pre-paid postage the same the U.S. Mail on the day Oct[.]
27th of
Anthony P[.] Libri Clerk Circuit _il_ Deputy Clerk Libri[,] Jr.[,] Anthony 27[,] CIV-7 E FILED ([stamped] Oct[J Court Clerk of the Circuit * COURT [of JUDICIAL CIRCUIT [certified] the] SEAL 7th *)” CO., ILL
SANGAMON occasion, the clerk failed April critical Unfortunately, on the awarding summary judgment, al- entry mail the trial court’s docket entry judge’s court file at though the clerk did enter docket entry stated: direction to the cause of action. docket strike APPLETON, Rep: THOMAS Judge: DOCKET D R. “4/14/2000 [,] MARY FITZGERALD for the Motion Sum-
This cause comes on for consideration on present by mary Judgment party. parties filed Both each Arguments Judgment [defendant. is counsel. heard. entered question [defendant exists no of fact that has not There material any premises. lien on The lack of a part claimed a business precludes or claim of a the commencement the 90- demand lien A day THE SEND option period. CLERK IS DIRECTED TO COPY MR. OF DOCKET TO MR. AND YOUNG. THIS ENTRY PAVLIK CAUSE STRICKEN.” entry
The circuit clerk’s stated: Judge Signed Cause APPLETON THOMAS Stricken “4/14/2000 Report: Apr[.] R. Terminated 2000.” Status: Cause Stricken. judge’s the record (Although entry signature, this to the refers bearing signature.) entry judge’s contains or no docket document record, or when the unfortunately, does not reflect whether entry Judge Apple- Thomas April judgment order docket computer. placed in the court into the clerk’s Nei- input ton was file or ther is the clear when information available counsel record this was entry itself, fact, in the the docket computer. court file or clerk’s date time though not indicate on what dated does the court file. entry computer the docket in the actually placed in his reporter computer The fact a court enters a docket that does not clerk’s office transferred indicate whether or at computer contemporaneously file or the the case clerk’s circumstances, takes a matter judge where a a later date. Under such understanding ruling his or her will under with that advisement clerk, mailed at date a later *12 344
thereafter rules in her his or chambers and clerk directs to mail the the to ruling parties, the but the clerk fails to mail the the ruling, court not expressed words, has its order in publicly, at the situs proceeding required. 127, See Granite City, Ill. 2d at 565 N.E.2d i at 931. While this trial did expressly court not state that it rule would by mail, should, the court was to clearly rule mail. Graves therefore, is, control That the here. since order never was mailed the parties or their attorneys, the order did not become final purposes appeal.
Moreover, the court in supreme additionally Mitchell stated:
“The ‘mistake’ in the instant case was the belief of the circuit judgment court Mitchell’s counsel that a motion to vacate the order, entry, more than 30 after its a valid means thereby which the circuit court could reenter the same order and 30-day period appeal.” start new in file notice Mitch ell, 151, Ill. 2d at 632 N.E.2d 1013. at Here, “mistake,” the court and counsel made no such and for that reason, court should be allowed to correct the clerical error.
The supreme court al prior should follow law to Mitchell that apply equitable lowed courts to principles to correct mistakes (see ministerial officers Page County, Cesena v. Du (1991)), 582 N.E.2d litigant’s to excuse a mistaken reli (see judge’s ance on a erroneous direction v. Needham White (7th 1981)). Laboratories, Inc., However, 639 F.2d Cir. cases, distinguished Mitchell from stating: these believe, however, do not analogous “We that case at bar is equitable principles which employ cases to correct ministerial Mitchell, 158 at mistakes.” Ill. 2d at 632 N.E.2d actually very Mitchell mistakes involved found Cesena and (1) failing my Needham: the clerk’s mistake in to file and forward (2) decision and the court’s erroneous direction to file a motion to Clearly, judgment grounds vacate the order on the of the clerical error. officer, clerk, Mitchell both error involved of the ministerial judge’s The trial appellate erroneous direction. courts Mitchell, therefore, should have been affirmed.
Alternatively, distinguished since the Mitchell court its facts from Needham, indicating Cesena and a difference between the case at issue employ equitable principles there from the cases that correct mistakes, clearly ministerial court here can to correct the reverse error, relying clerk’s ministerial even on Mitchell. reasons, the trial
For I reverse court’s these would this case.