85 Neb. 397 | Neb. | 1909
An action for the foreclosure of tax liens was instituted in the district court under the provisions of what is known as the “Scavenger Law.” The county board having failed to name a paper in which the notice should be published, the treasurer designated the Papillion Times, a newspaper published by plaintiff. The notice was published and plaintiff presented its account to the county board of allowance. The claim was allowed in part only, and from the action of the board plaintiff appealed to the district court where the full claim for four publications at the statutory rate was allowed. The county appeals.
It appears from the record that there was some error
After the cause was removed to the district court, plaintiff filed its petition, alleging the corporate capacity of both plaintiff and defendant, the selection of plaintiff’s paper for the publication of the notice, its publication, the presentation of the account to the county board, the board’s action thereon in allowing less than was claimed to be due, and the appeal. The defendant answered, admitting the corporate capacity of the parties, the publication of the notice under the designation of the county treasurer, and denied all other averments. The fifth paragraph of the answer was as follows: “Affirmatively answering said petition defendant alleges at the time of said publication and at all times complained of in said petition various county officers of the defendant county, to wit, George P. Miller, county superintendent of public schools, P. D. McCormick, county clerk, Edward C. Mc-Evoy, county sheriff, I. H. McDaniel, clerk of the district court, and others were stockholders in. the plaintiff corporation, and as such were pecuniarily interested in the publication of said notice.” The plaintiff demurred to this paragraph upon the ground, that the facts stated therein did not constitute a defense. The demurrer was sustained. Defendant excepted to the ruling of the court and was given leave to file an amended answer by a date named. An amended answer was subsequently filed, which was practically the same as the original, with the exception of the fifth paragraph which was wholly omitted and another averment substituted as tire fifth, as follows: “Further and affirmatively answering said petition, this
An important question presented at the threshold of this case is as to whether the right to a review of the rulings of the court was not waived by the filing of the amended answers? If such is the case, we cannot legally decide as to the merits of the paragraphs referred to. In Maxwell, Code Pleading, p.: 380, it is said: “When a demurrer is sustained, and the pleader desires to amend, it has been held that he thereby waives his exception to the ruling of the court.” In Pottinger v. Garrison, 3 Neb. 221, we said: “The rule of law seems to be well settled that, in order to obtain a review of the decision of the district court, in sustaining or overruling a demurrer, in an appellate court, the party must suffer a judgment in chief to be rendered on the demurrer; and that, if he answers over and goes to trial upon the merits, he waives his demurrer to the pleading demurred to, and error cannot be assigned upon the judgment of the district court sustaining or overruling the demurrer.” This is doubtless the well-settled law of this country. Brown v. Brown, 71 Neb. 200; Worrall Grain Co. v. Johnson, 83 Neb. 349; Citizens State Bank v. Pence, 59 Neb. 579; Bankers Reserve Life Ass’n v. Finn, 64 Neb. 105; Palmer v. Caywood, 64 Neb. 372; First Nat. Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 104; Hurd v. Smith, 5 Colo. 233; Heman v. Glann, 129 Mo. 325; MacLachlan v. Pease, 171 Ill. 527; People v. Core, 85 Ill. 248; Bremen Mining & Milling Co. v. Bremen, 13 N. M. 111, 79 Pac. 806; Perkins v. Davis, 2 Mont. 474; Shamokin Bank v. Street, 16 Ohio St. 1; St. John v. Hardwick, 17 Ind. 180; Kennedy v. Anderson, 98 Ind. 151; Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. (U. S. 146; United States v. Boyd, 5 How. (U. S.) 29; Rosa v.
No reversible question being presented by the record, it follows that the judgment of the district court must be affirmed, which is done. *
Affirmed. '