18 Ind. App. 633 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1897
On the 1st day of November, 1892, appellant and appellee entered into a written contract as follows: “This contract made this 1st day of November, 1892, by and between Fleming Manufacturing Company, of Fort Wayne, county of Allen, party of the first part, and E. L. Lathrop, of Fort Wayne, party of the second part. Witnesseth, that for the considerations hereinafter mentioned on the part of the second party, the first party agrees to, and does hereby, hire the second party for a period of three years, from November 1, 1892, at a salary of one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) per month, together with the legitimate traveling expenses incurred for the first party, the second party agrees as follows: (1) To render services to the best of his ability, as inventor, mechanic, and general- traveling man for the benefit of the business of the first party; (2) to give no influence or help in any way to any competing person during the continuance of this contract; (3) to render at the end of each week an itemized expense account of the money expended for the first party; (4) to make application for all improvements and inventions in road machines desired by the first party, said inventions, if patentable, to be assigned to party of the first part for their interest, use, and keeping during the life of the patent, the expenses to be borne by the first party, and first party agrees to make no-changes in any machine without consultation with party of second part.”
The appellee sued appellant for an alleged breach of the foregoing contract, and drafted his .complaint in
The breach of the contract alleged in the second paragraph of complaint is so nearly identical to the first, that it is unnecessary to set it out again.
1st. General denial.
2d. That soon after appellant employed appellee, as set out in the contract sued upon, the appellee, without cause or reason, became very much offended at one Schneider, appellant’s foreman in his said factory, and would often during said employment, without authority from appellant, countermand ordfers and instructions given by said foreman, to the employes in his said factory, which said employés were under said foreman, and which resulted in great confusion among said employes and great loss and damage to appellant’s business; that appellee’s ill-feeling toward said foreman grew to such an extent that appellee notified appellant that said foreman would have to quit the employment of said appellant; that if said Schneider did not quit or was not discharged from appellant’s employment, he, appellee, would quit; that said appellee demanded said discharge in an insolent and impudent manner, and openly and repeatedly, in the hearing of other employes of appellant, boasted that he, or said Schneider would have to quit; that they could not work in the same factory, and that- he did not have to work for defendant (appellant); that these acts on the part of appellee engendered an ill feeling on the part of other employes toward said foreman, which appellee tried to aggravate to such an extent that several of said employes quit appellant’s employ, which resulted in great injury to his said business; that for the purpose of avoiding further difficulty between appellee and said foreman, and further trouble among the employes, appellant sent appellee out on the road to sell goods, in order to keep him away from said
3d. That appellant discharged appellee, and offered to and did pay him the amount due him under the contract, to all of which appellee agreed and consented, and received and accepted the said amount for his services.
4th. The fourth paragraph is a counterclaim, and avers that appellant runs and operates a large factory, and had, at the time appellee was in his employment, a foreman, by the name of Schneider; that on the-day of June, 1893, while said foreman was in the discharge of his duties as such foreman, and without cause or reason, in the presence of a large number of other employes, appellee assaulted and beat said foreman in a cruel and inhuman manner, cutting, bruising, and injuring him so severely that he was unable for a month to discharge his said duties; that he has not yet fully recovered; that said assault created great
Appellee demurred to the three affirmative answers of appellant, which demurrer was overruled and appellee excepted. Reply by general denial. This cause was commenced in the Allen Circuit Court, and after a trial there, resulting in a verdict for appellee, and the granting of a new trial, the venue was changed to the Wells Circuit Court, where a trial by jury resulted in a general verdict for appellee for $1,846.12. Appellant moved in writing for a new trial, and assigned eighty-nine reasons therefor. His motion was overruled, judgment rendered upon the verdict, and he appeals, and has assigned errors as follows:
1. The court erred in overruling motion for a new trial.
2. The court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress portions of the deposition of Herman Hohnholz.
3. The court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to strike out portions of the deposition of T. J. Hill.
The appellee has assigned cross-errors as follows:
1. The court erred in overruling appellee’s demurrer to the third paragraph of appellant’s answer.
2. The court, erred in overruling appellee’s demurrer to the'fourth paragraph of appellant’s answer.
The second and third assignments of error on behalf of appellant, do not present any question for our consideration. In Ohio, etc., R. W. Co. v. Judy, 120 Ind. 397, it is said: “A ruling on a motion to strike out parts of depositions must be assigned as cause for a new trial in order to present any question on appeal.” This is the settled rule,in this State. Hatton v. Jones, 78 Ind. 466; Bank and Loan Co. v. Dunn, 106 Ind. 110.
1. The record does not show that the motion was presented to the court.
2. It is not signed by counsel.
We do not think these objections are well taken. On March 2Í, 1895, during the March term of the Wells Circuit Court, and the term at which the case was tried, appellant presented a certain bill of exceptions, which was examined and signed by the judge, and immediately following the record showing the signature of the judge to this bill of exceptions is this entry: “Defendant also files motion and written reasons for a new trial in this behalf in these words, to wit:” Then follows the motion in full. It is true the record does not show that the motion was signed by counsel, but the court and counsel for appellee recognized it as a valid motion; the court subsequently overruled it and pronounced judgment in favor of appellee on the verdict. If counsel for appellee had raised the question below, the omission of counsel to sign the motion for a new trial could have been remedied, or upon their failure or refusal to do so, after their attention had been called to the omission, such motion might have been stricken from the files, on proper application; but when the court regarded the motion for a new trial as a perfect and statutory motion, and acted upon it by overruling it, and when no objection was made in the trial court as being in any wise defective on appeal, the mere fact of the omission of counsel to sign it will be deemed waived.
Before taking up for consideration any of the ques
The first error of which appellant complains, is the admission of certain evidence given by appellee. In
Both by the contract between appellant and appellee, and the law, the ownership of the patented shifting axle, claimed by appellee, was determined, and hence the question of its value was foreign to the issues. The tendency of the evidence was to prejudice the jury against the appellant, and it was error for the court to permit the question to be propounded and answered. Where evidence has been improperly admitted, it will be presumed .that it influenced the result, unless the contrary clearly appears. Baker v. Dessauer, 49 Ind. 28; Thompson v. Wilson, 34 Ind. 94; Barnett v. Leonard, 66 Ind. 422.
Our conclusion upon this question makes it unnecessary, to notice the second alleged error which Appellant discusses, and which calls in question the ruling of the court, in excluding certain offered evidence, on the cross-examination of appellee, relating to his knowledge of the fact that Schneider had applied for and been granted a patent for the same device claimed by him, and that the question of the rightful owner of the patent had been decided' against him. It is sufficient to say that neither of these inquiries were within the issues, and did not throw any light upon the main controversy.
The appellant insists that the court below erred in admitting certain evidence over his objection, the object of which was to fix a motive for the discharge of appellee other than that pleaded in the answer. We quote some of them, and our decision of them will be of controlling influence as to all others of a like character. On cross-examination of appellant, these questions were asked him, viz:
1. “You discharged him (appellee) for going into
2. “You discharged him (appellee) because he went into the shop?” Answer. “Yes, and in having a fight in working hours with Schneider.”
, The questions just quoted were immediately followed by those to which appellant objected.
3. “Were you not intending to discharge him (appellee) long before that?”
4. “I will ask you to state if you have not stated on a previous occasion that you only kept Mr. Lathrop for some time prior to the time you actually did discharge him, to get his deposition in a law suit with the Western Scraper Company?”
And in rebuttal, Harmon Hohnholz was called as a witness for appellee, and in his examination in chief was asked these questions:
5. “Did you have a conversation with defendant (appellant) in reference to the employment or contract he had with Mr. Lathrop?” Answer. “I did.”
6. “You may. state what that conversation was?” Answer. “Mr. Pape told me he had hired Mr. Lathrop for $1,800.00 a year, and as I thought I was a good salesman, I thought I might have more, and I objected and told Mr. Pape I was not satisfied with that, and he explained to me. I was to keep quiet; he merely paid him $1,800.00 because he needed his testimony in some law suit, and after he got that testimony, he would find a way to shift him.”
We have numbered these questions for convenient reference in disposing of them. In number three appellant was asked if he had not intended to discharge appellee long before he actually did. Even if appellant had intended to discharge appellee prior to the time he did, such fact afforded no reason or motive for his discharge at the time it was made. It was not a ques
Question number four is so radically out of line with sound principle and the adjudicated cases, that it seems useless to discuss it. If the question had any purpose in view, it was either to lay the foundation for an impeachment or contradiction, or to establish a motive on the part of appellant for the discharge of appellee, and in either event the question was an improper one. If the purpose was to lay the foundation for an impeachment, it was wanting in' three essential elements, to wit: (1) No time is fixed; (2) no place is designated, and (3) no person is named. When an impeaching question is asked a witness, the rules of evidence and fair dealing guarantee to him, to the end that he may, within reasonable bounds protect himself,, and that he may not be taken unaware, that the question shall be definite, directed to a certain fact or facts, and within the limits of a reasonably fixed time. We know of no exception to this rule., If the purpose of the question was to establish a motive, it is equally objectionable as will appear from a further discussion of the question.
Questions five and six were also objectionable. The witness Hohnholz was called in rebuttal. We have searched the record in vain to find where appellant was asked about any conversation with him, and hence this part of his evidence was not in rebuttal of any evidence offered by appellant. These two questions also sought to elicit some facts from Hohnholz to establish a motive, for the discharge of appellee. The answer to question six is also objectionable for the reason it is not responsive to the question, and is merely the conclusion of the witness, without detailing the conversation asked for. The objections to
Each of these questions, in our judgment, were objectionable, and it was error for the court to overrule the objections thereto. The motive or intention for employing or discharging appellee were not subjects of legitimate inquiry. The sole issue was whether or not there was a breach of the contract of employment. If there was a breach, and that breach had been committed by appellant, he was liable to respond in damages. If there was a breach on the part of the appellee, and he was discharged by reason thereof, he has no cause of action. Appellant grounded his defense upon the affirmative matter charged in his .answer, and if he has failed to establish such affirmative matter by a fair preponderance of the evidence, his defense must fail, and no ulterior motive on his part can be inquired into.
The appellee had made a prima facie case when he had shown the execution of his contract of employment and established the fact of his discharge before the expiration of the term of his employment.
The motive of the appellant/ either in employing or discharging him, could not add to the measure of damages, and the only effect such evidence could have, as it could throw no light upon the merits of the controversy, was to poison the minds of the jurors against the appellant, and impress upon them that appellee had performed for him a valuable service, for which he had not received just remuneration.
That the motive or intention of the master in discharging his servant, for cause, cannot be inquired into, is sustained by the authorities. Wood on Master and Servant, 230; Spotswood v. Barrow, 5 Exch. 110;
Henry Schneider was called as a witness on behalf of appellant. On cross-examination, and over appellant’s objection, the' following questions were propounded to him:
1. “I will ask you to state whether or not in the shop a short time before Mr. Lathrop came back from Illinois, whether you stated to John Flashman and Herman Miller, or either of them, in a conversation relating to Lathrop, that if he came back you would get a way to fix him, or get rid of him?” Ans. “I did not.”
2. “Mr. Schneider, I will ask you to state to the court and jury whether or not you stated to Herman A. Miller, while Lathrop was out on the road, about two weeks before the difficulty, that you came up to Miller at his place of work in the shop you were working in, and you said, referring to Lathrop: ‘That damned---(we omit the vulgar epithets used, as they are too offensive to find a place in the book) is going to come home soon, but we have got it all “fixed so he won’t stay here.’ Did you make that statement at the time and place I have stated to Mr. Harmon A. Miller?” Answer. “No, sir.”
Other like questions, pertaining to the same alleged conversation with Miller and Stroub were asked Schneider, but it is not necessary to embody them in this opinion.
On rebuttal, Miller and Stroub were permitted, over the objection of appellant, to contradict Schneider in regard to the conversation he had with them relating to what he said, or is charged to have said, about getting rid of appellee on his return from Illinois. There is no rule of evidence under which this testimony was admissible. It cannot be contended
We come next to a brief consideration of some of the instructions given by the court, and the refusal to give others requested by appellant. At the request of appellee the court gave instruction number eleven as follows:
“To justify a person in the right of self-defense it is not always necessary that he shall wait until the blow is struck or the wound given; but if he reasonably believe from the situation and the surroundings that he is in imminent danger, and great bodily harm, and acting upon such reasonable appearances, being without fault, he may, in defense of his person, strike at once, and may continue such defense until he no longer reasonably believes that he is in further danger of great bodily harm.” * * *
Instruction number three, tendered by appellant, is as follows: “The defendant in one paragraph of his answer, says that he was carrying on a large business, and employed a large number of men, among whom was a foreman by the name of Schneider; that he, the defendant directed the plaintiff to stay away from that part of the factory in which he carried on the business that was overseen by said Schneider; that notwithstanding such orders, the plaintiff went into that part of the factory where he knew said Schneider was engaged as foreman of part of defendant’s business; that in the presence of other employes of the defendant, plaintiff assaulted and beat said Schneider while acting as such foreman. If you find from this evidence that the defendant did have such business; that a part of it was managed and controlled by a foreman by the name of Schneider; that the defendant directed the plaintiff to .stay aw'ay from that part of his factory, and not have anything to do with, or interfere with said Schneider, or to go where he was in said factory; and there said plaintiff, notwithstanding such
The court refused to give this instruction, but gave it as modified. The modification as made by the court consisted in inserting in the body of the instruction, between the words “did” and “assault,” the words, “willfully mcl not in proper defense of his person,” and also by adding, at its close, the words, “and not in self-defense” As applied to the answer and the established facts in the case, the instruction as tendered by the appellant correctly stated the law.' The substance of the instruction was to the effect that if the appellee disobeyed the orders of his master, and assaulted his foreman, it was such an act of insubordination as would authorize appellant to -discharge him. The question that should have been submitted to the jury, was not whether the appellee “willfully and not in proper defense of his person,” assaulted the foreman of appellant, but whether he disobeyed an express command or order of appellant, and did assault appellant’s foreman. The modification of the instruction goes to the extent of saying to the jury, that notwithstanding the appellee disobeyed the orders of appellant, and assaulted his foreman, such conduct would be justifiable if he did not act willfully. The relation of master and servant implies obedience to the master’s orders relating to'his business, and that the servant, during the term, will yield his will and convenience to that of his master within the bounds of all
At the request of appellee, the court gave the following instruction:
“17. In estimating the damages the plaintiff should recover in this action, if you find he was wrongfully discharged by the defendant, you may consider the employment he now has, if you find he is employed, the amount he is now receiving, the probability of his being able to retain his present position, until the expiration of the time under which the defendant had contracted to employ him, or that he occupied his time at his own or other remunerative business, and after taking the amount you find from the evidence that plaintiff might reasonably earn during the unexpired portion of his contract with the defendant, you should allow him then as damages the difference between that amount and the amount stipulated by his contract to be paid him by the defendant.' The damages so assessed by you not to extend beyond this trial.”
The instruction is subject to objection, because it is wanting in at least one essential element of the measure of damages, and for the additional reason that it invades the field of speculation and uncertainty. The court said to the jury: “You may consider the employment he now has” * * ”* * and “the amount he is now receiving.” It was not essential as to what his employment was at the time, or how much he was receiving for his services; but how much he had earned, or might reasonably have earned, up to the time of the trial.
The instruction omits the important element as to what he had, or what he might reasonably have earned. The court also told the jury they might consider “the probability to retain his present position until the expiration of the time under which the defendant had contracted to employ him.” This was not a legitimate
In the case of Hamilton v. Love, supra, Hackney, C. J., says: “While the contract rate has been adopted as the just measure of compensation, where a discharged servant may recover for the entire unexpired term of the contract, and while he may sue before the contract term has expired, there are just and necessary limitations upon these rules. One limitation is that, if he sues before the expiration of the contract term, he is limited in his recovery to the time when the trial takes place. If this were not true, he would be permitted to recover damages in advance of their accrual, and, having recovered such damages, secure other employment, and thereby obtain double compensation for the period which follows the trial.”
And in the case of Gordon v. Brewster, supra, it was said: “In ascertaining the amount of damages on his contract running four years, we do not think the court and jury were authorized in assuming that the same state of things existing at the time of the trial would continue until the expiration of the contract. Had the respondent seen fit to wait before bringing his action until the period had elapsed for the complete performance of the agreement, the measure of compensation could then have been easily arrived at. * * * But, as the case now stands, we think he is only entitled to recover his salary on the contract down to the day of trial, deducting therefrom any wages which he might have received, or might have reasonably earned in the meantime. This rule appears to us to be the most equitable and safe of any that occurs to our minds, and the one most likely to effect substantial justice between the parties.”
There are other alleged errors in the record which the learned counsel have discussed, both in their oral arguments and their briefs, but as the same questions * will not likely arise in a subsequent trial of the case, we do not deem it necessary to notice them here, as the judgment must be reversed for the reasons already given.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to the court below to grant appellant a new trial, and for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.