This is an appeal in a suit against immigration officials and against a vessel, her master and owners, asking damages , on the ground of false imprisonment. The appellants, who were libelants in the court below, are two Greek seamen, Andreas Papagianakis and Zafiras Kymos, who arrived in the port of Norfolk on June 29, 1949, as members of the crew of the Greek vessel “Samos.” On inspecting the crew of the vessel, Harold G. Lamoureaux, Immigration Inspector at Norfolk, issued an order that these seamen be detained on board the vessel, finding that they were not bona fide seamen. They were detained pursuant to the order, being locked up at night to prevent their escape from the vessel, until they were released in habeas corpus proceedings. The judge below ordered their release on the ground that the finding of the Immigration Inspector was not supported by substantial evidence and on appeal we affirmed this order. Regan v. Papagianakis et al., 4 Cir.,
An intervening libel, filed by appellants in a proceeding pending in the lower court against the vessel, sought to implead the immigration officials and recover damages against them and against the vessel, her master and owners, on account of the detention from which appellants had been released in the habeas corpus proceedings.
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The immigration officials filed exceptions to the libel and it was dismissed as to them on the ground that their actions
On the question as to the correctness of the order discharging the immigration officials from the suit, there can be no question but that, even though the detention order of the immigration inspector was not supported by substantial evidence, he was acting in the line of official duty in issuing it. It is provided by statute that a vessel arriving at a port of the United States shall detain alien seamen aboard until they shall have been inspected by an immigration officer at the port and shall deport them if required by the immigration officer to do so. 8 U.S.C.A. § 167. Alien seamen seeking to enter a port solely in pursuit of their calling as seamen are exempted from requirements relating to immigrants, 8 U.S.C.A. § 203(5); and they are allowed to land for the purpose of reshipping under such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe. 8 U.S.C.A. § 168. These regulations prescribe that, where the immigration officer is not satisfied that an alien applying for temporary admission is a bona fide alien seaman, he shall order that he be detained aboard the vessel and be deported. Section 120.21(e) of 8 C.F.R. is as follows: “Where the immigration officer is not satisfied that an alien applying for temporary admission as a bona fide alien seaman is entitled thereto, the immigration officer shall order the owner, charterer, agent, consignee, or master of the vessel on which such seaman arrived to detain him on board and deport him in the manner provided by law.”
It is perfectly clear, therefore, that, in inspecting the crew of the “Samos” and issuing the order that appellants be detained aboard the vessel, the immigration inspector was engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by statute and one which involved the exercise of discretion and the performance of a function of a quasi judicial character. It is true that the statute, 8 U.S.C.A. § 167(a), imposes the duty upon the “immigration officer in charge”; but the order was issued “by direction of the immigration and naturalization officer in charge”, and we think there can be no question but that such authority may be validly delegated by the immigration officer in charge to the immigration inspectors working under him. In a busy port such delegation is essential to the proper transaction of business.
The question presented is whether an officer in the executive department of the government may be held liable in a suit for damages because of acts done in the discharge of official duty involving the exercise of discretion of a quasi judicial character. We think that this question must be answered in the negative, as it was answered by the court below. It has long been settled that judicial officers may not be held liable in damages for acts performed in the discharge of their duties. Randall v. Brigham,
As noted above, the argument upon which the Supreme Court bases its decision in Spalding v. Vilas, supra, applies in principle in the case of other executive officers as well as heads of departments ;- and it was so applied in the case of a special assistant to the Attorney General in Yaselli v. Goff, 2 Cir.,
In Cooper v. O’Connor,
“The rule as now declared in many cases has been applied, not only to officials judicial and quasi-judicial, but to executive officers generally, such as the Postmaster General, the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Members of the United States Parole Board, the Parole Executive, the Warden of a Federal penitentiary, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, a building inspector, the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the Chief of Record and Pension Office of the War Department.
“The reason now given for the rule is simply one of public policy. ‘Otherwise the perfect freedom which ought to exist in discharge of public duty might be seriously restrained, and often to the detriment of the public service.’ De Arnaud v. Ainsworth,
In Gregoire v. Biddle, 2 Cir.,
“It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. Judged as res nova, we should not hesitate to follow the path laid down in the books.
“The decisions have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation upon the immunity that the official’s act must have been within the scope of his powers; and it can be argued that official powers, since they exist only for the public good, never cov
See also 43 Am.Jur. pp. 86-89; 22 Am.Jur. p. 397; Dreucker v. Solomon,
On the basis of the foregoing authorities, it is perfectly clear that, since the immigration officials were acting in line of duty and were engaged in a discretionary, quasi judicial function in the issuance of the detention order, they may not be held liable therefor in damages, whatever motive may be alleged for issuing same. We think, also, that even under the rule laid down by some of the older cases, i.e. that the officer would be liable if actuated by malice or other sinister motive, they were properly dismissed from the case, since there is no allegation that they were- actuated by malice or any improper motive in issuing the order. See Gibson v. Reynolds, 8 Cir.,
Nor do we think that the suit can be maintained against the immigration officials because the libel alleges violation of the Civil Rights Act. This was sufficiently dealt with by Judge Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, supra. Screws v. United States,
On the question as to the liability of the vessel, her master and owners, little need be said. Appellants were detained by them on board the vessel; but this was justified by the order of the Immigration Inspector. The Edit H., 4 Cir.,
There is nothing in the record to support the charge that anyone connected with the vessel induced the immigration authorities to issue the detention order or that it was issued for any reason other than as found by the Immigration Inspector, viz., that petitioners were believed not to be bona fide seamen because, to quote the Inspector, “Both men signed on in France just prior to ship’s sailing for the United States. Both requested to be paid off to join another ship. But did not name any ship that they had in mind. Neither man had ever paid off in the United States before. They
Appellants complain because default judgment was not granted them; but whether such judgment should have been entered or respondents allowed to answer was a matter resting in the sound discretion of the District Judge,
Affirmed.
Notes
. The pertinent allegations of the intervening libel are as follows:
“That upon the return of said vessel to Hampton Roads, Virginia, the aforesaid Master contrived to have said intervening libelants detained on board by instigating the aforesaid Harold 6. Lamour-eaux, acting under the directions of the
. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 43 and 47.