583 A.2d 826 | Pa. | 1990
Esther PAPA, Appellant,
v.
FRANKLIN MINT CORPORATION, Peg Hladky and Ed Leudtke, Appellees.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
*359 Barry Levin, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Louis A. Bove, Philadelphia, for Franklin Mint, appellee.
Before WIEAND, KELLY and CERCONE, JJ.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
In this action to recover damages for depression and emotional distress alleged to have been inflicted upon the plaintiff intentionally by her employer and co-employees, the trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant employer because of the exclusivity provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. See: Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, § 481(a), as amended, 77 P.S. § 481(a). After careful review, we affirm.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that there is no intentional tort exception to the exclusivity clause of the Workmen's Compensation Law. See: Barber v. Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, 521 Pa. 29, 555 A.2d 766 (1989); Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc., 514 Pa. 32, 522 A.2d 548 (1987). The exclusivity provision is not rendered ineffective merely because the claimant-employee, in proceedings to recover workmen's compensation benefits, was unable to prove a compensable injury.[1] For injuries allegedly occurring during the course of employment, an employee's remedy is limited to those provided by the Act. If the employee fails to prove a compensable injury in workmen's compensation proceedings, such failure will not support a *360 second attempt to prove injury in a common law tort action against the same employer.
The judgment entered in favor of the Franklin Mint Corporation is affirmed.
NOTES
[1] See: Papa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Franklin Mint Corporation), 121 Pa.Commw. 10, 549 A.2d 1352 (1988).