265 Pa. 291 | Pa. | 1919
Opinion by
On January 4, 1917, plaintiff was injured while working for defendant. He was taken to the Brownsville General Hospital for treatment, and on February 17, 1917, defendant’s insurance carrier paid the hospital for its services, as required by section 306, clause (e), of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of June 2,1915, P. L. 736.
Article III of the act embraces the subject of compensation, and is divided into sections 301 to 319, each inclusive. Section 301 provides: “Compensation for personal injury......shall be made......according to the schedules contained in sections 306 and 307 of this article.” Those schedules cover every kind of compensable injury and wherever therein the word “compensation” is used, it refers to payments to be made to the employee, or to his widow, children or dependents.
Clause (d) of section 306, which is not a part of the schedule, provides, however: “(d) No compensation shall be allowed for the first fourteen days after disability begins, except as hereinafter provided in clause (e) of this section”; and appellant argues from the use of the word “except” that the payments “hereinafter provided in clause (e)” are also intended by the legislature to be “compensation.” Doubtless it would be so held if clause (d) was the only one to be considered; but what is said above, and the sections hereinafter referred to, alike negative the inference sought to be drawn therefrom.
Clause (e) is as follows: “(e) During the first fourteen days after disability begins the employer shall furnish reasonable surgical, medical and hospital services, medicines and supplies, as and when needed, unless the
Moreover, it is said in section 308: “Except as hereinafter provided, all compensation payable under this article shall be payable in periodical installments, as the wages of the employee were payable before the accident”; and in section 316, which is the section immediately succeeding the one setting forth the limitation of one year, and is the “hereinafter provided” of section 308, it is said: “The compensation contemplated by this article may at any time be commuted by the Board,” etc. It is clear the “compensation” specified in those sections does not refer to the payments for “reasonable surgical, medical and hospital services, medicines and supplies,” under section 306, clause (e), but only to those to be made to the injured employee, or in case of his death to
It follows that appellant’s petition was filed too late, and hence,
The order of the court below is affirmed.