Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co.Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co.
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This appeal arises out of a denial of a motion to open and set aside a judgment discharging the defendant’s mechanic’s lien on the real property of the plaintiff.
The record establishes that the defendant, Hartford Cement and Building Supply Company, on September 26,1979, placed a mechanic’s lien on real property in Norwalk owned by the plaintiff, Pantlin and Chananie Development Corporation. Pursuant to
Four additional defendants, each a subcontractor which had filed a mechanic’s lien on the real estate owned by the plaintiff, appeared at the hearing and settled their claims with the plaintiff.2 The court ordered that the share of available funds allocated to the defendant3 be prorated among three of the defendants “if no appeal is filed by Hartford Cement or if the appeal is filed but not successful.”
Two days after the court rendered judgment against the defendant, the defendant filed a motion to “reopen and set aside judgment of default and/or discharge of mechanic’s lien” pursuant to
In its memorandum of decision in response to those various motions, the court held that the exclusive mode of review of the propriety of its prior judgment discharging the mechanic’s lien was an appeal to this court within seven days of the discharge as provided under
Within one week of the judgment denying its motion to open and set aside, the defendant filed an appeal from the judgments rendered by the court discharging the mechanic’s lien and denying its motion to open and set aside, and from the court’s declining to consider its motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s application to discharge. As alternate grounds for error, the defendant claims that there was error in the trial court’s failure to grant his motion to open and set aside the judgment and in the court’s underlying failure to dismiss the plaintiff’s application for discharge. Both claims of error argue that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant as a result of defective service of process or an unreasonably brief notice period before the scheduled hearing on the plaintiff’s application.
We agree with the defendant that the trial court was in error in failing to address those issues. In *258determining whether to open a judgment upon a default or nonsuit, the trial court must consider whether the party prejudiced by the judgment has sustained its burden of “showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of such judgment or the passage of such decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting or making the same.”
The trial court’s refusal to consider the merits of the defendant’s motion to open and set aside the judgment was grounded on a misreading of
There is error, therefore, in the appeal from the judgment denying the defendant’s motion to open and set aside, that judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings with regard to that motion. Because its resolution may well render moot the defendant’s appeal from the judgment discharging the mechanic’s lien, we decline to review that judgment at this time.
Notes
One of the lienors, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Company, intervened in subsequent proceedings initiated by the defendant.
The court did not specify the amount of the defendant’s share, nor did it specify the basis of the share. Beview of the transcript reveals that the amount availible for distribution among the lienors was $14,124. At oral argument, counsel for plaintiff indicated that the defendant’s pro rata share in the amount of $6143 is being held by the plaintiff pending disposition of the present appeal.
The record indicates that the trial court ordered that the order for discharge of the lien should be set aside and that the defendant should bo allowed to present evidence. In light of the memorandum of decision and corresponding judgment, the order as it appears in the record is apparently in error.
At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to correct the record, filed more than four months after the filing of the appeal, the court again declined to decide the defendant’s motion for extension of *258time-within which to file an appeal and its motion to dismiss. The court did not address the defendant’s motion for stay of execution pending appeal.