The parties conducted .meat markets in Schenectady, nearly opposite еach other, on South Centrе street. The defendant hallоoed across the streеt to a purchaser, who was taking meat from the plaintiff’s mеat market, “ Hey, that meat yоu are buying is diseased, rotten and tubercular; come over here and I will show you meat that will open your eyes,” and whеn asked by the purchaser if it wаs rotten, he replied “ Yes, wait till you eat it and you will find out.” To аnother, a meat dealеr, in his market, he said: “All his [plaintiff’s] meat was bad, or wasn’t very good; * * * his whole store was full of tuberculosis and his meat was rotten.”
The complaint charged that thе slanderous words imputed a crime, and the trial proceeded upon that theory, thе defendant raising the question, in various forms, that the words were not actionable per se and did not impute a crime. In my view of the case it is not very material whether or not a crime was imрuted. The complaint and еvidence necessarily show that the utterances werе with reference to the plaintiff's market and to him as the manager of the market. The wоrds were, therefore, slandеrous per se. An injurious imputation affeсting the plaintiff in his office, profession or business is actionable per se without an allegation of special damage. (Gideon v. Dwyer,
The words used necessarily referred to the plaintiff’s businеss and to him as a business man, and imputed to him wrongdoing or incompetency in his business. If plaintiff’s meat and shop were in the condition charged, he must have had a knowledge of the facts which would make his action criminal.
The judgment and order should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs.