T1 Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs/Appellants, Sarah Ryland, Marie Billings, Barbara Ann Gill, Ross Lee Thomas, Mildred Ellis, Georgia Burlingame, Jacob W. Blevins, Ruth M. Blevins, Bill Dolan, Barth Campbell, Denise Campbell, Kevin Campbell, James Lynn Blevins, Roy Phillip Blevins, Arleta Gayle Blevins, Steven Ellis Blevins, Michelle
12 On September 5, 1997, Grantors entered into a Contract of Sale of Real Estate with Larry K. Wilson and Shirley E. Wilson (Contract). The Contract expressly stated "There are no mineral rights that go with the property." The warranty deeds dated October 3 and 28, 1997, which conveyed Grantors' interest in the subject real property, were filed of record January 12, 1998, with the Logan County Clerk. The warranty deeds contained no reservation of minerals.
T3 In May 2004, the Wilsons had the minerals in and under the subject property appraised. Grantors claimed the Wilsons actions in 2004 provided the first notice that the Wilsons were adversely claiming an interest in the minerals. In July 2004, Grantors recorded the Contract and a Notice of Claim of Interest to All Mineral Rights (Notice) against the subject property with the Logan County Clerk. The Notice claimed Grantors did not intend to convey the minerals with the surface.
T4 On January 11, 2005, Larry Wilson executed a quit claim mineral deed conveying the minerals in and under the real property to Mickey Overall. Overall filed the instant quiet title action August 11, 2005. Grantors' answer asserted Overall's quiet title action was barred by mistake and estoppel. Grantors filed a counterclaim for quiet title and for reformation of the deeds due to mutual mistake. Grantors claimed they were entitled to this equitable relief because (1) the Contract expressly excluded mineral rights from the sale, but through a serivener's error, the warranty deeds failed to reserve the mineral interests in the real property, and (2) Overall was on notice of Grantors' adverse claim to the minerals before he obtained title to the minerals.
15 Pangaea was substituted as Plaintiff. Pangaea filed a motion for summary judgment asserting Grantors' quiet title claim-which necessitated the reformation of the October 8 and 23, 1997, deeds due to mutual mistake-was time-barred under the five year limitations period of 12 0.S8.2001 § 95(A)(12). Grantors refuted their counterclaim was untimely. Grantors argued the limitations period to bring their reformation claim did not begin to run until they discovered the mistake in May 2004, when the Wilsons took actions adverse to the Grantors' interests.
T6 The trial court held the five year limitations period at $ 95(A)(12) was applicable. It determined the filing of the deeds constituted constructive notice of and afforded a means to discover the mistake. Pursuant to Overholt v. Indep. School Dist. No. 2, Tulsa County,
T7 Grantors appealed that judgment in Case No. 104,402. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed. COCA held the trial court should have determined whether the limitations period for the reformation counterclaim expired before Pangaea's claim arose pursuant to 12 0.8.2001 § 2013(C).
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18 On remand, Pangaea again moved for summary judgment in its favor. Pangaea claimed Grantors' reformation claim was barred under § 2013(C) because the counterclaim was time-barred prior to the time Pangaea's quiet title action arose. Pangaea cited Overholt and Horn v. Horn,
T9 For summary judgment purposes, the parties conceded the deeds dated October 3 and 28, 1997, mistakenly failed to reserve the mineral interests. They also agreed an action for reformation, due to mistake, must be brought within five years after the cause of action has accrued and that said action ac-erues when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the mistake. The question on appeal is when did the limitations period begin to run? In the trial court proceeding, Grantors asserted the limitation period for their reformation claim did not begin to run until 2004 because this was the first time Mr. Wilson took actions adverse to Grantors claim to the mineral rights. Grantors cited Maloy v. Smith,
T 10 Grantors' reliance on Maloy was misplaced. The principle in Maloy-that the statute of limitations is tolled "until an adverse claim arose"-is limited to cireum-stances where the party seeking reformation or his predecessor has been in the peaceable continuous possession of the interest which he seeks to acquire by reformation. Maloy at 1 9,
¶11 It is uncontroverted, Pangaea and its predecessors have been the continuous record title owners of the minerals since January 1998. Maloy clarified the record owner of the controverted mineral interest is the person who must be deemed to be "in possession" of said mineral interest. Id. at T 22,
T12 The next question is when should Grantors be charged with discovering the mistake in the deeds? We hold the public records afforded Grantors with a means of discovery of the mistake; therefore, said records provided constructive notice of the mistake which was sufficient to start the running of the five year statute of limitations. Mat-thewson v. Hilton,
113 For the foregoing reasons and after de novo review of the record, we hold summary judgment was properly granted to Pangaea and affirm the trial court's judgment. Because we affirm, it is unnecessary to address the remainder of Grantors' propositions of error. Pangaea's motion to dismiss the petition-in-error filed by Oklahoma Title & Closing Company, Inc. is denied.
T 14 AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The trial court dismissed Defendants Grace Arlene Billings, Judith Marie Teeple, Elizabeth Billings, and Phern Billings as parties at Pangaea's request.
. Section 2013(C) provides in part:
C. COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDING OPPOSING CLAIMS; STATUTES OF LIMITATION. A counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party. Where acounterclaim and the claim of the opposing party arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, the counterclaim shall not be barred by a statute of limitation notwithstanding that it was barred at the time the petition was filed, and the counterclaimant shall not be precluded from recovering an affirmative judgment.... Where a counterclaim was barred by a statute of limitation before the claim of the opposing party arose, the barred counterclaim cannot be used for any purpose.
