History
  • No items yet
midpage
Panea v. Isdaner
773 A.2d 782
Pa. Super. Ct.
2001
Check Treatment

*1 citing vanee of two eases that do not inter- temporary lieve that a moratorium is one pret provisions tool, of the MPC.12 Kline has such I respectfully dissent. made clear that the Third City Class Law

did not imply authority. such The two

cases Majority references do not at-

tempt to do what do today, interpret we the text of the MPC and ascertain the Panea, Doina PANEA and John intent of legislature to determine Wife, Appellants Husband and whether township planning boards (at 3677), use temporary moratoria to accomplish v. development coordinated promote and safety of its residents via up-to-date com- ISDANER, M.D., Neil Isdaner, Neil prehensive plans. M.D., P.C., Hospital, and Jeanes Appellees.

Finally, the Board in the instant case argues that if it possess does not the im Shirley L. Bell, Bell and P. Thomas plied power or inherent tempo to enact a Husband, Appellees, her rary moratorium suspending subdivision v. development, and developers and landown expedite ers filing Joseph Slezak, M.D., will applica Joseph of their A. A. Sle tions gain approval zak, Ltd., Egleston, before the M.D. L. enact Alan M.D. ment comprehensive Community of the new plan. and Frick Health Center. response, Kline, Majority cites to Appeal Joseph Slezak, A. M.D. stated, “although which argument Joseph Slezak, A. M.D. entirely merit, not without it is one which (at 2174) Ltd. must be directed to the legislature and not If legislature courts. wishes to (at Baker, Appellant 642), Robert authorize the “temporary” enactment of a v. or “interim” ordinance to maintain the sta Myers, M.D., Donald Sanford tus quo provide it can so by legislation!!]” Davne, M.D., and Acromed — Majority Opinion, Pa. p. -, Corporation, Appellees. pp. Kline, A.2d at citing 775-76 68 A.2d at 189. legislature responded to our call Superior Pennsylvania. Court of by creating MPC, and enacting the Argued 17, April 2000. only authorizing municipalities to create 10, April Filed and adopt comprehensive plan regu late subdivision and land development, but granting

also them necessary tools to

carry objectives. out such I Because be- construction,

12. I do find it relevant that both limiting municipal Kline power to its published prior Boron Oil were to the enact- express provisions, favors the individual land Statutory ment of the construction, Construction Act of making owner. A liberal it easi 1501-1991, §§ requires Pa.C.S. made, imply power expressly er to fa liberally give us to construe statutes effect Hostettler, municipality.” Naylor vors the purpose promote justice. to their and to Township Validity Hellam: The Morato particularly considering, Development 1 find it ria on Land Pennsylva relevant Under "[cjourts Constitution, have municipal enabling construed nia 8 Widener J. Pub.L. strictly (1999). liberally. statutes both A strict *4 Axelred, Philadelphia, for Pa- Barbara nea, appellants. Smith-Delach, Washington, for

Kathleen Slezak, appellant. Kahn, Plymouth Meeting, for

Jeffrey S. Baker, appellant. Bell, Zolfaghari, Blue for Isdaner

Mark Davne, appellees. Castelli, Egle- Pittsburgh, Gregory ston, appellee. Bell, Messer, Pittsburgh, for F.

Howard appellees. Meeting, for Ryan, Plymouth F.

Daniel Myers, appellee. McEWEN, Judge, Del President

Before EAKIN, JOYCE, HUDOCK, SOLE, MUSMANNO, STEVENS, ORIE TODD, JJ. MELVIN MELVIN, pursuant ORIE J.: claimed an of this sum offset 991.1817(a) the Act. The Paneas appeals present 1 The instant common were balance settlement questions concerning proper applica- 65,578.00. totaling Septem- On $ 991.1817(a), tion non-duplication 25, 1998, ber Paneas filed Petition to recovery provision of the Pennsylvania Settlement, Enforce and PPCIGA moved Property Casualty Insurance Guaran- 10, 1998, to intervene. On November (the Act). ty Association Act 40 P.S. Honorable I. Bernstein an Mark entered §§ In the 991.1801-1820.1 first two cases denying Order the Petition to Enforce Set- parties prior reached settlement tlement, and thus the motion to intervene trial, and the insurer defendants’ was sub- Judge was deemed moot. Bernstein de- sequently liquidation into ordered before unambiguously permitted termined the Act funds were disbursed. the offset Isdaner person- and Dr. was not the third case defendants’ insurer was ally the amount ordered liable for of the offset. liquidation following into timely This plaintiff appeal verdict favor followed. granted offset was on motions post- SLEZAK, M.D., BELL No. V.

trial relief. The relevant facts of each case Pittsburgh, briefly. shall be set forth *5 ¶3 In this case the Bells instituted ISDANER, M.D., PANEA v. No. malpractice against medical action Philadelphia, Dr. Jo- 1998 seph professional his corpo- A. Slezak and ¶ 2 In appeal, the Paneas instituted ration, others, Egleston Dr. L. Alan among a civil action alleging malpractice medical alleging in negligence failing diagnose to Isdaner, against Neil M.D. and Neil Isdan- Mrs. Bell’s mechanical bowel obstruction. er, M.D., (the defendants). Isdaner P.C. supervised After court settlement negotia- Ultimately parties reached a the settle- tions, 15, 1998, January parties on the agreement ment the wherein Isdaner de- agreement reached an wherein the Bells $75,000.00. pay fendants agreed to On $200,000.00 sum of would receive the from 23, 1997, a release December was executed Slezak, limits, Dr. representing his discharging the Paneas the Isdaner $300,000.00 and Pennsylvania insurer, defendants Physi- and their Liability Medical Catastrophe Professional (PIC) Company cians Insurance from fur- (CAT Fund) Loss Fund to the extent the 21, 1998, liability. January ther prior On payments fund on of was hable for behalf funds, of payment any to of the settlement both doctors. for Dr. Counsel Slezak sent Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court of agreement to counsel for the liquidation ordered PIC into due its to Bells. The Bells executed and Pennsylvania returned insolvency.2 Property The Shortly the document. thereafter and be- Casualty and Guaranty Insurance Associa- (PPCIGA) fore tion in the insurer made disbursement stepped as to successor funds, PIC, PIC, carrier, insurer. See Dr. insurance Slezak’s insolvent P.S. placed determining 991.1803. was declared insolvent After the Paneas $9,422.00 in liquidation by received benefits the Commonwealth under their Court. Act, coverage, health Pursuant PPCIGA PPCIGA assumed 14, 2000, January Group By 2. v. PIC order dated we direct- See M. Diane Koken Insurance (filed Pa.Cmwlth.). appeals Inc., ed that these three listed consecu- 44 M.D.1998 1/21/98 tively argument for before the Court en banc. delay damages, petition Dr. Baker filed a primary insurer to PIC position him an addi- professional association. the trial court awarded his Slezak $18,162.91, judg- in a resulting total tional ¶ to PPCIGA refused $65,662.91 Myers. against ment of $200,000.00, claiming under 40 P.S. 991.1817(a) offset it was entitled 1998, PIC, Myers’ January insur- expenses paid by Bells’ medical er, the Common- insolvent and became health health insurance. Since the Bells’ placed Pennsylvania PIC Court of wealth $200,000.00to insurer had excess Myers’ de- Consequently, liquidation. Bell, it was entitled Mrs. PPCIGA claimed After the PPCIGA. fense was assumed complete offset the amount mo- verdict, post-trial jury’s Myers filed agreed pay. The filed Slezak Bells tions, he asserted entitlement wherein agree- petition enforce the settlement Act. trial provided the setoff appeal followed the trial ment. This agreed determined that Baker court provision that the offset court’s conclusion from other insur- had recovered benefits apply this case and that did ance, compensation including workers’ as written. agreement was enforceable for several sub- and medical costs benefits exceeding in an amount sequent surgeries, MYERS, M.D., BAKER V. the judgment amount of entered No. 642 EDA 1999 trial Myers. Consequently, malpractice 5 This action was medical applied the offset court 1990; instituted in March of Baker sued light to zero in Act and molded the verdict Davne, Myers Drs. Donald L. and Sanford payments made on Bak- of the insurance alleging they perfor- were negligent trial further held er’s behalf. The court spinal surgery mance of fusion and each judgment di- Baker could not enforce the *6 had failed to obtain Baker’s informed con- timely appeal rectly against Myers. This alleged Drs. Complaint sent. Baker’s followed. him Myers and Davne had failed advise experimental the new and nature of by questions presented 7 The common plates and used the sur- bone screws Panea, may Bell Baker be cases of thus, they gery, and had not obtained Bak- as follows: restated pro- er’s consent to the surgical informed (1) agreement, Should a settlement 1995, 1, cedures. December the first On unpaid at the time which remains granting trial ended with the trial court becomes insol- tortfeasor’s insurer Myers nonsuit in favor of and Davne. vent, fully without re- be enforceable appealed, Baker and this Court vacated of 40 provision the offset gard to judgment the trial court’s entered 991.1817(a), must the set- § P.S. or Myers’ Davne’s favor remanded recognize the molded to tlement be Following re- the case for a new trial. statutory offset? 1998, mand, jury on November (2) of 40 P.S. provision Should the offset Myers and Dav- finding returned a verdict 991.1817(a) applied § be a cause informed consent ne liable on Baker’s prior to its of action that accrued $47,500.00 in Baker claim and awarded effective date? trial court deter- damages. However the (3) is to the PPCI- If offset available responsi- Myers party was the sole mined GA, preclude personal it should also con- obtaining informed for Baker’s ble for payment therefore, liability of insureds sent, court molded the trial amount? of the offset that determination. the verdict to reflect Additionally, the Baker case asks us to 9 At applicability issue here is the decide: the so-called offset of the Act

(1) “Non-duplication entitled recovery,” Whether a Plaintiff who obtains a provides: damages verdict for is entitled entry judgment on the ver- Any person having a claim under an dict, notwithstanding any right of policy insurance required shall be to ex- setoff which ultimately as- haust first policy. his under such by serted PPCIGA? section, For purposes of this a claim (2) applicable, Even if whether a defen- under an policy shall include

dant who defends a claim insurance, claim under kind of estopped should asserting whether it is a first-party third-party statutory offset? claim, include, and shall without limita- (3) Whether statutory PPCIGA’s setoff tion, insurance, accident and health to payments by

extends other insur- worker’s compensation, Blue Cross and proven ance have not been to be Blue Shield and all other coverages ex- related to culpable defendant’s con- cept policies of an insolvent insurer. duct? Any payable on a covered (4) Whether claim under this act the trial court shall be reduced erred

molding recovery the amount of the verdict in favor of Dr. other upon Davne based insurance. finding its Myers responsible 991.1817(a) added). 40 P.S. (emphasis A obtaining Baker’s informed consent? defined, “covered claim” in pertinent

¶ Initially, scope we note our of part, at 40 P.S. 991.1802as: review of a trial court’s construction of a (1) claim, An unpaid including one for statute is plenary. Wojdak v. Greater premiums, unearned submitted Cablevision, Inc., Phila. Pa. claimant, which arises out of and is with- (1998). Further, A.2d 214 as this matter in the coverage subject and is only questions law, involves our stan applicable limits of an insurance dard of review is limited determining to which this applies article issued whether the trial court committed an error insurer such insurer becomes an insol- *7 of law. Stone & Ins. Edwards v. Com vent insurer after the effective date of monwealth, Ins., Dep’t 276, 538 Pa. 281 of this article and: 2, 304, (1994). n. 648 A.2d 307 n. 2 When (i) the claimant or insured is a resi- statute, interpreting a a court must at dent of this Commonwealth at the tempt to ascertain the Legis intent of the time of the insured .... event lature, which can by be derived read all ing sections of the together ¶ statute and 10 The Paneas and Bells first as conjunction with each other and con sert the Act applied should not be to set strued with reference to the entire statute. prior insolvency tlements reached be Housing Auth. County Chester v. application cause its was not within the of of Com’n, Pennsylvania State Civil Service contemplation parties. Specifically, of the (1999). 621, 556 Pa. 730 they A.2d 935 The argue payment the source of legislative intent behind the agreement statute’s en the settlement speci was not meaning applica actment controls its fied and not made contingent upon solven W.C.A.B., tion. Palsy United Cerebral cy. Consequently, application of the Act (1996). 544, 543 Pa. 673 A.2d 882 violates basic contract principles, law

789 liability of the defendants’ is preclude parties’ reformation of the fact whether any showing unliquidated at the time of agreement liquidated the absence or fraud, or mutual mistake. accident We no The Act’s is of moment. application the by this persuaded argument. are not of whether or the key determinant the Act is whether claim is covered under argument 11 This asks us time liability unpaid remains ignore litigation the economic realities of supra, 40 triggered. Act is See P.S. interplay coverage of insurance claim). (definition § of covered 991.1802 process. disputes the settlement No one agreements the fact that the settlement Statutory 12 Reference to the liability; how established defendants’ statutory Act a illustrates Construction ever, liability to the extent the defendants’ remedy is the common law. favored over by is insurer is ulti covered insurance the provides: 1504 Specifically, Pa.C.S.A. mately obligated pay. logical It cannot ly parties anticipated be that all the denied remedy provided In all is cases where payment that insurance would cover enjoined anything or duty or a is is amounts. all The defendants statute, to be done directed paid premiums malpractice for their insur strictly of the statute shall directions expected coverage in ance and to have pursued, penalty and no shall be inflict- Thus, event of a claim. the defendant ed, anything agreeably done doctors are also victims of the insurers’ law, cases, than common such further insolvency. recognition of the harm necessary carrying such shall be companies occasioned becom statute into effect. ing legislature insolvent the saw fit to fash The of this Commonwealth have courts remedy by enacting ion this Act. The “[wjhere remedy is consistently held that provisions triggered of the Act are when assembly, an act of di provided “an liquidation finding order of legislation strictly must rections insolvency” entered an insurer remedy pursued and such is exclusive.” after the date of the Act. effective See Alliance, 61, 412 Pa. Republican Lurie v. (definition P.S. in 991.1802 of insolvent 367, (1963). 63, 192 A.2d See also surer). Consequently, triggering Co., General Accident Ins. Harcourt v. event occurs before the insolvent in now (1992), appeal Pa.Super. 615 A.2d 71 obligation indemnify surer has met its (1993) denied, 534 Pa. loss, insured’s insured and (same). provides instant Act a clear The third party claiming through insured adequate for a due remedy loss has a potential claim under the Act. casualty in insolvency property aof that applica Paneas’ and Bells’ assertion purposes of the Act’s stated surer. Some Act represents tion of the a reformation *8 pay a means for provide “[t]o are: misplaced. their contract None of the is prop reformation, of claims under certain ment covered parties have asked casualty policies, to erty and insurance recission, that matter of the contract.3 delay payment of Rather, merely asserting are a avoid excessive defendants loss to and to avoid financial extinguish such claims statutory right to either limit or policyholders result of as a obligations pay their to on the claims. The claimants or However, statutory while negotiated by set-off. were 3. Since the initial settlements settlement, involved, basis rescind the par- this be a to PPCIGA became neither before do so. ty Appellants have chosen to contemplated a of the settlement reduction 790 insolvency Furthermore, of an insurer.” plaintiff P.S. surer. a has a who 991.1801(1) added).

§ (emphasis claim under the poli- defendants’ insurance cy, unpaid which remains at the time of clearly attempts 13 The Act insolvency, is considered having as “cov- protect policyholders both and those with § ered claim” under 991.1802 (defining against policyholders claims from the con claim), covered and thus falls within the sequences of insolvency of the insurer parameters (Non-duplication of 991.1817 by association, establishing an the sole recovery). purpose of is compensate which those who have claims which have not been ¶ Next, argue the Paneas also company because the insurance is insol “Non-duplication the current version of the by vent. The association is funded assess recovery” provision inapplicable is be ing against insurers, a fee all member and cause it was enacted after their cause of every required insurer is to be a member action accrued. disagree. origi We as a condition of authority its to write 1970, nal version of the Act was created in property casualty and policies. 40 P.S. under the Pennsylvania name Insurance 991.1803(a), (b)(3), §§ and 991.1808. (PIGA). Guaranty Association Penn See manner, this the risk of loss due to the sylvania Guaranty Insurance Association insolvency spread one insurer is out Act, §§ 40 P.S. 1701.101-603. The current all companies over member insurance repealed replaced version the 1970Act policyholders. their Id. at 991.1810. In 10, February became effective as of effect, every claim, pays time PPCIGA 1995.4 The Paneas assert their cause of every member company pay insurance is 3, 1993, action accrued on December ing part of the claim. The Act therefore prior therefore the version of the act must seeks to lessen the financial burden on the However, applied. the time of the un industry by preventing duplica derlying injury upon brought is suit recovery. tion of Zappala As Justice stat is not the previ determinative As event. ed in prior reference to the version of the stated, ously provisions of the Act non-duplication instant provision: “This applicable become upon liqui an order of legislature’s reflects the intent finding dation with a that an insurer is fiscally insurers, solvent which are insolvent after the effective date of the contractually obligated claim, Here, Act. PIC was declared insolvent primary payment.” source of Bethea 21, liquidation January and ordered into on Forbes, 422, 428, 1215, v. 519 Pa. 548 A.2d clearly after the effective date of the (1988). legislative Given the Hence, intent of current version of the Act. scheme, statutory plain we find the upon Paneas’ reliance interpreting cases tiffs’ repealed entitlement to the disbursement legislation misplaced, is settlement funds controlled com these longer controlling. cases are no See Rather, mon law contract principles. McCarthy Bainbridge, the extent there was insurance coverage, (Pa.Super.1999) (stating n. fact “[t]he payment nothing appellees’ constitutes prior cause action arose more than a claim against an insolvent to [the effective date of the is irrele Act] having insurer virtue of a claim exempt appellees vant and does not statute.”). tortfeasor who was insured that in- applicability of the amended *9 12, 1994, 1005, 79, 15, 19, 1996, § 4. Act of December February P.L. No. No. effective 40 137, 1, 10, 1995, February § effective as §§ P.S. 991.1801-1820. 21, 1995, by amended the Act December of

791 subrogee-”). It paid by claim the presented 15 are next with We eq- subrogation that is an light of well question of whether the established the 991.1817(a) involving legal the of § insured uitable doctrine of the of application or place take person may substitution insolvent insurer be held the agreement between responsible the offset. without contractual ally amounts Republic Ins. parties. Kaiser v. Old the of the Act the legislative find intent We Co., (Pa.Super.1999). A.2d result. The precludes such an anomalous the granted placing as a of argue the are not “It is means plaintiffs that if insureds upon of the one ultimate burden a debt plaintiffs then the will personally liable it, ought loss, conscience good the and as an innocent who bear between pays applicable and is when one generally tortfeasor the risk of loss victim obligation or placed the out of own funds a debt on tortfeasor. De his should the of argument, payable of that is from funds spite appeal primarily the facial the (citations omitted). closer of how the Act another.” Id. Since examination serves recovering plaintiffs’ precluded the are from spread the loss belies the Paneas non-duplication of plaintiffs by application In it is the contention. fact not rather, loss, have any recovery provision, they loss can not recov- who bear the occurred, paid by the said to it is the solvent ered relative the claim have therefore, subrogee; health insurer paid plaintiffs’ insurers who claims under the insurance, from Paneas. the other sources of which the cannot recover the requires Act to be exhausted first. ¶ 17 Nor can the health insurance each of three cases under consider from carrier recover sum PPCIGA plaintiffs ation will receive the full because such a claim does not constitute of either their settlements or pursuant covered claim to the Act. See verdict, just necessarily it will come (definition 991.1802, § of “covered P.S. from PPCIGA the or doctors. (2) claim”), “The term (stating: shall reinsurer, example 16 For the case of include amount ... due Paneas, insurer, pool underwriting as the settlement amount was $75,000.00. $9,422.00, subrogation recoveries or oth PPCIGA offset sociation as also, paid by erwise.”), in American States Ins. Paneas’ health see Co., 56, 62 Paneas v. Auto 721 A.2d surance carrier the Co. State Ins. $65,578.00. similarly (Pa.Super.1998) (interpreting of balance The health insur of subrogation predecessor ance carrier cannot stat assert a worded definition 1701.103(5)(b), $9,422.00 ute, prohibiting against Paneas claim for the P.S. by Act’s a claim an insurer PIGA application because non- subrogation). Any other result duplication recovery provision equitable the Pa the intention of the non- never under the would subvert neas received sum provision of duplication recovery subrogee, As the Paneas’ settlement. 991.1817(a). greater no Contrast this scenario with health insurance carrier has if PIC had re than held Paneas. would have occurred rights those See what Clarke, have mained Paneas would Pa.Super. Ins. solvent. The Allstate Co. PIC; (1987) $75,000.00 1021, 1024 (stating received the entire "as however, recovery have been precise position would subrogee stands subject health, subrogation insurer’s subrogor subrogee be limit should recovery rights reducing their recovering subrogation the amount ed $65,578.00. Consequently, application subrogor relative to the received *10 the Act of the Paneas are same not recover offset amount from the they had In position concluding would have been there defendants. the tortfeasor no insolvency. been same scenario of protection This also could invoke the holds true for the Bells and Mr. Baker. of provision, purpose offset we noted the find personally protect To the doctors hable for people the Act was had who the offset amount one of would contravene for insurance but who did have the Act, purposes the stated protection of the is “to for which to their they paid due policyholders insolvency. avoid financial loss to ... insurer’s Our Court reasoned result of insolvency insurer.” as follows: 991.1801(1). P.S. PIGA’s release from all finan- Given responsibility cial as a direct result of ¶ 18 Our decision is consonant today unin- appellant’s failure to exhaust his Lines, holding Valley our with Burke v. appel- policy rights, sured we hold that Inc., 421 Pa.Super. 617 A.2d 1335 recovering lant is likewise barred from (1992), recognized wherein we that to im- appellees. Any holding from other pose directly such a financial on loss render the would ‘exhaustion’ clearly insured tortfeasor would contra- Guaranty meaning- of the Insurance Act purpose predecessor vene Act .... less (PIGA). Burke, in- plaintiff was jured a motor vehicle accident. The appellees personally If were re- now insolvent, defendants’ insurer was declared award, appellant’s sponsible damages and PIGA assumed the and cover- defense they would without source obligations. age plaintiff Prior to trial the bridge gap between settled his uninsured motorist carrier appellant’s uninsured settle- motorist $85,000.00 though even available $85,000 $200,000 award ment of and the coverage $200,000.00. A jury was re- expose appellees To a fi- .... to such $400,000.00 turned verdict of favor of (which loss result of nancial direct plaintiff. Plaintiff also found 50% was appellant’s rights failure to exhaust his negligent; thus the verdict was molded to policy) his uninsured under motorist $200,000.00. post- The defendants’ filed very purpose would violate the motions, they trial wherein asserted the avoid ‘financial to ... loss PIGA —to was recover plaintiff not entitled to from policyholders as a result of the insolven- because he his claim them had settled UM cy appel- of an insurer.’ Protection of policy for less than the limits and the financial be ac- lees from loss can damages than molded were less PIGA’s complished barring appellant’s right liability agreed limit. The trial court recovery against them. plaintiffs molded the verdict in light of (citations omitted). We fur- Id. at 1338-39 rights failure to exhaust his under the designed ther that “PIGA opined was -policy. equal provide recovery with a claimants (or policy limits predecessor Under the version5 of the insolvent insurer’s non-duplication recovery liability cap) instant less 'the PIGA’s whatever by ex- plaintiff have recovered provision, Court held the the claimant hausting rights precluded recovering from PIGA his other on his failure to exhaust other insur- of insurance.” Id. 1338. We are based him, plaintiff presented ance available to could here with a situation where 1701.503(a). P.S.

793 paid by If other insur the amount jury or award exceeds known. damage admitted, or not established policy insolvent insurer’s limits ance has been the cap.6 Thus, readily evidentiary we can liability hearing will a PPCIGA’s short necessary the of a defen- Mr. Baker question whether the facts. address determine personally for the authority prohibits dant can be held liable that offers no limits exceeding the or stat- mo post-trial in related considerations cap.7 utory are com In fact insurance issues tions. in motions to add monly post-trial involved the ¶ 20 next turn to addition We damages to Pa.R.C.P. 238. delay pursuant ap the Baker questions presented al in Hellman, Pa.Super. See Miller he Baker first is enti peal. Mr. contends denied, (1994), appeal Pa. against entry judgment to the of both tled (1995) (stating “[this 655 A.2d 990 delay damages and to defendants with whether the insurance will decide Court] judgment of that from seek satisfaction on delay damages will liable carrier He at his discretion. any available source basis.”). a case case a is argues judgment his to unrelated Act. any potential provided offset the to ¶22 a is returned Once verdict previously the disagree. For reasons We establishing damages, finding liability and settlements, expressed respect with to we point, at that the defendants and PPCIGA non-duplication recovery provi the find of provided triggered by has been Act equal to applies vigor sion certainly insolvency, are aware insurer’s may post-trial applied verdict application of the offset proceedings to mold the verdict. of the would affect the amount verdict. discussed, previously 21 As Mr. Baker timely Accordingly, filing find we party is a claimant virtue of his third statutory post-trial asserting the motions policy. claim under the PIC The Act does to assure appropriate offset is method present a claimant with a choice of jurisdiction trial still to that the court has personal to pursue whether insured’s act.8 statutory assets or claim the benefits. ¶23 argues that Baker next Mr. Act, duty Under PPCIGA has to estopped from assert Myers should be claims. P.S. covered he defended 991.180S(b)(l)(i). ing a setoff because why We see no reason Act nothing claim. find We duty fulfillment cannot be accom- asserting from a de prevents defendant post plished proceedings. verdict Post- Furthermore, section proceedings present timely, or- fense. verdict 991.1803(b)(2) with all of provides PPCIGA derly and efficient manner for resolution duties, “rights, obligations It any is at this entitlement offset. rights PIC damages insurer.” One of plaintiffs time that insolvent point on behalf of established, provide a defense and the amount had was have been follows, therefore, it Myers; be Dr. on a covered claim should payable 8.This, course, (b)(l)(i)(B) suggest is not that PPCI- caps Act 6. 991.1803 PPCI- $300,000.00 asserting its liability per precluded from GA’s claimant. GA would be judgment the offset after the entitlement Rather, operates since the offset final. expressed panel Burke dictum 7. The obiter satisfy completely PPCIGA's obli- partially or plaintiff could recover view that may directly gation, it be raised at time from the defendant. excess amount Burke, judgment. on the verdict execution supra, at 1339 See fa. provide contrast, PPCIGA also a defense on generally life insurance is Myers. practical behalf of Dr. As a matter defined as: *12 Myers successfully defends and is A contract between the holder of a liability fastened with then Mr. Baker policy (i.e., and an company insurance assert, has no claim to and the Act is carrier) whereby company implicated. Accordingly, we find no merit in agrees, premium return for pay- to this contention. ments, pay (i.e., a specified sum maturity face value or value of the 24 Mr. Baker questions next policy) to designated beneficiary right whether PPCIGA’s to a only setoff is upon the death of the insured. payments available for of other insurance for the damages resulting culpa from the That kind of insurance which the risk conduct giving liability ble rise to on the contemplated particular is the death of a part panel of the insured. A of this Court person. has question answered this in the affirma Id. at 723. tive. In McCarthy Bainbridge, As rudimentary these definitions indi- (Pa.Super.1999), A.2d 200 appeal granted, cate, life insurance and medical mal- 563 Pa. (2000), 758 A.2d 1200 this practice liability casualty insurance are Court was asked to decide whether different, fundamentally notably most 99Í.1817(a) permitted PPCIGA to offset they against because insure different amounts received a claimant under a protect against risks and types different life against insurance the amount of loss. provides Life insurance a de- agreement due under the settling mal death, fined payable upon benefit

practice action. panel The concluded whether accidental or from natural it did not and reasoned as follows: causes, designated beneficiaries. The reading reasonable of the off- Medical malpractice liability insurance set require is to that the claim provides coverage for in- amounts the to be offset must the same loss as (i.e., doctor) sured is legally held the claim asserted against PIC. In oth- liable to others because of the doc- words, er the claim must insur- negligence tor’s own and the harm it sought protect ance that the insured caused. the same risk as was covered McCarthy, at 203. To the extent McCar- the now insurer insolvent whom thy proposition stands for the that the loss providing coverage. PIGA is That is not must be culpable attributable to conduct of the situation with present- which we are party third and the “other insurance” is Here, ed in this case. the medical mal- paying the capacity loss its of a second- practice provided by the now ary obligor, we concur with this rationale. insurance,

insolvent insurer casualty generally In Daley-Sand defined as: v. West Co., Pa.Super. American Ins. type primari- That of insurance that is (1989), A.2d 965 explained Court ly concerned losses caused interplay subrogation between and insur injuries persons legal liability ance as follows: imposed upon the insured for such injury damage or for property to the an pays When insurer [Blue Cross] of others. claim under a policy, actually paying it is (5th Dictionary, Black’s Law at 721 debt the tortfeasor [Defendants]. ed.1979). liable; only secondarily The insurer is it Here, was re- á verdict the tortfeasor. liable. primarily tortfeasor who is is the $47,500.00,and the Baker awarding turned paid insurer has a claim Once the additional [Plaintiffs], included it then stand trial court insured The Honor- $18,162.91 delay damages. and assert the the shoes of the insured DiNubile, molded against the tortfeasor. Jr. then rights insured’s able J. Victor shoes the offset by applying to stand the insured’s to zero the verdict it and to collect from the tortfeasor once that “it is without provision on- the basis repre- insured an amount has received insurance dispute that [Baker] *13 called the senting Compensa- the tortfeasor’s debt is under [Workers’] benefits both right subrogation. to insurer’s which far surgeries and for certain tion judgment of the en- exceeded the amount contrast, In a insur Id. at 969. when life Opin- in ....” Trial Court tered this case company pays beneficiary ance ion, 2/9/99, the offset at 3. Baker asserts proceeds under a life those proceeds other insurance improper was because debt. represent do not tortfeasor’s regard- have made payments would been Rather, the life proceeds represent Myers. fault of Dr. He notes less of the company’s primary obligation insurance injuries any inter- predated that his back Accordingly, contract. a life under the defendants and therefore vention insurance carrier does not obtain compensation carrier argues his workers’ subrogate against recovery in the to pay regardless of obligated was to malpractice paying action virtue of its par- conduct third intervening tortious pursuant policy. claim to the life insurance be correct argument life ties. Baker’s would This is true because the insurance asserted included insur- pay being carrier was not caused to make its the offsets injuries party’s negligence; prior to a third whether payments ment due ance rather, solely due indem- obligated expenses it was to in of medical the form (death), However, happening to the of an event re the record re- nity benefits. gardless Conversely, of fault. when an medi- sought recovery for the flects Baker second, employer subrogation seeks his expenses cal associated with Act, Compensation or for that Workers’ surgeries third and fourth carrier, recovery $71,000.00.9 matter a health insurance These totaling approximately establishing it was dependant upon is that alleged in deed to have damages were payments caused to make its due tortious con- resulted from the defendants’ Manu negligence party. of a third Dale in- Baker’s failing to obtain Mr. duct Bressi, facturing Co. v. 491 Pa. the trial Consequently, formed consent. (1980). Consequently, it cannot A.2d to molding the verdict did not err court said that the failure to offset where be of the fact the other light zero proceeds of life insurance payment consists expenses for medical payments were made recovery. in duplicative results result of the defendants’ incurred as the conduct, payments and these culpable holding we now turn Given this damages awarded not- alone exceeded in Baker to determine presented the facts indemnity also withstanding the benefits offsets were caused whether the asserted carrier. compensation paid by the workers’ culpable conduct of paid due to the $3,472.90 surgery and paid for the fourth post-trial motion to mold Specifically, in the further counsel treatment. Defense averred that related defense counsel the verdict evidentiary hearing if these as- requested an Company Insurance NorthBrook Baker Mr. $67,611.21 payments were contested. third serted Baker’s second and for Mr. made. deny payments were Company did not these surgeries and Allstate Insurance ¶27 molding Accordingly, reverse the order Finally, Baker contends the we Myers only Dr. jury verdict hold molding the verdict trial court erred informed responsible obtaining Baker’s upon finding its favor of Dr. Davne based against both consent and the verdict Myers responsible for be reinstated. None- defendants should obtaining informed consent. Baker ar his theless, insured since Dr. Davne was also delegation duty gues Dr. Davne’s ap- equally by PIC the offset physi informed consent to another obtain liability, to Dr. Davne’s plicable liability him of cian does not absolve properly of zero should molded verdict information not be required should the entered as to both defendants. conveyed. agree. We ¶29 summation, case of law, Pennsylvania 28 Under M.D., Isdaner, Phila No. 3677 Panea v. patient’s physician if a fails to obtain a ap trial court’s delphia affirm the we he surgery informed for a consent 991.1817(a) and the Order plication of any inju performs, that doctor is hable for petition Paneas’ to enforce denying the *14 resulting surgery, regardless from the ries Slezak, In the case of Bell v. settlement. physician negligent. of whether M.D,. 1998, we re Pittsburgh No. 2174 Zemel, 18, Pa.Super. R. 420 Foflygen v. enforcing the settlement. verse the Order (1992), 1345, appeal 1352-1353 M.D., EDA Myers, No. 642 Baker v. denied, 619, (1993); 535 Pa. 629 A.2d 1380 1999, judgment in en part affirm we also, MacPhail, 202, Pa. Morgan see v. 550 molded to reflect the tered on the verdict (1997) physician (holding 704 A.2d 617 991.1817(a) by § applicable provided offset patient informed consent from must obtain Myers Act to Dr. and reverse the of the as performing surgical operative before verdict to Dr. molding Order absolve procedure). validity of the informed liability. Davne from pretreat dependent upon consent is relayed regardless ment information ¶ SOLE, J., joins and files a 30 Del the disclosures were made whether Concurring Statement. physician qualified per or another treating ¶ McEWEN, Judge, President files 31 Foflygen Allegheny v. General Hos son. Dissenting Concurring and Statement. appeal (Pa.Super.1999), A.2d 705 pital, 723 ¶ TODD, Dissenting files a 32 J. (1999); denied, 705, A.2d 233 559 Pa. 740 Opinion. Seitchik, also, 719 A.2d 319 see Boutte only (Pa.Super.1998) (holding surgeon who ¶ MUSMANNO, J., joins J.E02005- 33 surgery reconstructive follow performed (642 1999) Opinion EDA of ORIE mastectomy hable for obtain ing patient’s MELVIN, joins Dissenting J. but procedures ing informed consent where (2174 TODD, Opinion of J. on J.E02004-00 intertwined). Instantly, inextricably were 1998) (3677 PHL and E02003-00 PGH Myers and determined that Drs. 1998). Baker’s informed did not obtain Davne J., SOLE, concurring. DEL surgery. performing the consent before ¶ opinion Judge join Majority 1 I and, surgery performed Dr. Davne to ad- separately write Orie Melvin but therefore, Baker duty to ensure that had colleague by my dress the concerns raised surgery. to that his informed consent gave in dissent. Judge Todd her erroneously altered the The trial court Pennsylvania my in view the Myers responsible Because hold Dr. verdict to Property Casualty Insurance Guaran- informed consent. obtaining Baker’s in Panea dissenting opinions equities sented ty designed Act was to balance the Bell, in- cases injured agree claimant and an I that these an since between insolvent, I application carrier through sured whose becomes resolved must be agree Majority’s holding that the law. At the principles of contract settled a claimant faced with a reduc- remedy for time, and discern- join I the able same following settlement is to payment tion Judge Orie Melvin ing majority opinion of seeks rescind the settlement once PPCIGA (1) applica- it calls for Baker insofar 789, Majority Opinion at fn. 3. a setoff. statutory accorded tion of the set-off (2) PIGA, judgment ¶3 n.o.v. was it finds correctly suggests The dissent of Dr. Davne improperly entered favor negotiated compro- claimant where a has (3) interests, and, defendants subrogated mise or it concludes that the waiver anticipated claimant’s economic benefit set-off are entitled to benefit would re- original However, from the since PIGA is entitled. which permitted to offset duced PPCIGA were is entitled is the set-off to which PIGA subrogated interests from sum from insur- limited to those sums received However, provid- the settlement amount. type proceeds cover the same ance ability claimant ing a with the to rescind of loss as was later claimed al- the settlement these circumstances Bainbridge, 739 A.2d Myers, McCarthy v. leviates this concern. (Pa.Super.1999), appeal granted, (2000) Also, I when insurer offers to settle 563 Pa. 758 A.2d 1200 would within its limits on behalf of its remand Baker to the trial court for *15 insured, I cannot conclude that the insured hearing on the issue of the amount of the would, should, language or insist on in the is set-off to which PIGA entitled.

agreement which restricts the source of payment the to the insurer’s funds. Even TODD, J., dissenting. in professional liability policies certain approve an where insured must settlement ¶ respectfully Majority 1 I dissent. The terms, reality is that settlements with- cases that concludes the Panea and Bell in policy limits are assumed to be the application non-duplication of the of recov- responsibility suggest of the insurer. To Property ery provision Pennsylvania language limiting an insured must insist on Casualty Guaranty Associa- Insurance payment of source to the insurer’s (“the Act”)10 Act does not violate ba- tion would, believe, place funds I an unneces- principles. (Majority sic contract law Further, sary on the insured. to burden 788.) Similarly, in the Baker Opinion, at permit recovery of a settlement sum case, that Majority implicitly concludes in- an insured where the insurer becomes molding the verdict to reflect the offset settlement, following before solvent but a lawful- improper an interference with purposes payment, frustrates one disagree As I ly-rendered verdict. the Act. conclusions, I must each of these with dissent. McEWEN, Judge, concurring President dissenting. ¶ agreed to resolve their 2 The Paneas

¶ in return for claims Dr. Isdaner join 1 I to in the results hasten $75,000. the amount by perceptive analysis pre- achieved §§ 10. 40P.S. 991.1801-1820.

release which that ‘the effect of a release must was intended memorialize be deter agreement apparently by ordinary meaning was drafted mined from the of its ” Dr. Isdaner’s counsel and submitted to the language.’ (quoting Id. Buttermore v. signature. It 325, 328-29, Paneas’ counsel for their Aliquippa Hospital, 522 Pa. contingency provision contains neither a (1989)). of, regarding, nor discussion ¶5 cases, In these a review of each source of those funds. The release does plain language nothing releases’ reveals an integration stating contain regarding the source of the funds to be represents that the written document “the paid by physicians. Nor does it con- complete agreement.” Although release tain any contingency based on insurance PIC, insurer, physician’s as the was named Moreover, no coverage. there has been release, among numerous others any contingency regarding allegation counsel, including Dr. Isdaner’s PIC was pay the source of funds defen- not a action. party physicians’ obligations part dant was a ¶ Similarly, the Bells settled with Dr. explicit agreement parties between Slezak and the CAT fund return for a by parties and was intended to be $500,000, $200,000 payment total Thus, included the release. there are $300,000 paid by to be Slezak fraud, mutual no claims of accident or mis- by joint the CAT fund.11 The tortfea- take these cases. sor release executed the Bells contains Majority 6 The that “defen- reasons integration providing, clause “it is fur- merely asserting statutory dants are agreed ther understood and that there are extinguish to either limit or their understanding no written or oral or [sic] obligations (Majori- on the claims.” agreements, directly indirectly, connect- 789.) ty Opinion, If there is such settlement, ed with this release and however, statutory right, it is held not (Bell incorporated are not herein.” Re- physicians, the defendant but the Penn- R.85a). lease, setting Aside from sylvania Property Casualty Insurance apportionment forth the of settlement *16 (“PPCIGA”) and, Guaranty Association

funds and the CAT between Slezak above, noted neither PIC nor PPCIGA was fund, the release is silent as to the ulti- party to either of these actions or settle- paid. mate the to The source of funds ments. only contingency in the Bell release re- approval, required. ferred to court PIC ¶ Majority despite that 7 The concludes party not a to the action and

was was clause, presence integration the of an we specifically mentioned within the release. must find an unwritten term of the settle- ¶ i.e., agree agreement, parties’ 4 It is axiomatic that settlement ment the mutual understanding coverage that insurance parties ments are contracts between the paid by physician general and are to be enforced under con the amount to be fraud, principles, necessarily contemplated par- accident was tract law absent 789.) I ac- Philadelphia (Majority Opinion, mutual ties. at mistake. Clark Medicine, plaintiffs may below have College Osteopathic knowledge that physicians had insurance (Pa.Super.1997). Fundamental been aware may among principles coverage, those “is the directive even have known agreement argues prior Slezak in his brief that reached settlement 11. While Dr. (See insolvency. Ap- signed until after PIC was declaration of Brief for the release was not Slezak, insolvent, 5.) parties pellant at it is clear that the declared 5-6.) (Bell Judge Opinion, However, Trial Court coverage. I do not limits of that explain: on to went therefore conclude Caruso agree we that the insur- plaintiffs these considered that both the pattern here is The factual pay failure to would result er’s Slezak, defendant, and the plaintiffs their set- any shortage deduction arriving at were, time of at receipts. Nor can I conclude that tlement represented agreement, settlement any plaintiffs considered that such these mal- medical attorneys experienced responsi- payments not the ultimate were counsel Certainly each cases. practice physician who was bility of the defendant law, that, present be- understood Thus, agreement. whatever party to the participate fund fore the C.A.T. would expec- physicians’ unilateral the defendant settlement, must physician regarding payment by their insur- tations $200,000.00 of promise pay to the first er, simply is no evidence that there plaintiffs’ amount. the settlement understanding part of the mutual such was extracting was successful counsel parties to these agreement between promise counsel Slezak’s from defense Instead, I agreements. believe $200,000.00. pri- pay This was in- to conclude the it is more reasonable policy. limit mary of Slezak’s insurance jured they re- plaintiffs understood would fully intended that Certainly, Slezak physician’s ceive the full amount of the would be promised amount he paid di- share of the settlement whether would not be his paid by his insurer and his rectly by him or an insurer on However, this personal responsibility. physicians behalf. Had the wished plaintiffs. not the concern contingent upon make these settlements an to receive Their concern was insurer, payment by they full their certain- $200,000.00in order payment of offer of They ly could have done so. did not. fund for additional to the C.A.T. look Their concern was monies. thorough his and well-reasoned $200,000.00 only the but source of case, Opinion the Bell the Honorable payment. promise itsof Gary P. Caruso concluded: added)). (Id. (emphasis at 7 beyond reason to ask the Court [I]t the assertion Majority 9 The dismisses ignore parties, the fact that both applica- Bells that by the Paneas and the negotiated, time the settlement was against their settlement in- tion of the offset aware that Slezak was [Dr.] were reforma- represents improper primary pay- proceeds limits sured and that the *17 by $200,000.00. agreements tion of their settlement by able the insurer was awareness, sought to party that neither has However, stating nei- even with this agreements. the re- reform or to rescind party made reference to the ther 789.) view, my the at $200,000.00 Opinion, (Majority that the quirement obligations fulfilled their $500,000.00 Paneas and Bells settlement amount was to be and agreements the settlement insolvent insurer paid by Slezak’s now sought then, understandably, desired and provide that Sle- and further it did by their agreements their enforcement of relieved of obli- zak would be his/its in law for If was a basis terms. there insolvent gation the insurer became recission,12 onus was on or reformation made. payment before was out, However, point Bells instead as the opinion to whether these express I no as remedy, has relied seeking Dr. Slezak such a appropriate these cases. remedies party ther nor was a to this physicians, parties the defendant who PIC PPCIGA sought obligations to avoid their after represents action. I believe that it in- agreement had been reached and the intrusion unprecedented and unwarranted fulfilled jured plaintiffs had their obli- by judiciary inquire into a defen- thereunder, gations remedy. to seek such a in- expectations regarding possible dant’s In the absence of reformation or rescis- satisfy judgment coverage surance a sion, I physician believe the defendants accordingly if ex- and to mold a verdict full amount of the remain liable for the forthcoming. pected funds are they the in- agreed settlements sum, holding of contrary 11 In would, therefore, jured I plaintiffs. re- Majority, find that each of Philadelphia I would verse the Order Coun- ty cases, injured plaintiffs Court of Common Pleas which denied these three Appellants/Plaintiffs Petition to Paneas’ full amount of their should receive the against Enforce settlement Defen- judgment against the defen- Isdaner, dants/Appellees’ Neil M.D. and physicians. dant Isdaner, M.D., P.C., and affirm the Neil ¶ 12 Majority, Judge Orie Mel- County Order of the Westmoreland Court that Opinion, vin’s exhaustive holds granted Appel- Pleas Common already Act mandates that amounts re- to Enforce Bells’ Petition lees/Plaintiffs by injured plaintiffs ceived as health against Appellants/Defendants Settlement insurance benefits be deducted from the Slezak, Joseph Joseph A. A. M.D. The Ma- amount to be PPCIGA. Slezak, M.D., Ltd. in its jority’s prevails conclusion because case, I respect to the Baker With view, plaintiffs must viewed as these that Bak- similarly would conclude Robert Act.13 I cannot “claimants” under judgment against a er is entitled to enforce that agree Majority’s with the conclusion full amount of Myers, Donald M.D. for the provides instant Act clear “[t]he verdict, jury’s and I reverse the would remedy a loss due to the adequate Philadelphia Order of the. Court of Com- in- insolvency property casualty of a jury mon verdict Pleas which molded 789.) Opinion, at I fur- (Majority surer.” against Myers Dr. favor of Baker Majority’s implicit disagree ther with the $65,662.91 (including delay the amount of policyhold- that as conclusion between damages) to zero. Baker’s to recov- injured Act man- plaintiff, er and an adjudicated Myers er at any plain- borne dates loss be trial which rendered verdict ' presented. Nei- tiff. upon based the evidence above, validity As discussed neither the insurer upon the of the settlement in subse- PIC. quent filings any court and otherwise party acted of these nor PPCIGA was though agreement val- the settlement remains by Judge the Bell actions. As noted Caruso in respects. in all other id and enforceable case, "claimant” is not defined. the term Bell, 16.) (Brief Appellees plaintiffs did not have contractual These PIC, relationship upon nor basis Majority plaintiffs below 13. The assumes *18 against they have made a claim which could Act. are to be deemed claimants under the against only of action exists PIC. cause Their contrary, record does not reveal To the Thus, plaintiffs the tortfeasor. injured plaintiffs made claim for that the Instead, type of claimant referred to in the directly they even be the payment to PPCIGA. brought against defendant purpose have actions would and to which the Act's Act indemnity sought physicians who defense apply. insurer, coverage from their now-insolvent upon ¶ settlement reaching agreed Majority, one of by the 13 As noted amounts, successful obtain- counsel was fi- purposes is “to avoid the Act’s stated of subro- or even waivers ing compromises policyholders nancial loss to claimants interests, such a com- or whether gation insolvency of insurer.” of the an result added). in the 991.1801(1) might be reached promise or waiver (emphasis 40 P.S. the net Act, future, dramatically impacting thus of the offset The so-called actually to plaintiffs were recovery,” amounts these “Non-duplication of entitled agreements. the settlement alia, receive under “[a]ny payable amount inter provides, Indeed, statutory offset the entire this act shall be on a claim under covered waived, leading plain- thus any recovery may have been by the amount of reduced receiving the en- anticipated tiffs to have insurance.” 40 P.S. other subroga- 991.1817(a). no tire settlement amount with application of the Strict above, the As discussed Act, Majority’s rejection of tion to follow.14 mandating the may have Majority acknowledges there injured appeal, on plaintiffs’ claims settlement, rescind the us to act in contravention been basis requires thus of a possibility perhaps alluding purposes Act’s stated because one of the lien, effect, subrogation are, compromised or waived ignoring goal doing so we chose not to do so. plaintiffs below “avoid[ing] financial loss to claim- but ” Majority’s application of the Act Majority’s Again, the Certainly, .... under the ants plain- on placing Act’s in our the burden analysis, fulfilling part are results we a settlement to seek to enforce application statutory for the of its tiffs below purpose, statutory now inherent risk finan- with the “avoid[ance] [of] terms results begin i.e., forego the settlement ... setoff or policyholders,” cial loss to recovery legally anew their efforts to obtain physicians. Despite entering into directly from the doctors. agreements with the binding settlement insolvency of injured plaintiffs, due to the analysis, ap- Majority’s 15 Under the insurer, physicians the defendant are their to its terms pursuant of the Act plication now “off the hook” for the amounts parties it one of the requires penalize us to they agreed. i.e., claimants.15 Sure- purports protect, to immunize Act not intended Majority ly concludes that 14 The also physicians, cases in these policyholders, amount of re- applying a set-off liability. any personal completely from health insurance has no effect on ceived However, application the Act’s through proceeds actual of the settlement immunity has been today, such injured plaintiffs our Court realized because injured victim As between proceeds otherwise would achieved. the settlement tortfeasor, is to suffer when one subroga- and a subject to the health insurer’s I this conclusion, penalty, do believe I must a financial tion lien. With long have cases, proper one. We to be the and Bell result disagree. the Panea par- innocent between two recognized, “as negotiated prior to PIC’s settlements were by the be borne liability ... should ties insolvency. do not know whether We analysis Likewise, assuming purposes of this possibili- 15. I am we rale out the cannot injured plain- subrogation that the ty Majority could be asserted is correct that such proceeds than those other viewed as claimants. tiffs are to be here. at issue *19 possible.” standing public policy ... who of this Common- one made loss 72, Pa.Super. v. Dillabough, 448 wealth. Triffin (1996) (citation 684, omitted),

670 A.2d 550, (1998). 552 Pa. 716 A.2d 605

aff'd Fillette,

Accord v. 503 Pa. Rothman (1983); Rykaczewski Kerry

469 A.2d 543 v.

Homes, Inc., Pa.Super. (1960). public policy It is not sound negligent

make the victim of conduct

for the tortfeasor’s unfortunate choice of public

insurance carrier.16 I believe the supports of this Commonwealth by that the risk of

conclusion loss caused physicians’ company by injured physicians, by borne Gwendolyn PHILLIPS, Administratrix negligence. victims of their Robyn Jorjean of the ESTATE OF ¶ Finally, I note that the result Gwendolyn WILLIAMS, Deceased, Majority may reached lead to ab- Phillips, Administratrix of the Estate results, plaintiffs Deceased, surd who suffer more Campbell, of Jerome I. physical injuries, serious and who there- Gwendolyn Phillips, Administratrix of fore receive more extensive medical treat- Alphonso Crawford, De the Estate of greater ceased, Williams, ment and thus medical insurance Neil A Curtis Minor benefits, By Friend, may ultimately receive less cash His Guardian and Next Gwendolyn compensation agreed upon Phillips, Appellants, from their set- physicians plaintiffs than tlements with physical injuries. with less severe This is result anomalous could have LIGHTERS, Match, CRICKET Swedish legislature.

been intended S.A., Company, Pinkerton Tobacco Group, Inc., Pinkerton Pinkerton reasons, 17 For these additional I re- Group, Inc., USA, Cricket t/a d/b/a spectfully dissent. S.A., B.V., Poppell, Cricket Wilkinson Majority Sword, 18 As the has concluded that Inc., Cricket Wilkinson Sword/ Inc., today Corporation the result reached it is the one And NDC National Act, required legisla- Development Corporation I urge under the Shenan t/a Associates, go Man ture to revisit the mandates of the Act Park DNC Asset Inc., agement Inc., Regional light purposes long- of its stated Sales Indeed, claim, by Majority event of a the insured retains sav- the result reached encourages possi- cheapest the choice of the ings premiums passes the loss to PPCI- premium regard ble without to an insurance injured party. GAand the since, company's financial soundness

Case Details

Case Name: Panea v. Isdaner
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Apr 10, 2001
Citation: 773 A.2d 782
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.