PAN ALASKA TRUCKING, INC. and Alaska National Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Damon E. CROUCH, and State of Alaska, Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellee.
No. S-2417.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
May 5, 1989.
Rehearing Denied June 30, 1989.
773 P.2d 947
Chancy Croft, Anchorage, for appellee.
Before MATTHEWS, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, BURKE, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.
OPINION
COMPTON, Justice.
The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) awarded disability benefits to Damon Crouch. His employer, Pan Alaska Trucking, Inc., and its insurance carrier, Alaska National Insurance Company (collectively referred to herein as “Pan Alaska“) appealed the award to the superior court, which affirmed. Pan Alaska appeals.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In February 1981 Damon Crouch was injured while driving a truck for Pan Alaska Trucking. In January 1983 he filed an
In August 1985 Crouch filed a second application and requested a hearing on his claim. Pan Alaska petitioned the Board to dismiss Crouch‘s claim on the ground that he had failed to request a hearing within two years of the date of controversion. The petition was denied.
A hearing was held before the Board on October 7, 1986. In a written decision, the Board found that Crouch was permanently totally disabled as a result of his employment and awarded him disability benefits, costs, and attorney‘s fees. Pan Alaska filed a notice of appeal in superior court and requested that the court stay enforcement of the award pending appeal. The superior court denied this request, and Pan Alaska paid past benefits to Crouch. Pan Alaska then sought a stay of that portion of the Board‘s order awarding Crouch costs and attorney‘s fees. That motion too was denied.
The superior court affirmed the Board‘s decision and awarded Crouch additional attorney‘s fees.
II. DISCUSSION
The Board Erred in Failing to Apply AS 23.30.110(c) to Crouch‘s Claim
Pan Alaska contends that the Board should have denied Crouch‘s claim pursuant to
Crouch does not deny that more than two years passed between Pan Alaska‘s controversion of his claim and his request for a hearing. Instead Crouch contends that because he was injured prior to the effective date of the amendment grafting the two-year limit onto
The sequence of relevant events is as follows:
February 1981: Crouch suffers heart attack at Prudhoe Bay.
July 1982: Amendment takes effect, requiring claimants to request a hearing within two years of controversion.
January 1983: Crouch files claim and two days later the claim is controverted.
August 1985: Crouch requests a hearing on his claim.
Because the facts are not in dispute and the issue to be resolved is one of statutory interpretation, and because deference to agency expertise is not appropriate here, the court will apply its independent judgment to this issue. Hood v. State, Workmen‘s Compensation Board, 574 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 1978).
As a general rule, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively only, and will not be applied to causes of action arising prior to their enactment unless a contrary legislative intent appears by express terms or necessary implication. See Hood v. State, 574 P.2d at 813-814. This court has held, however, that the presumption against retroactive application does not apply to procedural statutes. Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State, 620 P.2d 182, 187 (Alaska 1980). Because procedural statutes often alter only the legal effects of events occurring during the legal process, courts have treated as irrelevant the date of the events giving rise to the cause of action:
[P]rocedural statutes may become operative when and if the procedure or remedy is invoked, and if the trial postdates the enactment, the statute operates in the future regardless of the time of the occurrence of the events giving rise to the cause of action.
Matanuska Maid, 620 P.2d at 187 (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industri-al Accident Commission, 30 Cal.2d 388, 182 P.2d 159, 161 (1947)).
Alaska Statute 23.30.110, entitled “Procedure on Claims,” does not grant or define a substantive right, but instead sets up the legal machinery through which a right is processed. There can be little doubt that it usually would be described as a “procedural” statute. Applied in this case, the amendment could fairly be said to operate only prospectively: it merely directs the claimant to take certain action following controversion—here, controversion occurred after enactment.
This court has recognized that some “procedural” statutes demand special treatment: Where a change in a procedural statute significantly alters the legal consequences of the events giving rise to a cause of action, it is treated as substantive in character. See Matanuska Maid, 620 P.2d at 187. Crouch argues here that because the change in
The amendment to
III. CONCLUSION
Crouch‘s claim is barred by
RABINOWITZ, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from this court‘s holding that the superior court erred in affirming an award of disability benefits to Damon Crouch.
The court concludes that
This court has “unfettered discretion to apply a ruling ... purely prospectively.” Id. at 393. “[W]e have previously identified four conditions indicating the propriety
I think it is significant that when the hardship is felt to be too great or to be unnecessary, retrospective operation will be withheld.... When so much else that a court does, is done with retroactive force, why draw the line here? The answer is, I think, that the line is drawn here, because the injustice and oppression of a refusal to draw it would be so great as to be intolerable.
Warwick, 548 P.2d at 395-396 (quoting B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 146-49 (1921)). Applying the four factors set forth above to the facts in this case leads directly to the conclusion that
1. Retroactive Application of AS 23.30.110(c) Will Cause Undue Hardship in This Case.
The hardship that Crouch will suffer by denying him disability benefits is certainly “undue.” The Workers’ Compensation Board awarded Crouch, a truck driver since 1949, disability benefits as a result of a work-related heart attack. The heart attack occurred during a round-trip winter2
haul from Fairbanks to Prudhoe Bay which required, among other things, the repeated installation and removal of seventy-five pound tire chains. The Board found that Pan Alaska was fully aware of Crouch‘s injury within days of its occurrence, and that it had access to evidence relating to the heart attack throughout his recovery period. The Board concluded that “the defendants were not prejudiced by the employee‘s delay in filing his claim.” The denial of disability benefits to Crouch, who may be precluded by the nature of the worker‘s compensation system from seeking any other form of recovery,2 will surely cause hardship.
Crouch‘s conduct in filing for a belated hearing is far from blameworthy. He suffered his heart attack in February of 1981. Effective in July of 1982,
During late 1983 or early 1984, Robert Blackford terminated his practice of law and left Alaska. In January of 1984, the Alaska Bar Association petitioned for Blackford‘s cases to be reassigned to other attorneys. The superior court granted this petition on January 30, 1984. On February 3, 1984, the superior court instructed the attorney handling the reassignments that she need not inform clients of pending limitations periods. On the other hand, the superior court did instruct her to inform Blackford‘s former clients that “time is of the essence in securing new representation.”
On April 25, 1984, the superior court authorized the release of Crouch‘s file, and by May 21, 1984, Crouch had secured the
2. Did Crouch Justifiably Rely on Prior Interpretations of AS 23.30.110(c) ?
The only prior interpretations of
3. Does This Court‘s Interpretation of AS 23.30.110(c) Involve an Issue of First Impression and Was it Foreshadowed by Earlier Decisions?
The question of whether the time period in
4. Is the Purpose and Effect of AS 23.30.110(c) Best Served by Applying It Prospectively in This Case?
Although its legislative history is silent, the purpose of
Notes
The board shall ... upon application of any interested party ... order a hearing on [the claim].... If no hearing is ordered within 20 days after [the board has notified the employer that a claim has been filed], the board shall by order reject the claim or make an award with respect to it.
This rule of “prospectivity” applies “whether the subject of the new decision is common law or statute.” Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 466 n. 23 (Alaska 1974); see also State v. Aleut Corp., 541 P.2d 730, 740 n. 25 (Alaska 1975) (interpretation of