Pampris v. EgnasherPampris v. Egnasher
This action arises out of a June 5, 2002 motor vehicle accident which occurred in the Town of Stockport, Columbia County, when a vehicle operated by Mary Egnasher (hereinafter decedent)* struck a vehicle operated by plaintiff Marie E. Pampris (hereinafter plaintiff) from behind as she sat stopped at a traffic light on State Route 9. As a result, decedent was convicted of a violation of
On the issue of fault for the accident, we agree with plaintiffs that summary judgment should have been granted. “As a general rule, a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence against the operator of the following vehicle, imposing a duty of explanation” (Nichols v Turner, 6 AD3d 1009, 1012 [2004] [citation omitted]; see Hubert v Tripaldi, 307 AD2d 692, 694 [2003]). Here, undisputed evidence exists that decedent rear-ended plaintiff‘s vehicle and, by decedent‘s admission, this occurred when she was distracted from the road because she was reaching for something in the seat of her vehicle. Under these circumstances, a prima facie case of negligence is established, placing the burden on decedent
On the other hand, we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment to plaintiffs on the issue of serious injury. Significantly, plaintiff was involved in a similar automobile accident in July 2001 and the affidavit and reports of the neurosurgeon who performed surgery on plaintiff following the accident do not conclusively establish that no part of plaintiff‘s claimed injuries were the result of the prior accident. Given these questions of fact on the issue of causation, as well as the outstanding discovery including, in particular, that plaintiff has not yet been deposed or undergone an independent medical examination, we concur with Supreme Court that plaintiffs’ motion with respect to the issue of serious injury is premature (see Jones v Town of Delaware, 251 AD2d 876, 876 [1998]; DeVito v Silvernail, 239 AD2d 824, 825-826 [1997]).
Peters, J.P., Rose and Kane, JJ., concur.
Mugglin, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent in part. Under the circumstances presented here, where plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment on both the issue of fault and the serious injury issue before any discovery has been conducted, I would affirm Supreme Court‘s order to deny both motions with leave to renew upon completion of discovery. While I agree that there is little doubt that Mary Egnasher‘s negligent conduct was the sole cause of this collision, that issue becomes purely academic if defendant can establish as a matter of law that plaintiff Marie E. Pampris sustained no serious injury in this accident (see
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied plaintiffs’ motion on the