In Re: SANDRA ANN READ, Debtor. PAM DUBOV, Pinellas County Property Appraiser; DIANE NELSON, Pinellas County Tax Collector, Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus SANDRA ANN READ, Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-14994
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
August 30, 2012
D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cv-00484-EAK; Bkcy. No. 8:09-bk-25809-MGW; [PUBLISH]
(August 30, 2012)
ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge:
Pam Dubov, Pinellas County Property Appraiser (“Property Appraiser“) and Diane Nelson, Pinellas County Tax Collector (“Tax Collector“) appeal from an order of the District Court of the Middle District of Florida affirming the final order of the Tampa Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court. The bankruptcy court held that Sandra Ann Read‘s (“the Debtor“) request for the bankruptcy court to redetermine her ad valorem tax liability for the year 2009 was timely filed under
The Property Appraiser and Tax Collector contend that the specific provisions of
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to
I
In this matter, the Property Appraiser certified the 2009 Tax Rolls to the Tax Collector for collection on October 12, 2009. The Debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code twenty-nine days later on November 10, 2009. The Tax Collector filed a proof of claim on December 15, 2009 (“Tax Claims“), for unpaid real property ad valorem taxes, based on the appraised value of approximately twenty investment properties owned by the Debtor. The Debtor did not file a judicial challenge to the value of her property in a Florida state court within 60 days of the October 12, 2009 certification of the 2009 tax rolls by the Property Appraiser pursuant to
II
We must decide whether the bankruptcy court erred in holding that the time period for the filing of the Debtor‘s request for a redetermination of the amount of the ad valorem taxes was timely, notwithstanding the fact that the time to contest the tax assessment had expired under state law. The Tax Collector and Property Appraiser contend that
The issue raised in this appeal has not been reviewed by any United States Court of Appeals. It has been addressed by three other bankruptcy courts. Each has held that a bankruptcy court loses the right to determine tax liability where, as here, the debtor does not seek redetermination prior to the expiration of time for the bringing of an action under state law. See In re Breakwater Shores Partners, L.P., 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1454, at *11 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2012) (holding
III
This dispute is before us because of the lack of clarity in the relationship between the time limits set forth in
(a) If applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor may commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may commence such action only before the later of —
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) two years after the order for relief.
In 2005, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code by adding
(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
(2) The court may not so determine--
(A) the amount or legality of a tax, fine, penalty, or addition to tax if such amount or legality was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the commencement of the case under this title;
(B) any right of the estate to a tax refund, before the earlier of—
(i) 120 days after the trustee properly requests such refund from the governmental unit from which such refund is claimed; or
(ii) a determination by such governmental unit of such request; or
(C) the amount or legality of any amount arising in connection with an ad valorem tax on real or personal property of the estate, if the applicable period for contesting or redetermining that amount under applicable nonbankruptcy law has expired.
Under Florida law, absent the application of
This plain reading of
Section 505(a)(2)(C) was added in 2005 as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”). This Court has held that “[t]he heart of [BAPCPA‘s] consumer bankruptcy reforms . . . is intended to ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.” Whaley v. Tennyson (In re Tennyson), 611 F.3d 873, 879 (11th Cir. 2010) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. 109-31(I), p. 2, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89); see also Elizabeth Weller, Does the Bankruptcy Court Really Have Unlimited Authority to Redetermine Taxes?, 29-NOV Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 12, 67 (2010) (“Recognizing the potential for abuse . . . Congress added § 505(a)(2)(C), which eliminated the court‘s authority to redetermine ‘the amount or legality of any amount arising in connection with an ad valorem tax on real or personal property of the estate, if the applicable period for contesting or redetermining that amount under any law (other than a bankruptcy law) has expired.‘“) (quoting
Before Congress amended
The 2005 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act that added
“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute, ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “It is our duty, ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’” United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 539 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)). “General language of a statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment. Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling.” D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (internal citations omitted).
The intent of Congress in enacting
Conclusion
We conclude that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that the Debtor‘s request for determination of her ad valorem tax liability was timely under the general time extension provision of
Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court‘s order holding that the Debtor‘s request for determination of her ad valorem tax liability was timely, and we REMAND this case to the district court with instructions to VACATE the bankruptcy court‘s order.
