PALMER v. THE STATE
S18A0426
Supreme Court of Georgia
May 21, 2018
Reconsideration denied June 18, 2018
303 Ga. 810
GRANT, Justice.
FINAL COPY
Appellant Qutravius Palmer and his co-defendant Zion Wainwright were convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the December 2013 shooting death of Xavier Arnold. On appeal, Palmer argues that the trial court erred by failing to order an unprompted evaluation of his competency to stand trial and by denying his motion to sever the co-defendants’ trials. He also asserts that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Finding no error, we affirm.1
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict, the evidence at trial showed that on December 26, 2013, Xavier Arnold and his girlfriend Xenia Aimes, both art students, decided to drive to the Kirkwood neighborhood of Atlanta to take pictures of graffiti near a bike path. They picked up their friend Ibrahim Sanusi on the way, and arrived at the site in Kirkwood around 4:45 p.m.
After the friends parked and began walking down the bike path, they noticed that two young men had begun to follow them, and stepped to the side of the path to let the men pass. Initially, the two men passed by, but when the group of friends tried to turn around and walk back toward their car, they were approached by Palmer‘s co-defendant Zion Wainwright, who was just 14 years old at the time. Wainwright rushed toward the friends and yelled in Arnold‘s face “What‘s up? Why are you acting so hard?” while Palmer stood behind him. Arnold replied that the group of friends was leaving and asked for Wainwright to “chill,” but the confrontation continued. Wainwright pulled out a gun and pointed it at Arnold while Palmer grabbed Arnold under the arms, immobilizing him. Arnold fought back, and he and
During their investigation, the police learned that Aimes was not certain when asked to identify Palmer because he was wearing a hood throughout the incident,3 but it appeared to her that the two men were
A few days after the murder, Palmer showed up at his neighbor‘s apartment in the morning before she left for work, repeatedly banging on the door until she answered. Palmer appeared frantic and asked to use the phone. He did so, and then looked up a news article about the murder online. He confessed to the neighbor that he was running from the police, that he had been walking with Wainwright (whom he referred to as his cousin) on the day of the murder, and that the two of them were involved in the murder.
Phone records confirmed that Palmer and Wainwright‘s cell phones were in the area of the murder at the time that it occurred, and that there was
Although Palmer has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, we have independently examined the record according to our usual practice in murder cases, and we conclude that the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Palmer was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318-319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
II.
Palmer contends that the trial court erred in going forward with his trial because doubts existed regarding his competency to stand trial. We disagree.
On July 18, 2014, about ten months prior to trial, Palmer filed a plea of mental incompetency to stand trial and a motion for psychiatric evaluation. Palmer‘s motion noted that he had been assaulted in jail and had become increasingly withdrawn and unwilling to communicate with counsel, and that he had made statements to counsel regarding his belief that somebody was “switching his spirit.” The trial court ordered a mental evaluation, and
The evaluating psychologist was not convinced. She found that Palmer‘s “description of seeing things and hearing things during this evaluation was not consistent with descriptions or symptoms of a true psychotic disorder,” and that “Palmer exhibited no symptoms of mental illness during this evaluation.” The psychologist identified “no symptoms of a psychotic disorder or mental condition that negatively influenced his cognition or ability to relate to me during this evaluation,” and concluded that there was “no reason he should not be able to work with his attorney or meaningfully participate in his defense.” The psychologist ultimately advised that Palmer was competent to stand trial because he “was able to demonstrate functional capacity with respect to the legal proceedings[,] . . . understood the nature and object of the proceedings against him, [and] could discuss his charge and demonstrate an understanding of general courtroom procedure.”
The evaluation was performed and submitted during September of 2014, and the court found Palmer competent to stand trial based on the psychologist‘s findings. On appeal, however, Palmer argues that the court
We see no error. “A trial court has the sua sponte duty to inquire into a defendant‘s competency only when information becomes known to it, prior to or at the time of the trial, sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendant‘s competence.” Biggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627, 629-630 (642 SE2d 74) (2007) (quoting Traylor v. State, 280 Ga. 400, 404 (627 SE2d 594) (2006)). The need for a competency evaluation depends on
whether the trial court received information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about the defendant‘s competency and alerted the trial court to the
possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense.
Traylor, 280 Ga. at 404. In analyzing this issue, “the appellate court must focus on any evidence of the defendant‘s irrational behavior, the defendant‘s demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion regarding the defendant‘s competence to stand trial.” Id.
In Traylor, we found that the defendant‘s inconsistent responses to the trial court regarding his decision to testify, as well as the court‘s directions to the defendant to consult with his attorney, failed to show the type of irrational behavior or unusual demeanor that would require the trial court to make further inquiry regarding competency. Id. at 404-405. Likewise, neither Palmer‘s (arguably confused) statements to the trial court, nor the fact that the court had to instruct him to communicate through his attorney, constituted irrational behavior or unusual demeanor sufficient to require the court to make further inquiry regarding his competency. Indeed, the record shows that although Palmer had some apparent confusion about his decision to testify, both the trial court and his attorney provided him with further
In Biggs, we found that trial counsel‘s testimony that the defendant showed no signs of incompetency during trial, understood the proceedings against him, assisted with the development and presentation of his case, and coherently articulated his defense supported the trial court‘s denial of the defendant‘s claim of incompetency to stand trial. 281 Ga. at 631. So too here. At the motion for new trial hearing, Palmer‘s trial counsel testified that Palmer communicated with him throughout the case, that they had meaningful conversations about the case in which Palmer seemed to understand what counsel told him, that Palmer understood the trial court‘s inquiries regarding his decision whether to testify, that Palmer was able to assist counsel in his defense, and that counsel was satisfied that Palmer was competent at the time of trial. This testimony is further indication that no circumstances existed that would have raised a bona fide doubt with the trial court regarding Palmer‘s competence.
Also, as in Traylor, Palmer provided no “medical opinion regarding his competence which would have caused the trial court to make further inquiry about it.” Traylor, 280 Ga. at 405. Even at this stage, Palmer has provided
III.
Palmer next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from Wainwright‘s. But we see no error.
When two or more defendants are jointly indicted for non-capital offenses, “such defendants may be tried jointly or separately in the discretion of the trial court.”
Palmer has made no such showing. In this case, the law applicable to the two defendants was substantially the same, all of the evidence presented at trial was admissible against both defendants, and there was minimal risk of the jury being confused or of evidence being improperly considered against either defendant. See Herbert, 288 Ga. at 845; Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 255 (773 SE2d 254) (2015). It is true that Palmer‘s defense was that he simply was not the person who committed the crimes with Wainwright, while Wainwright‘s counsel argued that Palmer pressured Wainwright into robbing the victims and that Wainwright shot Arnold in defense of Palmer during the ensuing physical altercation. But as we have already pointed out, the presence of these antagonistic defenses alone did not require severance. In
Palmer has not shown any denial of his due process rights, much less one that could have been avoided by severance of the co-defendants’ trial, and there was strong evidence at trial showing that Palmer and Wainwright acted together in the robbery and in killing the victim. Palmer has not shown, therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever or that he was prejudiced by that denial.
Palmer also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective, first for failing to adequately investigate Palmer‘s competency, and second for failing to object to a witness‘s testimony or to the State‘s asserted bolstering of her testimony. He is incorrect.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that his counsel‘s performance was professionally deficient and that such deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687-695 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (689 SE2d 280) (2010). To show deficient performance, Palmer must demonstrate that his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (745 SE2d 637) (2013); see also Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687-688. To show prejudice, Palmer must establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel‘s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694. If either Strickland prong is not met, this Court need not examine the other prong. See Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 61-62 (779 SE2d 322) (2015).
Regarding Palmer‘s second contention, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a witness‘s testimony that she received threats from Palmer‘s family or to the State‘s alleged improper bolstering of that testimony, we also see no error. The testimony was plainly permitted and was not improperly bolstered.
“[E]vidence of a defendant‘s attempt to influence or intimidate a witness can serve as circumstantial evidence of guilt.” Kell v. State, 280 Ga. 669, 671 (631 SE2d 679) (2006). Likewise, “an attempt by a third person to
Here, the witness‘s testimony included statements that Palmer‘s uncle had threatened her.5 Specifically, she testified that Palmer‘s uncle pressured her to tell police that she had overheard Wainwright telling Palmer that he shot the victim at Palmer‘s direction “because they only care about who was shooting.” The uncle also encouraged her not to come to court to testify at trial and said that if Palmer “go[es] down, me and my family will, too.” The witness testified that to her “knowledge and understanding,” Palmer‘s uncle “was working on behalf of [Palmer],” likely because Palmer had told his uncle that she was the only person who knew about his involvement in the
Moreover, when this witness was first called to testify, she said that she did not want to testify, and the trial court found her in contempt for refusing to do so. She was then brought back to testify the following day, at which point she continued to refuse to answer the prosecutor‘s questions until the court permitted the State to cross-examine her as a hostile witness. At a minimum, then, it was within the trial court‘s discretion to admit the testimony regarding the threats as relevant to explain the witness‘s reluctance to testify. Accordingly, Palmer‘s counsel was not constitutionally deficient for failing to object to the threat testimony. See Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 617 (783 SE2d 652) (2016) (“[T]he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.“) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Regarding Palmer‘s “bolstering” contention, he complains that the prosecutor asked the same witness on redirect examination whether the State “advise[d] you that we were concerned for your safety and if we could help you in some way,” to which she replied, “Yes.” Palmer argues that this was
To begin, the trial court had already permitted the State to question this witness as a hostile witness based on her unwillingness to testify. And the challenged testimony was elicited in response to the defense‘s attack against the witness‘s truthfulness about the threats on cross-examination. The State was permitted to rehabilitate a witness after her credibility had been attacked with relevant testimony to explain her recantation. See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 459-461 (807 SE2d 369) (2017); Fox v. State, 289 Ga. 34, 38 (709 SE2d 202) (2011). An objection for improper bolstering, therefore, would have been meritless, and Palmer‘s trial counsel was not deficient in this respect. See Moss, 298 Ga. at 617. In addition, Palmer has not shown how this alleged deficiency prejudiced him given the strong evidence against him.
Accordingly, Palmer‘s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fail.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Hunter.
Rachel M. Kaufman, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Arthur C. Walton, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth H. Brock, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.