Dоuglas R. Palmer (Palmer), as guardian ad litem for Kenda Palmer (Kenda), sued Dr. Francis Spain, a family physician, and Grit-man Medical Center (Gritman) for an injury Kenda sustained during her birth. Gritman settled with the plaintiffs and after a trial, a jury found in favor of Sрain. Palmer filed a motion for new trial and relief from judgment, which the district court denied. Palmer appeals the district court’s denial of his motions. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 3, 1993, Spain attended to Kenda’s birth аt Gritman. Kenda suffered a brachial plexus impairment (nerve damage), commonly referred to as Erb’s Palsy, to her right shoulder due to impaction on her mother’s pubic bone during the birthing process.
On September 28,1995, Palmer sued Spain alleging he negligently delivered Kenda, causing her injury and resulting damages. Spain defended on the grounds he satisfied the required standard of care by performing the necessary obstetrical maneuvers and that Kenda’s injury wаs due to a rapid descent and/or twisting in the birth canal. Palmer also named Gritman as a defendant. Palmer and his wife, Kenda’s mother, Malenna Palmer, made individual claims against both Spain and Gritman. On March 26, 2001, Gritman was dismissed from the сase after settling with all the plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the individual claims of Mr. and Mrs. Palmer against Spain prior to trial.
On July 9, 2001, Palmer filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) under I.R.C.P. 50(b) or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). During a July 19, 2001, hearing, the district court denied both motions. On September 7, 2001, the district court entered an order, proposed by Palmer, denying the motions for JNOV and/or new trial. Palmer adopted the transcript of the hearing as his proposed order. On September 10, 2001, Palmer filed a mоtion for reconsideration of motion for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1) and (2), 59(d) and a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), which he amended on September 17, 2001. Palmer refers to the motion under Rule 60(b) as a motion for new trial. Similarly, the district court refers to the Rule 60(b) motion as a motion for a new trial. However, a party may not seek a new trial under Rule 60(b), a motion under rule 60(b) is a motion for relief from judgment. The motions for reconsideration and for reliеf from judgment were supported in part by the affidavit of juror Jeanene Hickman (Hickman). During a September 27, 2001, hearing, the district court denied the amended motion to reconsider and the motion for relief from judgment. On October 23, 2001, the district court entered an order of its decision to deny the amended motion for reconsideration.
Palmer timely filed this appeal. He does not challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to recоnsider motion for a new trial.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial, or motion for relief from judgment, for an abuse of discretion.
Sheridan v. St. Lukes Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
III.
ANALYSIS
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Palmer’s Motion For A New Trial Pursuant To I.R.C.P. 59(a).
The district court may grant a new trial if the evidence is not sufficient to justify the verdict or if the verdict is against the law. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) (2002). The district court has broad, but not unlimited, discretiоn to grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6).
Sheridan,
1. The district court correctly perceived the grant or denial of Palmer’s motion for a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) as an issue of discretion.
During the July 19, 2001, hearing on Palmer’s Rule 59(a)(6) motion for a new trial, the
The standard in order to grant a new trial [requires me to] apply a two prong test. First, ... I must find that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be served by vacating the verdict. And two, I must find that a retrial would produce a different result.
When a district court recognizes the analytical process by which it may determine whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, it correctly perceives the issue as one of discretion.
See Sheridan,
2. The district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards in denying Palmer’s motion for a new trial.
As the district court recognized, the legal standard for deciding a motion for a new trial involves two different tests.
Sheridan,
In weighing the evidence, the district court independently determines whether the evidence, including the credibility of witnesses, supports the verdict. Id. The district court stated:
My assessment of the case is that excessive traction was applied to this baby resulting in her brachial plexus injury, but I’m not sure that gets you a new trial____ Just because I would have decided the case differently than what a jury would have decided it, is not, as I understand, my obligation.
The district court recognized the verdict was largely a credibility determination and the jury could believe the evidence supported Spаin’s argument that he performed the necessary obstetrical maneuvers and Kenda’s injury was due to her rapid descent and/or twisting through the birth canal. The district court stated: “[J]ust because I would make a determination differеnt than what the jury determined, I should not overturn that jury’s prerogative____ [I]f I thought there were basis for me to do differently I would do it. I don’t think there is a basis for me to decide this case differently____” The district court also commented that “it would be inappropriate for me to grant a new trial, even if I conclude on a credibility determination, I would decide it differently.”
Quick v. Crane,
The district court recognized the second test, whether a new trial will produce a different result, but failed to expressly make a finding. However, since the district court found the first test was not satisfied, it was not required to expressly determine whether a new trial would prоduce a different result.
3. The district court reached its decision to deny Palmer’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) by an exercise of reason.
The role of this Court, in determining if the district court reached its decisiоn by an exercise of reason, is to review the process the district court engaged in to make its decision.
Sheridan v. St. Lukes Reg’l.
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Palmer’s Motion For Relief Of Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 60(b).
A party may seek relief from a final judgment based on mistake, surprise or excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; misrepresentation or misconduct; a void or satisfied judgment; or any other reason justifying relief from judgment. I.R.C.P. 60(b);
First Bank & Trust of Idaho v. Parker Bros. Inc.,
1. The district court correctly perceived the grant or denial of Palmer’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) as an issue of discretion.
The district court recognized the issue of whether to grant a motion for relief from judgment as one of discretion when it stated during the September 27, 2001, hearing that: “[U]ndеr 60(b) you have to show unique and compelling circumstances” in order to obtain relief from judgment.
2. The district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards in denying Palmer’s motion for relief from judgment.
Palmer’s motion for relief from judgment failed to specify the grounds upon which he was entitled to relief from judgment. Furthermore, even if Palmer specified the grounds for relief from judgment, the district court exprеssly found the required unique and compelling circumstances lacking. Therefore, the district court acted within the bounds of its discretion and consistently with legal standards in denying Palmer’s motion for relief from judgment.
3. The district court reaсhed its decision to deny Palmer’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) by an exercise of reason.
In denying Palmer’s motion for relief from judgment, the district court determined: “[U]nder 60(b) you have to show unique and compelling circumstances. And I haven’t seen unique and compelling circumstances by which I can grant a new trial under 60(b).” Thus, the district court reached its decision to deny Palmer’s motion for relief from judgment by an exercise of reason.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Palmer’s motion for a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) and did not abuse its discretion when it denied Palmer’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b). Neither party requested attorney fees on appeal. Costs to the respondent.