38 N.H. 418 | N.H. | 1859
Part of the eighty-four dollars allowed to the guardian by the judge of probate was for expenses incurred in resisting the application made by the ward for a revocation of the guardianship, on the ground of his restoration to sanity. It is objected that, as the ward was in fact restored, the guardian should have made no opposition to the revocation, and the expenses incurred in this respect ought not to have been allowed.
The auditor reports that the expenses were incurred by the guardian in good faith, and under a reasonable doubt whether the ward was so far restored as to render the continuance of the guardianship unnecessary. The facts reported justify the auditor in this conclusion. "When the petition of the ward for the revocation was served upon him, the guardian made enquiry of those persons who had the best opportunity to judge of the condition of the ward, conferred with his relatives, family connections and neighbors, and upon their expressing strong doubt of his restoration, consulted an attorney-at-law as to what his duty required; and upon being advised that he should present the facts fully to the judge of probate, made the necessary and proper preparations for a hearing before him.
The revocation of the guardianship in such cases is not to be made until the cause for which it is granted is removed. If this is a matter so obvious that no reasonable
The citation for a settlement of the guardianship account was issued by the judge of probate prior to the passage of the act of June 27, 1857, making parties witnesses in all civil causes which were not then pending. When the appeal was entered in this coui’t, in conformity to the practice, it was referred to an auditor or master, with instructions to inquire into and report the facts. The hearing was had before the auditor prior to the passage of the act of June 25, 1858, extending the provisions of the former act to pending causes. Each party offered himself as a witness before the auditor, and was rejected by him on the ground that the statute of June 27 had no application to the ease ; but he also ruled that he had no discretionary power to admit the parties to testify. In so ruling, the auditor erred. In hearings of this nature before masters or auditors, whether appointed under the statute
The report being thereupon recommitted to the auditor, he reported, at the same term, that each of the parties offered himself as a witness, and was rejected, in the exercise of the auditor’s discretion, on the ground that, one of the parties being insane when the guardianship account accrued, they did not . stand on equal ground as witnesses in reference to the state of the accounts; and the decree of the judge of probate was affirmed.