458 Pa. 535 | Pa. | 1974
Opinion by
The question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to accept and mold the verdicts returned by the jury.
These actions in trespass were instituted to recover for personal injuries and property damage resulting from a two-car accident which occurred on November 29, 1967, in Allegheny County. The exact scene of the collision was the intersection of Route 8 and Burch-field Rd. in Shaler Township. Mr. Hurtis Moses was operating his vehicle in a southerly direction on Route 8 when it came into contact with a vehicle being operated by Ms. Margaret Palmer which had been proceeding in an easterly direction on Burchfield Rd. and was in the process of negotiating a left-hand turn onto Route 8. Both vehicles were damaged and Ms. Palmer and her passenger, Mrs. Helen E. Stroeeh sustained personal injuries. Ms. Palmer and Mr. and Mrs. Stroeeh commenced an action against Foss Motors, Inc., a corporation, and Mr. Moses. The claim of Margaret Palmer was subsequently severed and she was joined as an additional defendant. At the close of all of the evidence a judgment of nonsuit was granted as to Foss Motors, Inc. and the cases of Palmer v. Moses and Mr. and Mrs. Stroech v. Moses and Palmer were submitted to the jury. The jury returned three sets of verdicts and each time the trial judge refused to accept them on the ground that they were not in accordance with his instructions. While the jury was deliberating for a fourth time the court granted the motion of Palmer for the withdrawal of a juror and declared a mistrial. The request of the appellant, Hurtis Moses, to accept, record and mold the verdicts was denied. The Superior Court affirmed the action of the court below with two judges dissenting. Palmer v. Moses, 224 Pa. Superior Ct. 276, 303 A.2d 525 (1973). We granted allocatur and now reverse.
During this trial the jury returned three sets of verdict slips
When the jury first returned they announced in the case of Palmer v. Moses that they found Palmer negligent and Moses eontributorily negligent. In the case of Stroech v. Moses and Palmer, their verdict was that Palmer was negligent and Moses eontributorily negligent and awarded the sum of $10,000 to Mrs. Stroech. No reference was made as to whether any conclusion had been reached by them as to the claim of Mr. Stroech. Upon the receipt of this verdict the court initially expressed its intention to mold the verdicts in the Palmer case for the defendant and in the Stroech case to interpret it to be a finding against both the original appellant, Moses, and the additional appellee Palmer. The court further expressed the view that the jury should be required to deliberate further only as to a determination of separate awards for Mr. and Mrs. Stroech.
The jury subsequently returned a third pair of verdicts identical to the second except that Mrs. Stroech was awarded $7,000 and Mr. Stroech $3,000. The verdict was again refused by the court and the jury was directed to continue their deliberations. Minutes later the court granted a motion withdrawing a juror and declaring a mistrial. The appellant’s request that the third set of verdicts be accepted, recorded and molded to allow for recovery by Mrs. Stroech from both defendant and additional defendant in the amount of $7,000 and Mr. Stroech to recover from both in the amount of $3,000 was refused.
It is basic law in this Commonwealth that strict form is not required in verdicts. What is required is for the jury’s intention to be free of ambiguity and
In the action of Helen Stroech and Carl Stroech against Moses and Palmer the only issues to be resolved were, whether either or both defendants were negligent and if either or both were found to have been then the assessment of the damages to be awarded to Mr. and Mrs. Stroech. From the very first attempt to return a verdict it was clear that the jury had concluded that both Moses and Palmer were negligent. In each of the subsequent attempts to return a verdict the jury persisted in this view which was also consistent with their verdicts in the Palmer v. Moses case. That the jury may not have artfully expressed their intention to find against both defendants may be conceded but it cannot be seriously questioned that their intent was clear to all. This is evidenced by the fact that instructions of the court were not addressed to this, at best technical defect, but rather the jury’s failure to separate the award to the Stroechs.
After returning the second time, having complied with the admonition that they should set forth the award to be given to Mr. and Mrs. Stroech separately, the jury unequivocally expressed their decision to award Mrs. Stroech $10,000 and Mr. Stroech nothing. Although the court may have then had reason to award a new trial on the basis of inadequacy of verdict, Bedillion v. Frazee, 408 Pa. 281, 183 A.2d 341 (1962), there was in our judgment no justification for refusing the entry of the verdict. Between the first and second attempt to reach a verdict there was no evidence of any
In a quite similar factual situation we held that where the jury returned a verdict using the term “not guilty” and “guilty”, it was appropriate for the court to receive that verdict since the obvious intention was to express their conclusion on the question of liability. Hornak v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, supra. In that instance we stated: “In using the term hot guilty’, the jury, in our view, was merely expressing in laymen’s language the legal liability imposed upon certain parties whose acts caused injury, compensable in money damages, to the person and property of other parties. We think that an intelligent consideration of the record indicates that the findings made do fitting justice to the evidence as well as to the court’s exposition of the applicable ]egal principles. If the trial judge entertained a doubt as to what the jury meant by the term hot guilty,’ he should have directed a specific inquiry to them, rather than categorically instructing them that an inconsistency existed, thus jeopardizing perfectly sound verdicts won after a long and arduous trial.” Id. at 175-176, 249 A.2d 315-16 (1969).
While we appreciate the trial court’s honest desire to protect the record, we cannot become so enmeshed in language that we ignore the clear expression of a conscientious lay jury. The record demonstrates without question that they exerted every effort to perform their duties in accordance with the instructions given and to convey to the court and litigants with all the
We accept the view expressed by Judge Cercone in his dissent in the court below to this effect: “I can sympathize with and understand the difficulties faced by the trial judge in the case now before us in his many attempts to secure from the jury verdict slips in correct form. However, I believe the collective content of the verdict slips reveals them to evidence, consistently and clearly, though not. in technically correct form, their finding that Margaret R. Palmer and Hurtis Moses, the drivers of the two vehicles involved in the accident were both negligent; that Mrs. Palmer was not to recover in her suit against Mr. Moses; and that both Mrs. Palmer and Mr. Moses were liable to Mrs. Helen E. Stroech, a passenger in the Palmer automobile, in the amount of $7,000 and to her husband, Carl P. Stroech, in the amount of $3,000.” Palmer v. Moses, 224 Pa. Superior Ct. 276, at 279-280, 303 A.2d 525 (1973).
The order of the Superior Court affirming the action of the trial Court is reversed; the order of the trial Court declaring a mistrial and awarding a new trial is reversed and the record is remanded with the direction that the verdict for the defendant in the case of Margaret R. Palmer v. Hurtis Moses and the verdict in favor of Helen E. Stroech in the amount of $7,000 and in favor of Carl P. Stroech, her husband, in the amount of $3,000 against Hurtis Moses and Margaret R. Palmer be recorded. All aggrieved parties are then to be given a reasonable opportunity to file post-trial motions based on asserted error other than that disposed of in the present appeals. It is so ordered.
Verdicts in the case of Palmer v. Hurtis Moses:
First: “And now, to wit: November 17, 1971, we, the Jurors empanelled in the above entitled case, find Mrs. Palmer negligent and Mr. Moses contributory negligent.”
Second: “And now, to wit, November 17, 1971, we, the Jurors empanelled in the above entitled case, find for the defendant.”
Third: “And now, to wit, November 17, 1971, we, the Jurors empanelled in the above entitled case, find for the defendant.” Verdicts in the ease of Helen and Carl Stroech v. Moses and Palmer (additional defendant) :
First: “And now, to wit: November 17, 1971, we, the Jurors empanelled in the above entitled case, find Mrs. Palmer negligent and Mr. Moses contributory negligent and award Helen E. Stroech the sum of $10,000.00.”
Second: “And now, to wit, November 17, 1971, we, the Jurors empanelled in the above entitled case, find for the plaintiff and award Helen B. Stroech $10,000.00 and Carl P. Stroech nothing.”
Third: “And now, to wit: November 17, 1971, we, the Jurors empanelled in the above entited ease, find for the plaintiff and award Helen E. Stroech $7,000.00 and Carl P. Stroech $3,000.00.”
At this point in the record the following appears: “The Court: The terms are not correct but the intent is clear that they are finding Mrs. Palmer and Mr. Moses both, negligent. I would, therefor, say to you that I am going to mold the verdicts .to be in the Palmer case for the defendant, and in the Straech [sic] case I’m going to interpret that to be against both the original defendant, Moses, and the additional defendant, Palmer. Me. Euhlensteust : You’re going to return the jury to mold its own verdict? The Court : I’m going to send the jury out only to consider an award for Mr. and Mrs. Straech, separate awards.”