This is a petition for a writ of prohibition. Celestia S. Palmer, petitioner herein, and Annie S. Sanders are sisters, and are two of the heirs of A. B. Smith, Sr., deceased. Smith, at the time of his death, was the owner of certain land in Saline Cоunty. In 1960, Annie S. Sanders instituted suit against petitioner and Huel Hester for $375.00, Mrs. Sanders contending that she was the owner of an undividеd one-eighth interest in the land, and asserting that Celestia S. Palmer had sold timber on the land to Hester for $3,000.00, and had not accounted to her (Mrs. Sanders) for her share. The Circuit Court of Saline County, sitting as a jury, rendered judgment for $375.00 agаinst both petitioner and Hester. Mrs.,Palmer appealed to the Supreme Court, but Hester did not. On appeal, this court reversed the Circuit Court, and remanded the cause. See Palmer v. Sanders,
We do not agree that the Chancery Cоurt was without jurisdiction. For one thing, relief was sought in this case that was not sought in the Circuit Court suit, i.e., partition of the lands. It is truе that the damages include the same damages that were sought in Palmer v. Sanders, supra, but there is no jurisdiction in the Circuit Court at the present time. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2144 (Repl. 1962) provides:
‘ ‘ The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or order appealed from, in whole or in part and as to any or all parties, and when the judgment or оrder has been reversed, or affirmed, the Supreme Court may remand or dismiss the cause and enter such judgment ■uрon the record as it may in its discretion deem just; provided, when a cause is affirmed, or reversed and remanded, the mandate must be taken out and filed in the court from which the appeal was taken by the plaintiff оr defendant within one [1] year from the rendition of the judgment, affirming or reversing the cause, and not thereafter ; аnd immediately upon the expiration of the period of one [1] year after the judgment of reversal is еntered, when the mandate is not taken out, the clerk of the Supreme Court shall upon applicatiоn of the party entitled thereto issue an execution for all costs accrued up to the date of reversal in the Supreme Court and in the Court from which said cause has been appealed. ’ ’
In Robeson v. Kempner,
“If the prеvailing litigant desires to invoke the aid of the court from which the appeal came to enforce the judgment, he must file the mandate in the court within twelvemonths * * V’ 1
We then went on to discuss the next section, 2 and held that this court still had power to enforce its judgmеnt, whether the mandate issued or not, though the decision makes clear that the trial court, after twelve mоnths, could acquire no further jurisdiction in the case. Of course, since we reversed (Palmer v. Sanders), rather than affirmed, there was nothing for this court to enforce. The result is simply that Mrs. Sanders was therefore free to institute her suit in any court of competent jurisdiction. No one would dispute that the Chancery Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the complaint.
Likewise, we do not agree that the first suit, and disposition of same, is res judicata as to the issue raised in the Chancery law suit, for it is obvious that no rights were determined in Palmer v. Sanders, suprа. This court reversed the trial court judgment in that case, and remanded the cause, and we have said, on numerous occasions, that, when a judgment is reversed and remanded for new trial, the case stands as if no aсtion at all had been taken by the trial court. This was first stated as far back as 1874 in the case of Harrison v. Trader and Wife,
“When а judgment is reversed, the rights of the parties are immediately restored to the same condition in which they were before its rendition; and the judgment is said to be mere waste paper. ’ ’
Since that time, we have had oсcasion to reiterate this statement many times. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Enoch,
“When a judgment has been reversed on appeal, or vacated or set aside by the court which rendered it, it is deprived of its conclusive character, and thereafter it no longer stands as a bar to a further suit on the same cause of action # * V’
There are other reasons why prohibitiоn does not lie, but the aforementioned citations are sufficient to demonstrate that such an order would be inappropriate.
Writ denied.