A15A0642. PALATINI v. THE STATE.
A15A0642
Court of Appeals of Georgia
Decided July 14, 2015
Reconsideration denied July 29, 2015
774 S.E.2d 818
BARNES, Presiding Judge.
After allegedly pornographic images were found on his computer, Gerald David Palatini was arrested and later charged with one count of sexual exploitation of children. Following the trial court’s denial of his special demurrer, we granted Palatini’s application for interlocutory appeal.1 He now appeals and contends that the trial court erred in denying the special demurrer because the indictment alleged that the offense occurred on April 24, 2009, but the uncontroverted date of the offense was December 7, 2007. He also contends that the indictment was unconstitutionally vague. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
an accusation or indictment is subject to special demurrer if it is not perfect in form as well as substance. By special demurrer an accused claims, not that the charge in an indictment or accusation is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction (as would be asserted by general demurrer), but rather that the charge is imperfect as to form or that the accused is entitled to more information.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) State v. Jones, 251 Ga. App. 192, 193 (553 SE2d 631) (2001).
When presented with a special demurrer, the court should examine the indictment [or accusation] from the perspective that the accused is innocent, for this is what the law presumes. Nevertheless, the language of an indictment [or accusation] is to be interpreted liberally in favor of the State, while the accused’s objections to the indictment [or accusation], as presented in a special demurrer, are strictly construed against the accused.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 497-498 (700 SE2d 912) (2010). “We review rulings on special demurrers de novo.” State v. Leatherwood, 326 Ga. App. 730, 731 (757 SE2d 434) (2014).
The evidence shows that law enforcement seized Palatini’s computer in December 2007, Palatini was arrested on April 24, 2009, and he was indicted on March 15, 2010. In the First Indictment, Palatini was charged with six counts of sexual exploitation of children, five for possessing specific digital images on his computer “depicting a minor
The State then issued a Second Indictment, which contained a single count mirroring the language of Count 6 in the First Indictment, but stating that the offense had occurred “on or about the 24th day of April, 2009.” Palatini filed a special demurrer to the Second Indictment, arguing, among other things, that the indictment was too vague and that the date alleged in the indictment was impossible because the State had seized his computer by then.
On October 29, 2012, the State returned a Third Indictment against Palatini. The six-count Third Indictment was identical to the First Indictment. Palatini filed a special demurrer to the Third Indictment, and the trial court granted the motion on the basis that it was returned outside the statute of limitation and could not be deemed a superseding indictment from the Second Indictment because it broadened the charges from one count to six counts.
Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on Palatini’s special demurrer to the Second Indictment, which was the only pending indictment. At the hearing, Palatini asserted that the charge in the indictment should be quashed because the GBI had seized his computer in 2007, so he could not have possessed the images on the April 24, 2009 date alleged in the indictment, and thus it was impossible for him to have committed the crime as charged. The trial court rejected Palatini’s argument and denied his special demurrer.
Generally, to be perfect in form, an indictment must allege a specific date on which the crime was committed. Blackmon, 272 Ga. App. at 854. See also
Here, however, the indictment alleges a specific date on which the crime of sexual exploitation of children was committed. Moreover, the day of the crime as alleged in the indictment was not after the date upon which the indictment was returned. Accordingly, the indictment was not subject to special demurrer for being imperfect in form. Compare Blackmon, 272 Ga. App. at 855 (the indictment that failed to allege specific date on which crime committed was not perfect in form); Langlands v. State, 280 Ga. 799, 800 (3) (633 SE2d 537) (2006) (noting that defendant may challenge indictment date as impossible by way of special demurrer when offense was alleged to have been committed after he was indicted).
While Palatini argues that the date of the crime charged in the indictment was after the date his computer was seized by the police, his argument concerns the underlying evidence in the case rather than the form of the indictment. Consequently, his argument does not support the grant of a special demurrer in this case.
Palatini also contends that the indictment was unconstitutionally vague and should have specified which illegal images he possessed rather than simply that he possessed “numerous digital images, depicting minor female children, engaged in lewd exhibition of their genital area.” However, the indictment charged the offense in the language of
The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment to withstand a special demurrer is not whether it could have
Coalson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 761, 764 (2) (555 SE2d 128) (2001).
Where the offense is purely statutory, having no relation to the common law, it is, as a general rule, sufficient in the indictment to charge the defendant with acts coming fully within the statutory description, in the substantial words of the statute, without any further expansion of the matter.
Kyler v. State, 94 Ga. App. 321, 324 (3) (94 SE2d 429) (1956). See Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 103 (1) (475 SE2d 580) (1996) (indictment that tracks the language of the Code and can be “clearly and easily understood” sufficient).
Here, the statute forbids the knowing possession “or control [of] any material which depicts a minor or a portion of a minor’s body engaged in any sexually explicit conduct.”
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred as a matter of law in overruling Palatini’s special demurrer.
Judgment affirmed. Ray, J., concurs. McMillian, J., concurs in the judgment only.
Decided July 14, 2015 —
Reconsideration denied July 29, 2015
Gammon, Anderson & McFall, W. Wright Gammon, Jr., for appellant.
Jack Browning, Jr., District Attorney, Matthew S. Nestrud, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
