*1 S.E.2d Clark W. PAJAK and William J.

Audrey Anthony Wayne D. PAJAK and Ann Poore.

Poore and Christina

No. 18247.

Supreme Appeals Court of

West

March

Dissenting Opinion April Filed *2 McCamin, & McCam- estate of Clark and William on one side and Jolyon W. McCamic ic, Pajak. Wheeling, Anthony for & Wm Audrey Clark on the other. Poore and Wheeling, Shrader, Poore. Kaiser, Ray H. Brann A. Boos & Stamp, Byrd, Brum & for Byrd, altemeyer, Phillips, Audrey Pajak. Donald J. Harley, Wheeling, Tennant, Jr., Companion, Gardill, by fore action. Pajak, 1979 last will and testament William Christina Code, 41-1-6 his first Sr., Ultimately, circuit court were: Poore, was revoked marriage, ^[1975] the two because of his remar- Pajak’s intervened virtue W.Va. questions two children whether the in the be- J. and, (2) riage; pre-nuptial whether NEELY, Justice: Audrey Pajak D. between Sr., Pajak, William J. married Patricia Sr., Pajak, William J. is valid and binds in Schmidt and the two regard to her claim for a children, Anthony. The cou- Christina and Pajak’s share of Mr. es- wife’s 1954; ple were in the former Mrs. divorced tate. Poore, George then married who raised were his own children. Anthony, Poore never mally changed their names to Poore. Christina when legally adopted they came of Anthony Although George Christina and age they as if they for- Pajak, held that the ^[1975] Sr. died intestate.1 The The circuit court held that revoked the 1979 will of William J. Sr. and, therefore, pre-nuptial circuit court William J. Code, entered 41-1-6 also Sr., Pajak, again married William J. Audrey D. and William between children, and sired more Clark two Sr., binding, Pajak, was valid and J. William, by his second wife. Mr. Pa- barred claim that jak’s marriage second also ended divorce Audrey Pajak would otherwise have had on in 1980. In his divorce from before From this decision Mrs. the estate. wife, Sr., Pajak, his second William J. aside, set appealed to have testament; under wrote his last will and Jr., Pajak, J. and Clark William bequeathed all of this will he devised and of the will appealed to have the invalidation appellants, to the Clark Anthony allowed and Christina Pajak. and William argu- inherit set aside. Before Poore to Sr., Pajak, Then J. married his William, William here the issues between ment wife, day after Audrey, third one settled; Clark, Anthony and Christina were Audrey pre-nuptial entered into a he and us, then, Pajak’s ap- only that leaves Audrey agreement by which waived consequences seeking peal to avoid estate. J. and all interests William pre-nuptial contract. December, Pajak, died in 1985 and probate. 1979 will was offered for I. William, This case arose when Clark and agreement entered into by his second mar- children entirety, Mr. and Mrs. its riage, brought declaratory judgment ac- between provides as follows: respective rights tion to declare the ' W.Va.Code, be revoked which, though sion therein for such contingency, pointed when the appointment, when the estate ment, default of such sentative, Every divorce, pass to his or her would will made or next of kin: estate 41-1-6 except is made in his or her not, appointment, thereby appointed a will which making provision for such ^[1975] in default of such a man or woman contingency, or a will exercise of a heirs, marriage, provides Provided, personal repre- pass makes thereby ap- annulment as follows: would, to his or that even power appoint- provi- shall voked power is between her kin, person cise of such nulment or divorce. appointment was terminated (b) by person appointed in heirs, such will (a) exercising to the such annulment personal representative, appointment power such shall, nevertheless, person appointed person exercising such marriage power appointment is the if such exercise of such divorce, person appointment, by such an- in the exer- such not or next marriage and the whose unless power be re- Will; party of the party’s first that said between WIL- AGREEMENT THIS PAJAK, part, first and relin- part expressly waives LIAM J. HENNEN, dower, homestead, DARLENE quishes and AUDREY all claims to day of part, this 20th party of the second right available to a statutory or other *3 August, 1982. widow, personal and in and to the real party part of the first estate of which the

WITNESSETH: may possessed. and WHEREAS, contemplate die seised parties said marriage relation with entering into the (4) by IT MUTUALLYDECLARED IS other; and each be, parties it is their inten- said and WHEREAS, of both it is the intention tion, solely by virtue party, that neither marriage shall parties hereto that their marriage, acquire have or of said shall right of any way change legal the not in claim, statutory or any right, or title in grandchildren either of the or children other, or personal in to the real and they are be- parties’ property from what other, the same effect estate of the marriage; and fore the though place had taken as WHEREAS, recognize, ac- parties both agreement; parties this between the party the of the cept understand that and shall and that the estate of each descend love, brings affection and part first respective in his or her heirs- to and vest party worldly goods, the second and devisees, at-law, ex- legatees, or other affection, mar- brings love to the and provided by cepting may as otherwise be other; riage and to each her and Testament. and his or last Will IS, THEREFORE, AGREED IT NOW (5) FURTHER MUTUALLY IT IS mar- and consideration of the that for that, par- either of AGREED case the riage to be consummated between about sell con- mortgage, ties desire to or and hereto, parties hereto parties the both separate or vey personal his her real or agree: mutually estate, any, join each deed if will the (1) part party That the of the first will note, deed and or conveyance, of trust par- provide a home for the and maintain other, may necessary to be make Arlington ty part at 21 of the second purely event same effectual. Drive, Place, Wheeling, West Howard involving corporate business transaction elsewhere, par- Virginia, and/or as the business, or individually-owned or real agree; may ties personal property, requires signature party part, of the first That consummate, agrees each of both to then of the party he survives event thereto, signature affix his or her any part, will make no second claim without more. estate, her part party’s said second (6) IT AGREED that IS FURTHER husband, surviving which other than that each entered bequeathed him in said second may be part full on party with the will; party of the first party’s that the probable of each as to the extent and relinquishes right part and all waives estate other and of all value of the other, dower, any in and rights upon conferred law each party any real estate of which the said of the other virtue of estate seised, part may die the second desire, marriage. proposed It is their solely personal owned all her intent, agree, they hereby in consid- husband; estate, surviving as her marriage, that their re- eration of their part of the party That the second each spective rights and to other’s sur- similarly agrees, in the event she shall, by law in lieu estate as determined will party part, of the first vives the thereof, by this be determined and fixed any part or share of the make no claim to is, be, binding agreement, and shall party personal real or estate which legal respective and their them part, seised, than first dies other heirs, assigns. successors and may bequeathed her in said that as been, being, having is fur- premises, In view of the the husband or parties other; agreed both excepting ther between of the that either wife hereto as follows: hereto, parties pro- of the as hereinabove vided, Will,

(A) cogni- may, by parties are valid hereafter de- hereto par- bequeath clearly zant business interests termine to and does part; ty the first that each of said or her and interests to his wife more, other, parties join husband, will without parties hereto. every in each and kind or contract WHEREOF, IN WITNESS signa- may require both nature signatures hereto have affixed their on consummate; tures to year day and set first hereinabove part recognizes par- first that the Wheeling, *4 forth at West open ty is about another branch The evidence indicates that before fi- Furniture that whatever Carolina and Audrey, Pajak, J. William made, arrangements nancial need be that was a man of wealth who had considerable join party part will variety of active Au- business interests. required. promptly them as and when drey Pajak, marriage, as before her worked (B) parties in 21 The will reside hereto employee Compa- Carolina Furniture Drive, Place, Arlington Wheel- Howard ny, a retail furniture Mr. business which Virginia, elsewhere, they ing, West Pajak pre-nuptial was the sole The owner. may determine from to time. The time at issue this case was drafted property and its now stand contents by Pajak lawyer William J. Sr.’s and was part. party the name of the of the first presented Pajak lawyer’s to Mrs. agreed It is understood and and be- day mar- office one before the were parties this real tween hereto that lawyer ried. Mrs. testified that the estate, contents, and its unless earlier briefly, discussed with her transferred, dis- sold or otherwise will be signed reading and that then she it without posed provided of as the Will agreement. that Mrs. testified party part of the first in existence at the not know could have had she did that she time of his death. lawyer, reviewed another (C) parties Both heretofore exe- have signed the time and that at she separate respective personal cuted their ment, she believed she “wasn’t al- agree parties hereto that: Wills. wording of the object” lowed to to the right to Either reserves the agreement. present the terms of or her Will alter time, any and time to time. Pajak argued in circuit court (2) That neither the Will of will argues appeal on that at the time contest and now to his or the other nor make claim she signed pre-nuptial agreement she whatsoever, provid- except her estate the extent was not informed of in said Wills in accordance with ed and Sr.’s, She also William J. wealth. Agreement. understand or maintains that did not hereto, (D) parties Both said consid- meaning of and claus- the words know premises, agree to disclaim eration pre-nuptial agreement. We es used release, hereby disclaim and do however, conclude, behalf, other, to the on his or release willingly and agreement was entered into her, heirs, representa- legal his and/or Audrey Pajak is intelligently, and that devisees, all tives, assigns, legatees and Accordingly, we af- by its terms. bound or other singular, every statutory firm the circuit court. actual, estate, inchoate right, claim and contingent, every kind and charac- II. hold, ter, either would or might Initially, point we would out held, in, acquire could have to or pre- other, us a traditional case before involves all or of said protect agreement designed to nuptial marriage, solely virtue of said Pajak generally was accorded all of the rights children from claims inheritance privileges regarded wife who is not the chil- of a well rights made a new recently pointed out mother. As we unlikely dren’s It that Mr. would wife. is Gant, 174 v. W.Va. in footnote Gant had he not been have married (1985): 740, 329 S.E.2d 106 protect that he could his assets assured always strongly pre favored his children. We proper nuptial agreements that establish maintains that she ty rights at death West unaware of the extent of Chilton, 5 Munf. 467 Pickett et ux v. However, a success assets. Charles, (1817); v. 8 Grat. Charles and Mrs. was aware ful businessman (1852); Am.Dec. 155 Mitchell v. businesses, that he owned a number (1861); Syl. pt. Moore als. 16 Grat. & holdings, reasonably real estate and lived Coatney Hopkins, v. W.Va. 338 Contrary Pajak’s reading of well. to Mrs. Beard, (1878); Syl. pt. Beard law, pre-nuptial agreement for a to be (1883); pt. Syl. Hinkle v. W.Va. valid, necessary it is not that both (1890); Hinkle, S.E. detailed, written financial state execute Bramer, 84 Syl. pt. 2 Bramer v. required by ment such as bank before 99 S.E. Williamson *5 making Although a loan. made Williamson, First National Bank of regaling great moment of Mrs. no 720, 164 S.E. 777 Gies holdings, there is no with the details of his Remke, eler v. 117 W.Va. 185 S.E. that he was at all secretive or in evidence Therefore, any way Pajak. misled Mrs. we agreements pre-nuptial The reason that find no conduct that would amount Pajak signed type Mrs. are favored agreement “fraud” such that should be enhance, they by public policy is that rath- set aside. from, opportunities er than detract to form relationships middle-age marriage Typically, a marries in their later. III. twenties, children, through early has Finally, Mrs. maintains that If,

joint family efforts accumulates assets. agreement she could not understand the dies, then, surviving spouse spouse one opportunity and was not accorded an may duty spouse the deceased feel a by independent counsel. have it examined protect as to the children to the assets well sylla problem We addressed this exact Thus, spouse. from claims of second Gant, point supra, where bus Gant v. ability to enter into enforce- without we said: able, pre-nuptial agreements protect validity pre-nuptial agreement of a entitlement of a assets from money dependent upon procurement, its spouse, person an older with valid help spouse acquired requires having with the of his or her its executed been marriage voluntarily, in an earlier would be reluctant its con- remarry. Although effect, in the case before legal tent and under circum- divorced, us Mr. was it was obvious fraud, duress, misrep- free of stances protect the interests of that he wished to resentation; however, although advice his children. parties independent counsel at the time pre-nuptial agreement helps enter into a Indeed, it is unfortunate for Mrs. demonstrate that there has been that William J. died so soon fraud, misrepresentation, and duress or couple were married. None- after agreement was entered theless, during the the evidence is that in- knowledgeably voluntarily, such house, marriage good Mrs. lived in a pre- dependent advice of counsel is not provided by Pajak; Pajak’s son enforceability when the requisite to marriage to live in a former was welcomed are understanda- terms couple; house with the and, reasonably intelligent adult and automobile; to a given a ble new Lincoln both the opportunity have had roll there before we were I married. independent consult with counsel. things no idea what these were worth. appears It from Mrs. own testi- Certainly, Audrey has not sustained her mony that she made no effort even to read proof burden and demonstrated that in order to understand as a fraudulent concealment of she assets could, much of nor did she ask to induced to enter into the have the examined her own ment. lawyer. We believe that the terms of this person seeking A to overcome the agreement comport requirement with the presumptive validity pre-nuptial agree of a syllabus point Gant, supra, of Gant v. designed ment protect assets for the in that “the terms of the are previous children of has a reasonably intelligent to a understandable heavy proof. burden of adult....” Gant, As we said in supra: Gant v. Remke, In Gieseler v. crafting In rules an area such as the S.E. 847 we held: prenuptial enforcement agreements antenuptial agreements a confiden- only thing one is certain: no matter what tial exists between the con- adopt, rules we there will be cases when tracting parties duty and it is the application of those rules will be in- prospective husband to fully disclose the Therefore, equitable. question to be amount of his fairly and to deal asked is adoption whether the of firm with his bride to honest- making prenuptial agreements rules pre- ly carry provisions out the of the con- sumptively stated, enforceable in their tract. [Citations omitted] explicit terms will advance or undermine *6 432, However, 117 at W.Va. 185 S.E. 847. legitimate public policy that favors mar- pointed it must be out that the husband’s riage. In the prenuptial agree- field of in truly egregious. conduct Gieseler was ments, favoring firm rules enforceability case, In that the husband deserted his wife inevitably public policy further without cause seven months after the mar- encouraging middle-aged, cohabiting cou- riage and refused to return to her or con- ples regularize to their relationships by way support tribute to her and main- getting married. tenance from the time of his desertion until 749, 174 W.Va. at 329 S.E.2d at 115. years date of his death nine later. In addition, Mr. Gieseler never delivered to his Accordingly, judgment of the Circuit give wife shares of stock that he was to County Court of Ohio is affirmed. antenuptial her under the terms of their Affirmed. agreement, actively and he concealed the MILLER, J., dissents and reserves the true nature and property extent of his right dissenting opinion. to file his wife. us, In the case now before MILLER, Justice, dissenting: regard

testified with to Mr. assets: I today’s opinion sig- trust that I assumed he the house on Ar- does not owned nal lington position, a retreat from this Court’s Drive and he owned the Lincoln so, requir- I evolved over the automobile because he let me drive it. last decade or ing thought just he owned Furniture fair and treatment for married Carolina Company put pay- because he me on the women.1 It will be cold comfort to Mrs. See, J.B., Molnar, e.g., Kathy military pension); L.B. W.Va. band’s v. Patrick 179 Molnar v. 173 655, (mother’s 200, (1984) (wife’s right right S.E.2d to W.Va. S.E.2d 371 583 314 73 to Prather, alimony); expenses support birth father): and child from natural rehabilitative Prather v. 172 804, 348, Weller, (1983) (power In Re Estate W.Va. W.Va. 305 S.E.2d 304 (1988) (alimony gross impress payment 374 S.E.2d 712 collect- court to a trust to secure estate); alimony against support); ible deceased wife’s and child LaRue v. husband's Butcher LaRue, 158, Butcher, 33, v. 178 W.Va. 172 W.Va. 304 S.E.2d 312 357 S.E.2d 226 (wife’s (wife’s right equitable equitable home- hus- distribution for distribution of opinion is to direct a “[ijndeed, judge the trial majority intone hear verdict, ordinarily Wil- he should nevertheless is unfortunate for and, trial, so soon after the direct a died hear

liam J. evidence 32, at married.” W.Va. were in advance try than the case verdict rather truly is unfortu- S.E.2d at 388. What summary judgment.” on a for motion twisting of the law to majority’s nate is the majority’s I must also take issue her share deprive Mrs. on the statement footnote reliance estate. husband’s 740, Gant, 174 329 S.E.2d Gant v. pointed it should be out that Initially, (1985), strongly always “[w]e by way summary of a this case was decided estab prenuptial agreements that favored majority completely ig- judgment. The Virgi rights at in West lish death law nores this fact and our well-established 745, nia.” 329 S.E.2d 174 W.Va. at summary judgment except that forecloses original.) (Emphasis Looking genuine it is clear that there is no “when Gant, support I find no cases cited inquiry tried and con- issue of fact Certainly, this statement. Gieseler v. clarify facts cerning the is not desirable Remke, 430, (1936), 117 W.Va. S.E. Point application the law.” not, there refused to does Court Surety part, Aetna Cas. & Co. antenuptial agreement. uphold Wil York, 148 W.Va. Federal Ins. Co. New v. First Nat’l Bank William liamson (1963).2 reluc- 133 S.E.2d 770 Greater son, (1931),the 111 W.Va. S.E. 777 summary grant judgment exists tance to Court, vote, antenup- upheld a 3-2 here, where, complaint raises ground, on most tial narrow intent, relating to such as subjective issue i.e., at the time the fiduciary relationship. fraud or breach of a discussed, engaged, were not Ass’n, Property Inc. v. Alpine See Owners and, therefore, no confidential Co., Mountaintop 179 W.Va. Devel. existed. 365 S.E.2d 57 Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 164 W.Va. Bramer, Bramer (1919), S.E. 329 involved contract where

By avoiding any discussion of the sum- promised assert issue, husband mary judgment majority able *7 separate property. his against claim wife’s supply simply to critical facts that do not agreement least, This held that the was Court very exist At the this in the record.3 specific enough right off his not to cut case reversed and re- should have been Bramer, curtesy. Syllabus 3 Syllabus 1 Point trial under Point of manded for Co., any inter- supra: rejecting if a rule “Even we evolved broad Masinter v. WEBCO (1) services); Pajak] McCoy, was obvious that wished [Mr. Garska v. 167 W.Va. "[I]t maker 59, protect (1981) to the interests of his children.” 182 (primary caretaker 278 S.E.2d 357 32, contrary, 304, Marshall, W.Va. 385 at 388. rule); at S.E.2d To v. 166 Marshall W.Va. 273 Pajak marriage Pajak’s Mrs. resulted in (1980) (confidential relationship be- S.E.2d 360 W.Va.Code, 41- the revocation his will under marriage through re- tween husband and wife property 1-6. will left his to the two chil- This faith); dealing Sparks, quires good Sparks v. ignored dren from his second 484, (wife (1980) 165 S.E.2d 847 W.Va. 269 marriage. Mrs. Pa- two children from his first custody having to move of children entitled jak his third was wife. Murredu, state); with them out Murredu v. unlikely "It is that Mr. would 610, (1977) (wife 160 236 S.E.2d 452 with W.Va. not married Mrs. had he been assured custody of minor children entitled to exclusive protect that his assets for his children." he could home). family use of 32, only at S.E.2d at Not 182 W.Va. 385 fact, but, testimony as to was there no this See, e.g., England Mut. Romano v. New Life noted, nothing his the two earlier will left 523, Co., (1987); Ins. 178 W.Va. 362 S.E.2d 334 marriage. from his first children Doe, Lusk 175 S.E.2d 375 v. W.Va. 338 aware that he owned a "Mrs. Bennett, v. Price W.Va. businesses, holdings, real number of had estate S.E.2d 211 reasonably well.” 182 W.Va. lived majority at 388. The contradicts 385 S.E.2d quotes following majority that itself when it statement 3. The statements do family only owned the appear she knew in the record: antenuptial agreement.4 pretation of an 385 S.E.2d at that the an The side of Bramer is found in reverse antenuptial agreement have a confidential Hinkle, 34 W.Va. S.E. Hinkle relationship other. with each As we stated (1890), right where the widow’s dow- Gieseler, W.Va. 185 S.E. at er was found not to have been abolished 848: antenuptial agreement. an antenuptial “In agreements a confiden- Moreover, Beard, Beard v. tial exists between the con- (1883), despite concluded Court tracting parties duty and it is the antenuptial agreement making prospective husband to disclose the property separate wife’s claim of fairly amount of his and to deal husband, he was entitled to receive her with his bride and to honest- personal Coatney estate when she died. ly carry provisions out the of the con- (1878), Hopkins, based tract.” Beard, governing on same law but the important point It is at this to note some language Court in that case found majority facts which the has overlooked. agreement sufficiently explicit to bar First, only tenth-grade the husband’s to inherit wife’s education, experience and her work as a separate property. Second, sophisticated. retail clerk was not cases, Bramer, Our earlier such as Hin- sign antenuptial was asked to kle, Beard, Coatney, do not make day wedding. one before analysis agree- prenuptial of whether the brought The matter was first to her atten- oppressive procured by ment was fraud when, riding tion as she was to work with misrepresentation. They do not consid- fiance, her then he advised her it was nec- er the various factors contained in Gant. essary stop by attorney’s office to majority purports rely The on sign papers. some Gant, predicates Point 2 of valid- office, Upon attorney’s arrival at ity of a on a show- sign was asked to ing was executed ment, attorney after which the went over “voluntarily, of its con- briefly the document with her. She did not legal effect”; (2) tents and document, get to read the nor was she fraud, duress, misrepresen- was “free informed that she could have another attor- tation”; (3) independent advice of coun- ney review it for her benefit. Mrs. “helps sel demonstrate that there has been pretrial deposition in her stated that there fraud, misrepresentation.” duress or phrases in the were number words however, majority, apply fails to agreement which she did not understand.5 test to the facts of this case. Furthermore, held, attorney neither the nor consistently as even the We have *8 majority recognizes, ever advised Mrs. even see W.Va. house, (7) though Company, the and a "with the same effect as no mar- Carolina Furniture riage place parties to car. 182 W.Va. at S.E.2d at 389. had taken between the agreement”; this "But nei- Point 3 of Bramer states: (8) "mutually”; deprived ther the husband nor wife should be (9) marriage”; "solely by virtue of said rights thereby respective of his or her marital (10) acquire any right”; “shall have greater other's to a extent than is the claim”; (11) “title or clearly plain of the manifested the words “descend"; (12) necessary implication instrument or there- "vest"; (13) from.” “heir-at-law”; (14) (15) “legatee"; following: 5. These included the “devisee”; (16) “statute"; forth”; (17) (1) "first hereinabove set them”; (18) (2) “binding upon "contemplate”; "dower”; (19) (3) “cognizant”; "execute"; (20) (4) "statutory”; "waive"; premises”; "in and consideration (6) “relinquishes”; "disclaim or release.” assets, disclose the amount which husband as to generally, surely violated in this case.7 approximately property” was and worth extensive were reflects the $570,000.6 This statement Gieseler She was informed elsewhere, giving summarized in general view as executing agreement, the she was and her 41 Am.Jur.2d Husband and her to dower up §Wife (1968): estate under W.Va. in her husband’s share agreement made

Code, The no 42-3-1. agree- “Antenuptial settlements and Pajak except that her for Mrs. provision governed principle that ments are the claim an interest would not husband engagement marry gives rise to a an assets, valued between pro- the confidential between $6,000 $8,000. spective spouses. They cannot with re- agreement spect to such a settlement or analysis Turning to an Gant regarded category be the same factors, is that this is clear ordinary persons buyers and sellers or is testimony The that while Mrs. void. length. dealing each other at arm’s with did signed agreement, she so each frank duty It is the to be explanation from her without relevant in the disclosure of all cir- unreserved giving attorney of what she was husband’s bearing on cumstances the settlement or that she had no advance up. fact agreement. Overreaching, or abuse of warning until pro- relation confidential between attorney’s office the to her husband’s taken antenuptial spective spouses, an wedding makes undercuts a claim day before the Furthermore, voidable. Such settlement of voluntariness. agreement, nothing ante- to be enforce- absolutely under the settlement received able, fair, equitable, agreement. As in 41 and reason- nuptial stated Am. must be (1968), surrounding facts able view of the Husband and Jur.2d §Wife It provision for the wife circumstances. must also be entered adequacy voluntarily, at least agreement: with full or fair the fairness bears facts, “However, provision adequate knowledge for adequacy good part and in utmost faith on the is to considered connection the wife (Footnotes omitted). both.” question whether the contract is with fair, may inadequacy give rise foregoing If we with the combine vitiating the presumption of fraud not advised nor fact (Footnotes omitted). Annot., ment.” See given opportunity with her consult A.L.R.2d 883 lawyer agreement, the total own about

Moreover, more A apparent. unfairness is even num- it seems axiomatic fact agreement’s patterns con- of cases involve substan- knowledge of the ber have case, i.e., tents, requires, tially must be similar to this lack disclo- as Gant there assets, inadequate the hus- sure of consideration to reasonable disclosure of some wife, request showing that the and a sudden assets or at least band’s time independent with no for the wife talk prospective wife had some attorney. facts. Neither condi- to an Courts confronted of these difficulty pattern fact case. com- this tion exists Gieseler’s voiding antenuptial duty agreement. E.g., that “it mand *9 proper- condition” and “there was no fraud conceal- These assets included several rental 6. $30,000 ties, generated approximately inducing ment that had the effect parcels year, each several un- charged entering rental income agreement that oth- $130,000. land, developed and a home valued at erwise would not have been made?” two holdings real estate were val- entire self-defeating. concepts are Concealment $500,000. approximately He also ued technique practiced most common deposit and certificates of worth bank accounts approximately wealthy prospective marriage partner. There is $56,000. fear that desire to disclose assets for forego spouse all claims will not want to other majority opinion I find Point it. unintelligible. is meant to be almost What general party’s other "a idea of the financial

37 (Fla. 338 Lutgert Lutgert, So.2d 1111

App.1976), appeal remand, 362 So.2d after denied, (Fla.App.1978), 58 367 So.2d cert. Britven, (Fla.1979);

1125 Britven v. 259 650, 145 (1966); 450

Iowa N.W.2d Estate of 681,

Benker, 416 Mich. 331 193 N.W.2d

(1982); Zimmie, Zimmie v. 11 St.3d Ohio 396, (1984); B.R. 464 Ohio N.E.2d 142 Norris, Marriage Or.App.

Re denied, P.2d review Or.

P.2d Crawford, Re Estate of (1986). P.2d Wash.2d See Annot.,

generally 27 A.L.R.2d 883 regret say today’s

I opinion does befriend widow who believes that

justice husband, requires Gieseler,

the words of “to disclose the fairly

amount and to deal prospective bride.”

with his 117 W.Va. at

432, 185 S.E. at 848. reasons,

For I these dissent.

385 S.E.2d 393 Phillip

Gerald CHURCH

V.R. WESSON.

No. 18486.

Supreme Appeals Court

of West

June