583 N.E.2d 1018 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1989
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *275
Defendant-appellant, Midland Steel Products Company, appeals from the trial court's order granting plaintiff-appellee, Leonard F. Painter, an award of $1,500 for attorney fees under R.C.
Appellee filed an application for workers' compensation benefits from an injury he sustained to his right pelvis on June 30, 1983, while in the course and scope of his employment. At no time did appellant contest this particular claim, which was officially recognized by the Industrial Commission of Ohio.
On June 27, 1985, appellee filed a motion for further allowance for a swelling of his right lower extremity because of the venous return from the fractured pelvis. The Industrial Commission recognized this additional claim on January 23, 1986. *276
On December 22, 1986, appellant instituted an appeal to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C.
Appellant learned from its defense medical expert that the additional claim was related to the original fractured pelvis. Therefore, on October 28, 1987, approximately one month prior to the scheduled commencement of the trial, appellant's appeal was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A). Thus, all previous orders of the Industrial Commission of Ohio remained in full force and effect. The matter was returned to the Industrial Commission solely for a determination of appellee's benefits.
On December 9, 1987, appellee's attorney sent a letter to appellant's counsel requesting that attorney fees be paid for the statutory maximum amount of $1,500. Appellant's counsel refused to pay any attorney fees. On January 12, 1988, appellee filed a motion for attorney fees for the successful defense of the appeal pursuant to R.C.
On February 26, 1988, appellant filed a brief in opposition to appellee's motion for attorney fees. In its brief, appellant argued that its voluntary dismissal was not a "final determination" of the appeal; thus, an award for attorney fees would be premature. On March 2, 1988, appellee filed a reply brief in support of an award for attorney fees, and appellee included a motion for assessment of attorney fees as sanctions under R.C.
On March 9, 1988, the trial court granted the appellee's motion for attorney fees. The trial court scheduled a hearing in order to determine the amount of attorney fees under R.C.
On April 22, 1988, a hearing was conducted in the absence of appellant's counsel. Appellee presented evidence to the trial court reflecting the amount of time appellee's counsel spent in prosecuting appellant's appeal pursuant to R.C.
The trial court issued its order on July 19, 1988 regarding attorney fees. The trial court ordered $1,500 in attorney fees to be paid to appellee's counsel pursuant to R.C.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 22, 1988 and subsequently raised the following five assignments of error:
"I. Whether any attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to ORC
"II. Whether the basis of an award for attorney fees to the prevailing party in an appeal of only a further allowance award pursuant to ORC
"III. Whether attorney fees pursuant to ORC
"IV. Whether `frivolous conduct' as defined in ORC
"V. Whether an award of eighteen hundred twelve dollars and fifty cents ($1,812.50) in attorney fees as sanctions pursuant to ORC
R.C.
"The cost of any legal proceedings authorized by this section, including an attorney's fee to the claimant's attorney to be fixed by the trial judge in the event the claimant's right to participate or to continue to participate in the fund is established upon the final determination of an appeal, shall be taxed against the employer or the industrial commission if the industrial commission or the administrator rather than the employer contested the right of the claimant to participate in the fund. Such attorney's fee shall not exceed twenty per cent of an award up to three thousand dollars and ten per cent of all amounts in excess thereof, but in no event shall such fee exceed fifteen hundred dollars."
The award of attorney fees is mandatory under R.C.
"The state has a legitimate interest in seeing employees compensated for work-related injuries. Taxing costs to employers who contest claims ultimately determined to be valid is a procedure rationally related to the state's interest in seeing those injured employees compensated." Sorci, supra, at 225, 13 OBR at 276,
Appellant contends that the mandatory costs and attorney fees in R.C.
Appellant's argument is premised on the language set forth inLewis v. Connor (1985),
This case is clearly distinguishable from Lewis. InLewis, the trial court applied R.C.
Appellant's argument that there was no final determination is not well taken. R.C.
In the instant case, the voluntary dismissal of appellant's appeal finally determined that appellee was entitled to participate in the State Insurance Fund for the additional claim. This voluntary dismissal ultimately established appellant's right to participate in the fund. Therefore, the attorney fees were properly awarded pursuant to R.C.
Appellant's first assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.
In his second assignment of error, the appellant challenges the trial court's award of $1,500 for attorney fees, pursuant to R.C.
R.C.
In this case, the trial court conducted a hearing on the question of attorney fees. The trial court judge properly determined that the maximum amount of $1,500 permitted by R.C.
Appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken and is overruled.
Appellant's third, fourth and fifth assignments of error will be discussed jointly as they are closely related in the application of R.C.
"* * * at any time prior to the commencement of the trial in a civil action or within twenty-one days after the entry of judgment in a civil action, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely affected by frivolous conduct."
Appellant contends that R.C.
A claim for attorney fees as sanctions is collateral to and independent of the primary action. Stevens v. Kiraly (1985),
R.C.
A trial court's decision regarding the imposition of sanctions will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.State, ex rel. Fant, v. Sykes (1987),
The trial court in the instant case conducted two evidentiary hearings to determine the proper amount of attorney fees pursuant to R.C.
R.C.
"(A) As used in this section:
"* * *
"(2) `Frivolous conduct' means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that satisfies either of the following:
"(a) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action;
"(b) It is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." *281
"A pleading is called `frivolous' when it is clearly insufficient on its face and does not controvert the material points of the opposite pleading and is presumably interposed for mere purposes of delay or to embarass the opponent." Brown v.Lamb (1960),
The trial court in this case found that appellant's argument that an award of attorney fees under R.C.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellant's opposition to attorney fees constituted frivolous conduct. Appellant failed to support any of its propositions with valid law pertaining to the issues presented. Furthermore, the award of attorney fees in a successful appeal of a workers' compensation case is mandatory, according to Ohio statutory law and case law. The appellant asserted unsupportive arguments in an attempt to obstruct and delay the payment of attorney fees rightfully owed the appellant under R.C.
The record reflects that the trial court conducted two hearings on the issue of attorney fees, and appellant was given an opportunity to dispute the imposition of attorney fees under R.C.
The exercise of awarding attorney fees is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Swanson v. Swanson (1976),
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly awarded attorney fees according to R.C.
Appellant's third, fourth and fifth assignments of error are without merit and overruled.
The trial court's decision is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DAVID T. MATIA and NAHRA, JJ., concur. *282