45 Iowa 569 | Iowa | 1877
Lead Opinion
I. At the time the plaintiff applied at the ticket office for a ticket two other persons, one Boerstler and one Russell, applied also for tickets. The three took seats in the cars together. The conductor first came to Boerstler and asked him for his fare and Boerstler tendered the price of a ticket which the conductor refused to accept unless he should pay ten cents more. Thereupon Boerstler explained to the conductor the reason why he had no ticket, and the conductor insisted, notwithstanding the reasons given, upon his paying the extra ten cents, and informed him if it was not paid he should stop the cars and put him off the train. Boerstler then paid the full amount demanded. The conversation between the conductor and Boerstler was heard by the plaintiff. When the conductor asked him for fare he re-stated what Boerstler said. What occurred between the plaintiff and the conductor may be given in plaintiff’s own language. He said: “I objected to paying it, and told him we tried to get tickets and the office was closed and it was impossible to get one; lie was very firm and positive, and I thought he was a little excited; I told him that was not business to have a ticket office closed and then ask for more; then he said he did not want to hear any more rigmarole; he said I would have to pay or get off the train; he said he guessed they knew their business; he said I should pay it or he would stop the train and put me off; he said he did not want to go over that rigmarole again, that I had heard what he said to Mr. Boerstler; I wont say positive but I think he was a little excited; he didn’t use any
Upon the facts as above detailed the court gave the jury an instruction which is in the following words:
Whether, in case the wrongful act of the conductor had been malicious or .wanton, the plaintiff would be entitled to exemplary damages as against the company, there being no evidence that the company was guilty of malice or wantonness, or was in fault in employing such a person as conductor, we need not determine. The defendant objects to the instruction .upon the ground only that the evidence does not show malice or wantonness, and we think that the objection is well taken.
In Hamilton v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 53 N. Y., 25, the plaintiff was wrongfully ejected from the defendant’s car. It was held that punitive damages were not allowable, there being no evidence that the conductor acted otherwise than honestly. If, therefore, the actual expulsion of a passenger from a railway car, although wrongful, is not such evidence of malice or wantonness as will entitle tixe passenger to exemplary damages, the mere threat to do it cannot, for a still stronger reason, be so considered.
So far as the company was conceimed, it is enough to say that no insult was intended to the plaintiff by them. This the plaintiff well knew. It is possible that a better rule might have been devised, or some means adoptéd to guard against the occurrence of such a difficulty as has arisen in this ’ case, but, even if this were so, we should regard the occurrence as the result of mere oversight. It would involve nothing of personal affront, and we cannot regard the plaintiff’s injury as extending beyond the loss of money wrongfully exacted. This, doubtless, he is entitled to recover with interest. If'ifc be said that such a remedy is equiválent to no remedy,' it may be l’eplied that it is not the fault of the law, but of the case. We .
Reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the foregoing opinion, but not in the statement that compensatory damages may be awarded for mere injury to feelings.