ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 45) and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 47). Both Motions have been extensively briefed and are ripe for disposition.
I. Nature of the Action.
Plaintiff, Rose Page, brought this action for race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against her employer, Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. (“Winn-Dixie”), as well as a § 1981 race discrimination claim against her former supervisor, Brent Sellers. The Complaint originates from an incident that occurred on December 20, 2006, at Winn-Dixie Store No. 578, a food supermarket in Mobile, Alabama. At that time, company officials discovered that approximately $1,000 was missing from the store safe. After investigation, Winn-Dixie took disciplinary action against two African-American employees, Page and Markale Jackson, by demoting them for failing to follow company cash-handling policies. Winn-Dixie took no comparable action against the store manager and co-manager, both of whom are white, despite Page’s contention that they were equally culpable for this loss.
Both Page and Jackson (who are represented by the same counsel) filed federal lawsuits under § 1981 against Winn-Dixie, although Jackson’s preceded Page’s by a full year. This Court granted Winn-Dixie’s motion for summary judgment in the
Jackson
matter less than two weeks before Page filed her Complaint.
See Jackson v. Winn-Dixie, Inc.,
II. Background Facts. 2
Notwithstanding the parties’ verbose submissions (spanning more than 150 pages of briefing in the aggregate), the
A. Management Structure and Page’s Duties.
During the time period in question, Page was employed at Winn-Dixie Store # 578 as the In-Store Coordinator (“ISC”). (Page Dep., at 76-77.) 4 According to a Winn-Dixie job description, the ISC position includes the following duties: (i) to manage front end accounting and cash media reconciliation in compliance with applicable law and company procedures; (ii) to improve customers’ experience by providing fast service, a friendly atmosphere, and successful resolution of customer concerns; and (iii) to lead, develop and supervise front end operations. (Page Dep., Exh. 8 at 1.) In the view of Irvin Landry, WinnDixie’s decision-maker in this case, “[t]he ISC’s primary purpose is to oversee and manage the money in the safe and to ensure that the accounting of the office is done in accordance with company policy.” (Landry Deck, ¶ 10.) 5
Of course, Page was not the only WinnDixie employee with a measure of responsibility for Store # 578 as of December 2006. Among the relevant managerial personnel were the Store Manager, Brent Sellers, who oversaw day-to-day operations at Store # 578. (Sellers Deck, ¶¶ 1-2.) Sellers reported directly to Landry, the District Manager, who oversaw operations of all stores located in the
4-4
District, including Store # 578. (Landry Deck, ¶¶ 5-6.) On site, there was also a Co-Manager named Jeremy McPherson, who reported directly to Sellers and assisted him in overseeing daily operations at Store # 578. (McPherson Deck, ¶ 2.) And Store # 578 had an Assistant In-Store Coordinator (“AISC”), Markale Jackson, whose duties included performing safe counts and other cash-handling responsibilities.
See Jackson,
Like other Winn-Dixie locations, Store # 578 has a store safe where money is secured. (Landry Decl., ¶ 7; Page Dep., at 103-05.) Among the items found in the safe at any given time are bundles of U.S. currency, sorted by denomination of the bills, with each bundle bound by a strap on which the aggregate value of the currency is written. (Landry Decl., ¶ 8.)
The parties agree that, during the relevant time frame, Winn-Dixie’s cash-handling policies provided that certain money-counting procedures must be followed every morning at store opening, every evening at store closing, and whenever the safe key is transferred from morning ISC to evening ISC at shift change. (Doc. 48, at 2 ¶ 5; doc. 52, at 3.) These company procedures required that, on each specified occasion, the money in the safe must be counted, its contents recorded in writing, and the tallied amount reconciled with the store’s office cash report. (Doc. 48, at 2 ¶ 5; doc. 52, at 3.) Thus, when the store opened each day, the morning ISC (who may be either the ISC or the AISC) counted the money in the safe, recorded the tally on a safe count sheet, and confirmed that the count was consistent with that reported for the previous day’s store closing. (Page Dep., at 80, 108; Landry Decl., ¶ 11.) Then the manager on duty (who was present in the office when the morning ISC opened the safe and counted the money) also counted the money for verification purposes, and recorded that information on the safe count sheet. (Page Dep., at 108-09; Landry Decl., ¶ 11.) The money was then placed back in the safe, after which the safe was locked with a key. (Page Dep., at 110; Landry Decl., ¶ 12.) 6 The morning ISC retained that key until the conclusion of his or her shift. (Landry Decl., ¶ 12.) 7 At Store # 578, Page typically worked the morning shift as of December 2006, and performed these morning ISC functions, with Jeremy McPherson (the Co-Manager) often being the manager on duty who verified the safe count. (Page Dep., at 99, 102-03.) 8
The Winn-Dixie policy of paramount importance in this case involves the procedure for counting the safe’s contents. It is undisputed that, as of December 2006, Winn-Dixie cash-handling policies required that each time the money in the safe was counted, all bundles of cash (with the exception of the bundles of $1 bills) must be broken open, recounted, and res-trapped. (Landry Decl., ¶ 9; Landry Dep., at 62-63.) 9 This policy applied equally to the morning ISC who performed the initial count and to the manager on duty who verified that count. (Landry Dep., at 62-63.) It also applied to both ISCs who counted the safe at shift change.
C. The Cash Shortage and Ensuing Investigation.
The morning of December 20, 2006 began unremarkably at Store # 578.
11
Page (the morning ISC) and McPherson (the manager on duty) reported for work as usual and performed a count of the store safe’s contents at approximately 6:00 a.m., with Page conducting the initial count and McPherson verifying it. (Page Dep., at 118-19, 121; McPherson Decl., ¶ 6.) Both individuals filled out and signed a “Safe Count Sheet” documenting the cash on hand. (Page Dep., at 119 & Exh. 10; McPherson Decl., ¶ 6.) Per their routine practice, the safe was locked after the count was completed and Page held the only key in her possession for her entire shift. (Page Dep., at 121; McPherson Decl., ¶ 6.) At approximately 2:00 p.m., Jackson (the evening ISC) arrived for shift change. (Page Dep., at 121-23; McPherson Decl., ¶ 6.) Page and Jackson performed another safe count and filled out another Safe Count Sheet. (Page Dep., at 122-23
&
Exh. 11.) Upon completing the count and locking the safe, Page gave the
Later that afternoon, a problem was discovered. Jackson notified McPherson that he had broken open one of the bundles in the safe to make change for a cashier, only to discover that the bundle was missing $125. (McPherson Deck, ¶ 10.) McPherson and Jackson then checked the other bundles and found a total cash shortage of approximately $1,000. (Id.) McPherson reported the discrepancy to Landry, the District Manager, the next morning. (Id., ¶ 11; Landry Dep., at 69-70.) 12 Landry promptly sent a team of investigators to Store # 578 to investigate the disappearance of the funds. (Landry Dep., at 71-72.) At the conclusion of their on-site inquiry, the investigators notified Landry that the money was indeed missing and that proper procedures had not been followed at the shift change safe count on December 20. (Id. at 73.) Landry never was able to determine when the loss occurred. (Id. at 114.) In Landry’s view, the “problem” was that company policy had not been followed at shift change, as a result of which it was impossible to determine when the money went missing. (Id. at 76.)
More specifically, Landry found that the morning ISC and evening ISC had not counted and verified all the money in the safe at shift change on December 20. (Landry Dep., at 113.) Landry’s view was that this omission was the root cause of the $1,000 cash shortage. (Id.) Simply put, in performing the December 20 shift change count, neither Page nor Jackson had adhered to the requirement that bundled cash be recounted and restrapped during every safe count. Instead, they had simply accepted as valid the numbers written on the straps for each bundle, assuming rather than verifying those values. Because of that omission, there was no way of ascertaining whether the shift change count and verification that Page and Jackson performed on December 20 was accurate, or when the funds had disappeared from the safe.
In early January 2007, Landry went to Store # 578 and met with Page. (Page Dep., at 134; Landry Deck, ¶ 18.) Sellers, the Store Manager, was also present; however, he was there solely as a witness, and did not speak during the meeting. (Landry Deck, ¶ 18; Sellers Dep., at 27-28.) 13 According to Page, Landry accused her of not doing her job, in response to which she insisted that she did do her job and that “we all didn’t follow company policy because we didn’t verify the money.” (Page Dep., at 135, 137.) Page contends that she asked Landry about McPherson’s role, implying that he was blameworthy as well, but that Landry refused to discuss McPherson (who was not present at the meeting) with her. (Id.) The salient part of this meeting, from Landry’s perspective, was that he and Page “discussed the counting of the safe, verifying the bundles, and she admitted that she knew policy and procedure, and that she was not following policy and procedure.” (Landry Dep., at 102.) 14
There is abundant, undisputed record evidence that Page knowingly violated
D. Winn-Dixie’s Challenged Personnel Decisions.
Following his meeting with Page in January 2007, Landry decided to remove her from her position as ISC at Store # 578 and to transfer her to another store. (Landry Deck, ¶ 21.) As a result, Page was placed in Store # 549 as a full-time cashier, a position she continues to hold today. (Page Dep., at 142^14.) This was clearly a demotion, and was accompanied by a sizeable reduction in Page’s hourly wage. (Id. at 145, 169.) Landry also demoted Jackson (the evening ISC involved in the shift change count on December 20) to the position of Grocery Store Associate. (Landry Deck, ¶ 21.) It is uncontroverted that Landry made these personnel decisions as to Page and Jackson, and that Sellers neither made those decisions nor had the authority to do so. (Id.; Sellers Deck, ¶¶ 9-10.) Landry did not demote or penalize Sellers or McPherson for their roles in the cash shortage, although both received verbal counseling. (Landry Dep., at 83, 88-89; Sellers Dep., at 32; doc. 48-3, at 6.) 15
Page maintains that her demotion was unfair because “we all didn’t follow company policy.... We all should have been accountable for that missing money.” (Page Dep., at 146.)
16
The “we all” reference encompasses all Store # 578 employees involved in safe counts. Indeed, Page testified that no Winn-Dixie employees involved in counting money at Store # 578 were breaking down the bundles as of December 2006, such that all ISCs and managers at that location who participated in safe counts were equally in violation of the same policy.
(Id.
at 156-60, 168.) There is support in the record for the proposition that Store # 578 employees were engaged in wholesale noneompliance with company policies concerning the counting of bundled cash during safe counts in the relevant time period.
17
Page
For his part, Landry explained his personnel decisions on the record. He reasoned that, in his view, Page and Jackson were “primarily responsible for the loss because they had failed to follow WinnDixie’s cash handling procedures, which was one of their primary job duties as ISC and AISC,” because they were the only key-holders for the safe on the day the cash shortage was discovered, and because they had received training in proper cash-handling procedures. (Landry Deck, ¶ 22.) Landry echoed these points in his deposition, testifying that he decided to demote Page because “she didn’t follow policy and procedure, her job responsibility.” (Landry Dep., at 91.) Landry testified that one of the primary duties of an ISC is to oversee the cash office and to implement policies and procedures associated with that function. (Id. at 114.) And because Page and Jackson did not follow “that policy and procedure, is the reason [Landry] acted because we ended up with a $1,000 shortage.” (Id. at 113.) Landry also differentiated between the shortcomings of Jackson and Page, on the one hand, and those of managers on duty, such as McPherson or Sellers, on the other. In Landry’s view, when a manager on duty fails to perform the count in accordance with Winn-Dixie policy, the proper recourse is counseling, not demotion, because the ISC bears a heightened level of responsibility and accountability for the safe that managers do not. (Id. at 91-93.) According to Landry, Page (as morning ISC) “was totally responsible for the office” and the manager on duty’s verification of the morning count essentially transferred accountability of the funds in the safe to Page for the duration of her shift. (Id. at 97.)
Landry also elaborated on his reasons for not disciplining McPherson. They are twofold. First, Landry indicated that McPherson was not “primarily responsible” for the December 20 cash shortage “because overseeing the safe was not the managers’ primary duty,” such there were differences in type and level of responsibility for the safe as between the ISC/AISC, on the one hand, and the co-manager, on the other. (Landry Deck, ¶ 28.) Landry also exempted McPherson from more serious discipline based on his understanding that McPherson had not attended formal training on cash-handling procedures. (Id.) In fact, the record is clear that McPherson had received no such training, and did not know about the company policy requiring the unbundling and recounting of strapped cash during safe counts. McPherson did not count the bundles when he verified Page’s figures at the opening safe count on December 20 “because that was the customary way of doing things” at Store # 578. (Doc. 48-2, at 7.) His unrebutted testimony is that, as of December 20, 2006, he “did not know that it was required under company policy to count the money inside the bundles rather than just add up the value stated on the straps,” that he had received neither training nor instruction in that procedure, and that consequently he “did not count the bundles either.” (McPherson Deck, ¶¶ 8, 16.) The record shows that the only training McPherson received on cash-handling policies was “[o]n-the-job training” and that Winn-Dixie provided “no formal training for cash handling” for a person in McPherson’s job title. (Landry Dep., at 45, 115-16.) In fact, McPherson had been verifying safe counts without unstrapping bundled cash during the entire time that he was in management, operating under four different store directors, without ever being told that he was not following the proper procedure. (Doc. 48-3, at 2-3, 6.)
III. Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases because they involve issues of motivation and intent.
See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.,
Furthermore, “[t]he applicable Rule 56 standard is not affected by the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment.”
Murray v. Holiday Isle, LLC,
IV. Analysis.
A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework.
Although Page’s race discrimination and retaliation claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it is well established that § 1981 claims are governed by the same analytical framework and requirements of proof as their Title VII counterparts.
20
Therefore, as the par
At that point, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.... If the employer does this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.”
Crawford v. Carroll,
B. Race Discrimination Claim against Winn-Dixie.
1. Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case.
The parties agree that the elements Page must show to establish a
prima facie
case of race discrimination based on her demotion and transfer consist of the following: (i) she belongs to a racial minority; (ii) she was subjected to an adverse job action; (iii) Winn-Dixie treated similarly situated employees outside her protected class more favorably than she was treated; and (iv) she was qualified to do the job.
See, e.g., Crawford,
529 F.3d at
The only comparators that Page has identified are Sellers and McPherson. (Doc. 53, at 4 & 5 n. 3.) The record shows that McPherson violated the same cash-handling policy for which Page was disciplined on December 20, 2006, inasmuch as he failed to unstrap and recount bundled cash during the morning safe count. Likewise, the record shows that Sellers, the store manager, had routinely failed to count the bundles when he participated in safe counts at Store # 578. Winn-Dixie insists that Sellers and McPherson are not similarly situated to Page because Sellers’ misconduct was not connected to the cash shortage, McPherson had no training in and no knowledge of the bundle-counting rule, and Page’s responsibility for the funds was significantly different than that of Sellers and McPherson because of them differing job titles.
In advancing this “similarly situated” argument, Winn-Dixie ignores this Court’s unfavorable analysis of this same issue under factually indistinguishable circumstances in the
Jackson
ease. Recall that Markele Jackson was the AISC who participated in the shift change safe count with Page on December 20. Like Page, Jackson did not follow the bundle-counting protocol, and was subsequently demoted. In his race discrimination action against Winn-Dixie, Jackson likewise identified Sellers and McPherson as comparators, and Winn-Dixie proffered many of the same arguments that it does here for why those individuals did not qualify as “similarly situated” for purposes of the plaintiffs
prima facie
case. Relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s pronouncement that “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether the employees hold the same job titles, but whether the employer subjected them to different employment policies,”
Lathem v. Department of Children and Youth Services,
The
Jackson
decision likewise addressed Winn-Dixie’s contention that Sellers is not a proper comparator because his violation of cash handling policies did not result in a monetary loss, whereas the plaintiffs did. This Court wrote in
Jackson
that it could not accept this argument in the absence of supporting authority or legal analysis because “[w]hat the Court is to compare is ‘misconduct,’ not ‘the consequences of misconduct,’ as monetary loss from lax cash-handling procedures would appear to be.”
Jackson,
Defendant’s only new “similarly situated” argument that was not addressed in
Jackson
is that McPherson is not a viable comparator because he had not received formal training in cash-handling procedures, whereas Page had. The only authority that Winn-Dixie cites for this proposition is an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision,
Mathis v. Wachovia Bank,
For all of these reasons, Page has come forward with sufficient evidence that McPherson and Sellers were similarly situated to her to satisfy that element of the prima facie test. Inasmuch as there is no dispute that Page can establish the other three prongs, the Court finds that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of race discrimination in connection with her demotion and transfer in January 2007.
Plaintiff having established a
prima facie
case, the burden shifts to WinnDixie to “offer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action to rebut the presumption” of race discrimination.
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc.,
To meet this intermediate burden, Winn-Dixie presents argument and evidence that it “made the decision to demote plaintiff because she failed to follow WinnDixie’s cash handling procedures, which was one of her primary job duties.” (Doc. 46, at 28.) In the companion litigation in
Jackson,
this Court found that a similar explanation proffered by Winn-Dixie for demoting Markele Jackson after the December 20 cash shortage was “on its face a legally sufficient reason for its action,” and that the record contained “admissible evidence that this is what actually motivated its decision.”
Jackson,
3. Pretext.
Winn-Dixie having come forward with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, it is incumbent on Page to show that this stated reason is a pretext for race discrimination.
See Brown v. Alabama Dep’t of Transp.,
“Although Winn-Dixie decided not to punish similarly two white employees who violated the same procedures, their conduct was appreciably different from Jackson’s, because: (i) one comparator [Sellers] was not present in the store for the months before and after the monetary loss, and no evidence indicates he was in any way connected to it; and (ii) unlike Jackson, the other comparator [McPherson] had not been trained in the procedures, and his violations were unwitting. Winn-Dixie’s decision not to transfer the white employees did not establish that its stated reason for transferring Jackson was false or that the true reason for doing so was racially discriminatory.”
Jackson II,
In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s rejection in Jackson II of the same pretext argument that Page advances, she cannot survive summary judgment unless she distinguishes her circumstances from those of Markele Jackson, or otherwise offers some basis why the Sellers/McPherson argument resonates differently with respect to Page than it did with respect to Jackson. Plaintiff recognizes this obstacle, and seeks to differentiate this case from Jackson II by relying on three pieces of evidence that she contends were “either not utilized or unavailable” during the companion case. (Doc. 59-1, at 1.) The implications of each of these items for the Jackson II pretext analysis will be considered in turn.
First, Page ascribes considerable weight to the terms of the Front End Guide and How-To Guide, including language specifying that the security of the safe “is the responsibility of the Store Director, Store Co-Manager, and ISC” and language that the manager on duty is “accountable for verifying key cash office processes,” such as “opening and closing safe counts.” (Doc. 53, at 8, 14-15; doc. 59-1, at 2, 8-9.)
26
Plaintiff extrapolates from the first provision that Winn-Dixie policy is that the store manager, co-manager and ISC bear
equal
responsibility for any cash shortage, such that they must receive
More fundamentally, Page has failed to show that the Front End Guide or How-To Guide had any bearing on the discipline imposed in this case. The undisputed evidence is that the decision-maker (Landry) had never reviewed those Guides, and could not shed any light on their contents. 28 If Landry was not relying on those Guides in disciplining Page (which he plainly was not), then plaintiffs insistence that those Guides required Landry to discipline Sellers and McPherson equally is a non sequitur. Simply put, there is no evidence that Landry ever consulted, relied on or considered the Front End Guide or How-To Guide in any way in meting out discipline to anyone. Nor is there any evidence that he was required to do so, or that those Guides represented binding statements of policy at Winn-Dixie. Hence, the four pages from the How-To Guide and Front End Guide on which Page relies do not raise an inference that WinnDixie’s stated reasons for disciplining her were a pretext for race discrimination. 29
Second, plaintiff would distinguish this case from
Jackson
by citing Landry’s testimony as evidence that there is no divergence in training between McPherson and Page that might justify the differences in their discipline for the cash shortage. The Eleventh Circuit noted in
Jackson II
that, while Markele Jackson’s violation of the bundle-counting rule was knowing, McPherson’s was unwitting, and that they had not been trained similarly, such that the differential treatment of McPherson was not evidence of pretext. Landry’s testimony in this case in no way changes that calculus. Landry did
not
indicate that McPherson had received formal training in cash-handling procedures, whereas
Besides, even if Page were correct that a reasonable jury could find no difference in training between Page and McPherson that could support Winn-Dixie’s failure to discipline them identically for the December 20 cash shortage, that would not be sufficient to satisfy plaintiffs pretext burden. In this Circuit, there is a “well-established rule that a plaintiff must show pretext as to each proffered reason.”
Chapman,
Third, Page contends that the facts in this case are distinguishable from Jackson because of Sellers’ revelation here that, even though he was on sick leave from October 2006 through April 2007, he was at work every other week as his chemotherapy schedule permitted. Based on this evidence, plaintiff theorizes that “a reasonable jury could conclude that Sellers did in fact work” during the relevant period, “and may have even performed an evening count.” (Doc. 59-1, at 7.) This is sheer speculation. It is uncontroverted that Sellers was not at work on either Wednesday, December 20, 2006 (the day the cash shortage was discovered) or Thursday, December 21, 2006 (the day the Winn-Dixie investigators visited Store # 578). There is no evidence placing Sellers in the workplace at any time during the week of the cash shortage’s discovery. Plaintiffs own testimony was that the only times she ever counted the safe with Sellers were “before he got sick,” and therefore well before the cash shortage. The mere fact that Sellers worked from time to time during his medical leave in no way undermines, belies, or calls into question the veracity of Landry’s testimony that he did not hold Sellers primary responsible for the cash shortage because Sellers “was on medical leave” and “was not present in the store when the $1,000 was reported missing.” As such, Page has failed to distinguish this case from that of Markele Jackson in a manner that might alter the Eleventh Circuit’s determination in Jackson II that there is no evidence of pretext.
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court perceives no legal or factual basis for departing from the
Jackson II
pretext analysis, or for reaching a different outcome in this case. Furthermore, plaintiffs pretext argument fails for the simple reason that her theory of liability both sweeps far too broadly and amounts to little more than a protestation of unfairness. The record in this case is striking for Page’s repeated insistence (to Landry, to the EEOC, to her deposition interrogator, etc.) that her demotion was unfair because everyone else at Store # 578 was committing the same cash-handling violations that she was, yet only Page and Jackson (both of whom are black) were punished. As an initial matter, fairness has nothing to do with the § 1981 analysis.
See, e.g., Rojas v. Florida,
More fundamentally, though, plaintiffs underlying theory is that Page is a victim of race discrimination because white employees who participated in safe counts in the days leading up to the December 20 cash shortage and did not break the bundles were not demoted, but she and Jackson were. But, taking Page’s testimony at face value, she and Jackson were not the only African-American employees performing improper safe counts at Store # 578 shortly before December 20. For example, plaintiff indicated that Leanda Black or Wanda Lafayette (both of whom were African-American employees) performed the morning safe count in her absence on December 16,17 and 18, and that they did so without breaking the bundles. It is uncontroverted that neither Black nor Lafayette was disciplined for creating or not detecting the December 20 cash shortage. If Page’s comparators are other Store # 578 employees who participated in
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Page has failed to meet her burden of showing that Winn-Dixie’s stated reason for transferring and demoting her was false, or that the true reason was racially discriminatory. As such, Winn-Dixie is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs § 1981 race discrimination cause of action.
C. Retaliation Claim against WinnDixie.
Plaintiff also brings a retaliation claim against Winn-Dixie. According to the Complaint, Page maintains that her demotion and transfer constituted unlawful retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, because they were prompted by “her participation in the investigation of racial misconduct on the job by defendant Sellers for bringing a hangmen [sic] noose to work and using racial slurs in the store.” (Doc. 1, ¶, 12.) Winn-Dixie seeks entry of summary judgment in its favor on this cause of action.
’ To establish a
prima-facie
case of retaliation, Page must show that “(1) [s]he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2)[s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)[s]he established a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.”
Bryant v. Jones,
“To state a retaliation claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege a defendant retaliated against him because the plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity.... As with other statutory retaliation claims, such a claim under § 1981 requires that the protected activity involve the assertion of rights encompassed by the statute.”
Jimenez v. Wellstar Health System,
Winn-Dixie contends that Page did not engage in any protected activity prior to the January 2007 demotion and transfer. There is no evidence that she had ever filed an EEOC charge against Winn-Dixie prior to that personnel action, that she had ever complained to anyone at Winn-Dixie about racially discriminatory treatment, or that she had ever participated in a discrimination-based lawsuit
D. Claims against Brent Sellers.
Lastly, defendant Sellers seeks summary judgment on Page’s § 1981 race discrimination brought against him individually. The Complaint casts Sellers as the villain in plaintiffs demotion and transfer. In particular, Page alleges that he “set out to discriminate and retaliate against the plaintiff after she participated in an investigation of Sellers relating to his bringing a noose to work and the use of racial slurs on the job.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 3.) Of course, this theory is predicated on Page’s participation in an investigation of Sellers, but the record squarely refutes the notion that any such participation ever took place.
Unlike a Title VII claim, a § 1981 claim may be brought against an individual supervisor.
See, e.g., Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla.,
V. Conclusion.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 45) is granted and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 47) is denied. Accordingly, this action is dismissed with prejudice. A separate judgment will enter.
Notes
. Plaintiff's filings in support of her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment contain citations to declarations and other record materials from the Jackson matter. Yet plaintiff failed to append copies of certain of those exhibits to her summary judgment filings here. The Jackson exhibits which Page has cited but which she has not included in her evidentiary materials pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(a) are not part of the record in this case.
. The Court is mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record, including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA,
. Before Rule 56 briefing commenced, this Court cautioned the parties that "[g]iven the straightforward, finite factual allegations and legal theories identified in the Complaint, it is unclear why this case would fall within the narrow class of circumstances” that might justify expansion of established page limits for briefs. (Doc. 43, at 1.) This admonition fell on deaf ears, inasmuch as both sides have engaged in excessive and repetitious treatment of narrowly circumscribed legal and factual issues. The redundancies and irrelevancies that pockmark the parties’ filings are unhelpful.
. The Court's review of the record has been hampered by defendants’ submission of five complete deposition transcripts (doc. 44, at Exhs. A-E), numbering hundreds of pages, and including numerous deposition exhibits, all in derogation of the Local Rules.
See
LR 5.5(c) ("If discovery materials are germane to any motion or response, only the relevant portions of the material shall be filed with the motion or response.”). This is not the first time that this Court has alerted defense counsel to the provisions of Local Rule 5.5(c).
See Rowell v. Winn Dixie,
. This formulation of the ISC role is echoed by Leanda Black, who replaced Page as ISC at Store # 578 in January 2007 following the transfer decision that is the subject of this litigation. (Black Deck, ¶ 2.) Black explains that, "[a]s ISC [her] primary responsibility is to oversee and manage the money in the office.” {Id., ¶ 3.)
. There was only one key to the safe at Store # 578. (Sellers Decl., ¶ 6.) The manager on duty at Store #578 never held the safe key when the store was open; rather, that item remained in the custody of the ISC on duty. {Id., ¶¶ 6-7.)
. As Landry put it, “once that count is complete, the key to the safe is given to the ISE [sic ] and she or he is totally responsible and held accountable. That is the purpose of the ISE [sic ].’’ (Landry Dep., at 94.)
. Typically, Markale Jackson would work the later shift and serve as the evening ISC, such that he would perform the safe count with the manager on duty when the store closed at night. (Page Dep., at 100-01.) At shift change, safe count would ordinarily be performed by the morning ISC (Page) and the evening ISC (Jackson), without participation by a manager.
. These bundles of cash did not remain in the safe at Store #578 for a protracted period of time. According to Page, money was rotated out at least once a week, such that bundles would not generally be kept on site for more than a week. (Page Dep., at 117-18, 221.)
. Of course, the mere fact that these documents exist does not prove that the relevant Winn-Dixie managers were familiar with them, or that Page's discipline was motivated by or connected to those documents. The evidence in the record is otherwise. Store Manager Brent Sellers indicated that he had never seen the pages from the How-To Guide prior to this litigation. (Sellers Decl., ¶ 19; Sellers Dep., at 19.) As for the Front End Guide, Sellers testified that this document was part of a "binder which is available for employees to use if they have a question about Front End operations." (Sellers Decl., ¶ 19.) Sellers testified that he is familiar with that binder, but that he is “not familiar with its contents.” (Sellers Dep., at 16.) Similarly, McPherson's uncontroverted averment is that he is not aware of, and has not seen, the How-To Guide, and that he has neither reviewed nor used the Front End Guide. (McPherson Decl., ¶¶ 17-18.) And Landry indicated that the How-To Guide was "not something that I would personally go through or have to view,” such that he could not shed any light on that document or state whether store managers were ever given or ever reviewed it. (Landry Dep., at 56-57, 68.)
. At that time, Sellers was "frequently absent from the store because of a medical condition.” (McPherson Decl., ¶ 13.) In fact, Sellers was on a medical leave of absence from October 2006 through April 2007, such that he "was not regularly at the store” during the relevant time period. (Sellers Decl., ¶ 8.)
. Sellers learned of the cash shortage when someone from the store contacted him with that information. (Sellers Deck, ¶ 8.) It is apparent that he was not actually working on the day when the loss was discovered.
. In that regard, Page confirmed that Sellers "sitting right there, did not say anything” during the meeting. (Page Dep., at 135.)
. As Landry stated, "Ms. Page admitted to me that proper cash-handling procedures were not followed on December 20th (the day the shortage was discovered) when she and AISC Jackson counted the safe around 2:00 p.m.” (Landry Deck, ¶ 19.)
. When Landry learned that Sellers had not followed company policy when counting the safe, he counseled Sellers but did not otherwise discipline him. (Landry Dep., at 83, 88-89.) This counseling session consisted of Landry telling Sellers that he "needed to make sure that the store’s employees were complying with all cash handling procedures.” (Sellers Deck, ¶ 15; Sellers Dep., at 111.)
. This theme is a recurring one in the record, such as where Page testified that, "just like the rest of them, they was — they should have been demoted or something should have been — they should have been — the[y] violated company policy just like I violated company policy.” (Page Dep., at 219.)
. In the Jackson action, Sellers testified that it had essentially become "customary procedure” at Store # 578 not to count strapped cash during safe counts. (Doc. 48-2, at 5, 7.) Also in that case, McPherson agreed that it was a "commonly accepted practice” at Store # 578 not to break down the bundled cash during safe counts. (Doc. 48-3, at 3.)
. For example, Page's testimony is that the Store # 578 employees who performed safe counts and routinely failed to count bundled cash included Leanda Black and Wanda Lafayette, both of whom are African-American. (Page Dep., at 37, 125, 160-61.) According to Page, Black was performing cash counts in December 2006, because her signature was on the strapped bundles of cash in the safe on December 20. (Id. at 220-21.) Page testified that she informed Landiy that numerous employees at Store # 587 (including Black, Lafayette, Sellers, McPherson and others) did not follow company policy concerning the breaking down of bundles in safe counts. (Id. at 162-63.) Neither Black nor Lafayette was transferred or demoted after the December 20 cash shortage incident. (Id. at 160-61.) Moreover, in her initial statement to the EEOC, Page complained that she had been on vacation from December 16 through December 18, “and I would like to know why didn’t the persons, who work my shift on that day get in trouble. Because Leanda Black work mornings sometimes and also Wanda whenever I take off.” (Page Dep., at 200 & Exh. 15 at 1.) Thus, Page staked herself to a position that Black and/or Lafayette had performed morning safe counts on December 16, 17 and 18, and that they too should have been disciplined when the cash shortage came to light on December 20. Black confirmed that she performed opening and/or closing safe counts on days when Page was not working. (Black Dep., at 10-11.)
. This fact, coupled with his absence on December 20, implies that Sellers was out the entire week of the cash shortage discovery, because he would "have chemo every two weeks, and I'd work a week and I'd be off a week.” (Id.)
.
See, e.g., Butler v. Alabama Dep’t of Transp.,
. Page’s burden of establishing
aprima facie
case is not heavy.
See Crapp v. City of Miami Beach,
. Importantly, "[a] plaintiff does not shift the burden to the defendant under
McDonnell Douglas
merely by stating that he was fired or treated unfavorably.
McDonnell Douglas
requires the plaintiff to establish a
prima facie
case which includes identifying an individual who replaced him or was treated better than he was who was not a member of his protected class.”
Morris v. Emory Clinic, Inc.,
. At most, Winn-Dixie points to an unpublished district court opinion wherein the plaintiff's proposed comparator was deemed not similarly situated to the plaintiff because the comparator's "alleged violation did not result in a cash loss” while the plaintiff's did.
Key
v.
Advance Auto Stores Co.,
.
See also Rioux,
. Elsewhere, plaintiff frames this argument in the following terms: "[TJhere can be no legally justifiable reason to support defendant's action against plaintiff without similar action against Sellers and McPherson. Company policy dictates that plaintiff, her store director, and her store co-manager were all responsible for the security of the store safe ...; in the instance of any failure of store safe security, it stands to reason that all three would suffer equivalent measures of discipline for equivalent neglect of job duties.” (Doc. 48, at 10.)
. In her sur-reply, plaintiff incorrectly states "that the Defendants make no mention of the company’s 'Store Director How-To Guide’ in their Reply-NOT ONE REFERENCE....” (Doc. 59-1, at 3 n. 2 (emphasis in original).) Page 9 of defendants' reply explicitly addresses and responds to plaintiff's arguments concerning pages 362 and 364 of what Page calls the How-To Guide. (Doc. 55, at 9.)
. For example, Landry testified that an ISC’s "primary purpose” is to oversee and manage the money in the safe, whereas that is not the store manager or co-manager’s primary role. Thus, Landry identified gradations of responsibility for the safe among the ISC, the store manager, and the co-manager. This stance is in no way inconsistent with the Front End Guide and How-To Guide pages. To state that security of the safe is the responsibility of the store manager, co-manager and ISC is not to state that all three bear equal accountability in the event that safe security is compromised. Plaintiff’s argument therefore reads more into the excerpts of the Guides than their plain language can support.
. Similarly, Sellers and McPherson testified that they were unfamiliar with the contents of these exhibits and had never seen them before this litigation. The uncontroverted evidence is that the How-To Guide and Front End Guide were musty documents sitting on office shelves that Winn-Dixie managers did not consult in performing their job functions.
. A final point about the Guide pages is that they do not present any material facts that were not considered in Jaclcson. After all, the record in Jaclcson was clear that Sellers and McPherson bore some measure of responsibility for cash-handling procedures at Store # 578, inasmuch as they verified safe counts and engaged in other activities to verify certain office cash processes. In that regard, the Guide pages are not substantially new and different evidence, and do not constitute game-changers that might transform the pretext analyses performed by this Court in Jackson and by the Eleventh Circuit in Jaclcson II.
. Plaintiff offers a pair of additional arguments on this point. Both are unconvincing. Specifically, plaintiff questions the credibility of McPherson's statement that he did not know about the bundle-counting rule, and suggests that there is a jury issue on that point. But Landry’s testimony is that the only training McPherson would have received on cash-handling processes was “on-the-job training.” If (as Page’s testimony shows) no one in Store #578 was following the bundle-counting rule for years before the December 2006 cash shortage, then how could McPherson have learned about that rule simply from working in the store? Plaintiff does not answer that question, much less present non-speculative evidence that McPherson was ever exposed to the bundle-counting rule at any time in the course of his on-the-job training. No genuine issue of material fact is presented here. Also, plaintiff suggests that McPherson’s ignorance of, and lack of training as to, the bundle-counting rule is itself probative of pretext, because it suggests that “Winn-Dixie has a rule that no one follows, and is only now being selectively enforced.” (Doc. 59-1, at 6.) There is no evidence of selective enforcement. The record is quite clear that Winn-Dixie disciplined Page and Jackson not merely because they violated a cash-handling policy, but because they violated a cash-handling policy that resulted in a $1,000 loss. Plaintiff has adduced not one scintilla of evidence that Winn-Dixie has ever refrained from taking disciplinary action when violation of cash-handling policies results in a significant financial loss. These circumstances do not support an inference of selective enforcement, much less of pretext. At most, plaintiff is quarreling with the wisdom of Winn-Dixie’s human resources and training practices (i.e., whether managers should receive formal training, whether all cash-handling violations should be punished), but this Court cannot and will not sit as a super-personnel department passing judgment on the desirability of Winn-Dixie’s protocols in this regard.
See, e.g., Wilson,
. To be sure, plaintiff devoted approximately four pages of her opposition brief to the retaliation cause of action, but she chose not to address Winn-Dixie’s contention that she did not participate in protected activity. At most, Page states that (a) "an employee” complained in the summer or fall of 1996 that Sellers had made racially discriminatory comments and brought a noose to work, and (b) Jackson (not Page) participated in the investigalion of this anonymous complaint. Plaintiff leaves unanswered the question of how she can bring a § 1981 retaliation claim predicated on protected activity undertaken by someone else. She offers no legal support for the proposition that a retaliation plaintiff can "take credit” for protected activity in which another employee engaged, in the absence of personal participation in or ratification of that protected activity by the plaintiff herself.
. In so concluding, the Court does not embrace Sellers' reasoning that he is entitled to summary judgment because he was not the decision-maker for the challenged personnel action. There is authority for the proposition that the "personal involvement” requirement "may be satisfied by proof that the individual had knowledge of the alleged acts of discrimination and failed to remedy or prevent them.”
Wallace,
