143 A. 890 | Conn. | 1928
The appellant claimed to have proved, as an inference from the facts proven, which are in the main outlined in the statement above, that there existed at the time of the execution of the will and during the entire time the testator had resided at East Haddam a relationship of special confidence and trust between him and Phelps and Mrs. Daniels. The appellant was the uncle and next of kin of the testator. He would take the estate of the testator in the absence of a will. He was the natural object of the testator's bounty, as that term is used in our testamentary law; it comprises whoever would take in the absence of a will because they are the persons whom the law has so designated, and in this particular, in the ordinary case, the law follows the normal condition of near relationship. The beneficiaries charged with undue influence are Phelps, a second cousin, and Mrs. Daniels a second cousin by marriage of the testator. Error is assigned in the charge to the jury upon the subject of the confidential relation claimed by the appellant to *581
exist between the testator and Phelps and Mrs. Daniels. Our rule of law upon this matter has been frequently and determinatively stated in our opinions. Our general rule is that those who attack a will as the product of undue influence must assume the burden of proving that charge. But as we say in Lockwood v.Lockwood,
In Gager v. Mathewson,
In Kirby's Appeal,
Under this rule and upon the facts claimed by the appellees, Mrs. Daniels did not occupy a confidential but a personal relation. The appellant's claim that Phelps occupied toward the testator a position of confidence and trust was based mainly upon the fact that he lived with Phelps on terms of intimacy and affection; that Phelps had been one of the trustees of his mother's estate, of which the testator received the income from 1893 to 1920, when it was turned over to *583 the testator; that Phelps was a trustee and the active manager of the trust fund from the residue of the estate of the testator's Aunt Annie, from about 1917 to the testator's death, and that two months after his father's decease the testator, who was the sole devisee and legatee, assigned all his interest in the estate, amounting to $200,000, to Phelps and Quigley on their agreeing to pay over the income to him during his life and that they acted as trustees as long as the testator lived, and that the active trustee in the management of the estate and the disbursement of the income was Phelps.
Upon the evidence so offered the question of whether Phelps occupied a position of confidence and trust toward the testator, as the appellant claimed, was one of fact for the jury under proper instruction from the court. If the jury found, and there seems no dispute as to this fact, that the testator had assigned over the far greater portion of his entire property to Phelps and his co-trustee for their direct benefit to hold and manage and pay over to him the income, they might reasonably have further found that the situation was brought within our rule and the burden of proof of undue influence shifted from the appellant to the appellees.
The court incorporated in its charge extensive extracts from the opinion from which we quote, Kirby'sAppeal,
The court thus definitely instructed them that the rule as to the burden of proof in a case of confidential relation was not applicable, that that burden remained upon the appellant and did not shift to Phelps.
The court thus determined as a matter of law the issue as to whether, on the evidence submitted by the appellant, a confidential relation existed, instead of leaving that issue to the jury. This we think was error. The appellees urge that, even though the trial court was in error regarding the confidential relationship, *585 "the rule ought not to be applied to them because under the authorities this rule is applicable only in case a stranger takes under a will to the exclusion of the testator's family and the natural objects of the testator's bounty." So, the appellees argue, since Phelps and Mrs. Daniels were those with whom the testator made his home, with whom he was on terms of intimacy and affection, and those who had cared for, and made sacrifices for him which he had reason to, and did appreciate, they were in fact the natural objects of his bounty.
Natural objects of bounty of a testator has, in our law, always connoted one meaning, and that the definite one which is found in the rule by which testamentary capacity is determined. There we say the testator when he makes his will is required among other things "to appreciate his relations to the natural objects of his bounty." This does not mean to those with whom he has been on terms of confidence, intimacy and affection, but those who will take in the absence of a will, his next of kin. St. Leger's Appeal,
The natural objects of one's bounty include his children, yet in Purdy v. Watts,
In Kirby's Appeal,
There never, so far as we are aware, has been any confusion on the part of the profession as to who comprised "natural objects of a testator's bounty." Necessarily the law must determine these, otherwise this class would be as variable and uncertain as the opinions of the triers who might be affected by the particular circumstances of a case.
How near must the intimacy be, how close the relationship, how affectionate the conditions of their living to make the confidential relationship effective?
Practical considerations, such as these, will satisfy the judgment that a legal rule should not be based upon so unstable and changeable a footing. We have, however, drawn clearly the distinction between the confidential fiduciary relationship and the relationship of mere intimacy and service.
It was claimed in Gager v. Mathewson,
The limitation of the rule is to those who are not the natural objects of the testator's bounty but hold toward him a fiduciary relation and not a mere personal one. This limitation marks with great distinctiveness the difference between the natural object of a testator's bounty in law and one whom the appellees denominate a natural object of bounty because of his relationship of intimacy, service and affection with the testator; but our law makes no such nomenclature. Again, we limit the rule by excluding from its application the relationship of parent and child, examples of which are: Mooney v. Mooney,
Meriden Savings Banks v. McCormack,
We entertain the same opinion as to the error of the trial court that we expressed in Gager v. Mathewson,supra, at page 544: "It is impossible for us to say that the error pointed out was not material. The verdict was general and may have turned upon the question whether the burden of proof on the issue of undue influence was upon the proponents instead of the contestants."
The appellant on rebuttal offered in evidence two copies of records of courts in the State of Massachusetts purporting to show the conviction of the testator for the criminal offense of operating an automobile while under the influence of liquor.
The trial court excluded these copies. The ruling was right.
As a general rule, judgments in criminal cases are not admissible in civil proceedings to prove the acts charged. State v. Bradnack,
There is error and a new trial is ordered.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.