Lead Opinion
| Rayburn Page appeals from the divorce decree that ended his marriage to appellee Charlotte Page and awarded her continued medical insurance coverage for twelve months, $350 per month in alimony for twelve months, and $2000 in attorney’s fees. Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in its finding of facts, which led to an abuse of discretion in the award of alimony and continued medical insurance coverage for twelve months and the award of $2000 in attorney’s fees. We affirm.
The parties were married on July 7, 2007, and separated on June 25, 2008. Ap-pellee filed a complaint for absolute divorce on August 25, 2008. During the first months of the marriage, the parties lived in appellee’s house in Hot Springs; at the end of October 2007, they moved into appellant’s newly constructed house in Bentоn, which was 12paid for from the proceeds of the sale of his last house. Appellee testified that at the time of the hearing she received $900 per month in rent for her house, which covered her mortgage of $846. Appellee worked at a radio station until Seрtember 2007, when she was laid off. According to appellee, the couple had planned for her to quit her job at the end of the year so they could travel, but she was laid off before then. She went back to work in April 2008 at a radio station but was again laid off. At the time оf the hearing, appellee earned $8.50 per hour working at Home Instead Senior Care; she received scaled unemployment from her second job at a radio station, to give her income for a forty-hour work week. Appellee’s income for 2008 was approximately $24,000. Appellant has income of approximately $6400 per month, which includes veteran’s disability, social security, a pension, and income from a savings account invested with Edward Jones.
The parties both testified regarding their financial arrangements during thеir marriage, the possessions they brought to the marriage and those they acquired together, and other matters related to their marriage and decision to separate. In a letter ruling dated April 23, 2009, the court made detailed findings and the following awards: appellee received possession of and responsibility for the Toyota Camry she drove; appellant retained sole ownership of the Benton house; furniture and household items were divided; appellee received alimony of $350 per month and continued medical insurance coverage for one year; and appellee was awarded $2000 in attorney’s fees. The | scourt explained its alimony decision as follows: “Due to the parties’ agreement for Plaintiff to quit her job, Plaintiffs age (58), the ability of Defendant to pay, and the financial need of the Plaintiff at least temporarily until she can regain comparable compensation, the
On appeal, appellant challenges the circuit court’s decision to award any amount of alimony and to order him to continue to provide medical insurance to appellee for one year. Appellant begins by challenging the court’s finding that “[d]ue to agreement of the parties that Plaintiff [appellee] would quit work after the marriage, Plaintiff has lost income аnd the ability to regain a job comparable in compensation to her former employment.” We review domestic-relations cases de novo on the record, but we will not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Ransom,
The decision whether to award alimony is a matter that lies within the trial judge’s sound discretion, and on appeal, this court will not reverse a trial judge’s decision to award alimony absent an abuse of that discretion. Cole v. Cole,
|fiOur courts recognized rehabilitative alimony in 1990, when this court considered Bolan v. Bolan,
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony and continued medical insurance, appellant points to the length of the marriage, appel-lee’s “voluntary reduction of income” in reducing her tenants’ rent, and the “substantial economic benefit [appellee] reaped as a result” of the marriage. We note that the decision whether to award alimony depends on the particular faсts of each case
As to appellee’s lowering of the rental amount оn her house, she testified that she lowered the rent from $1050 to $900 per month because her tenants were having trouble paying the rent and she needed her mortgage to be covered. We do not believe that fact has any significant impact on this case. Appellаnt also argues that appellee “reaped considerable economic benefit” from their marriage. In its letter ruling, the court found that when the parties separated, appellee withdrew $6800 from a joint bank account; that appellant made twо car payments on appellee’s car that she brought into the marriage, purchased new tires for it, and paid off the balance of $4700; that appellee traded in that car and received $4000 for it toward her new car; and that appellant paid аll house payments, utility bills, and insurance on his house. None of these facts lead us to conclude that the trial court’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Appel-lee received no interest in that house in the divorce. As to the car, appelleе did receive some financial assistance from appellant during the marriage, but she has responsibility for the car she currently drives. Furthermore, that appellee withdrew funds from a joint account to pay bills when the parties separated does not seem unreasonable, and the trial court undoubtedly took that into consideration in making its ruling.
17Appellant also asserts that appellee’s current income “was not clearly defined at trial” and appellee failed to demonstrate that she needed alimony to meet her financial obligations. Appellee testified that in 2008 she made $24,000 and that she was making less than that at the time of the final hearing in 2009. We believe the evidence was sufficient to show that appellee had the need for alimony for a limited time following the divorcе. The same reasoning applies to the award of medical insurance.
Finally, appellant argues that the award of $2000 in attorney’s fees to appellee constituted an abuse of discretion. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-309(a)(2) (Repl.2008) provides thаt, in the final divorce decree, the trial court may award the wife or husband a reasonable attorney’s fee. A trial court has considerable discretion to award attorney’s fees in a divorce case. McKay v. McKay,
Notes
. In fact, our supreme court has stated that the fact that a marriage lasted only a few months is a circumstance to be considered. Dingledine v. Dingledine,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
| SI agree that this case must be affirmed, but write separately because I wish to draw attention to the lamentаble state of the law concerning whether or not a trial court has the authority to award alimony. The majority seems to be saying in its opinion that the trial judge has virtually unbridled authority to award alimony, if he or she decides to, as long as the payor seems to have more money than the payee. Sadly, I cannot fault this reading of our case law.
Here, it is certainly true that Mr. Page has a greater monthly income than does his wife of one year. It is, however, disturbing that the sources of his income, his veteran’s disability, social security, pension, аnd income from a nonmarital Edward Jones Account, in other circumstances would all be “property” that Ms. Page would have no right to claim. One might find it difficult to see how it is equitable to grant Ms. Page a share of this property, particularly in light of the fact that the marriage lasted less than one year. However, the polestar in alimony cases seems to be rectifying the economic imbalances in earning power and standard of living of the parties. Kuchmas v. Kuchmas,
I dissented in Evtimov v. Milanova,
I agree with the majority opinion and its rationale for affirming the trial court. I write separately to point out that our court recently affirmed a denial of alimony where the circumstances of the requesting spouse were significаntly more dire than Ms. Whitworth’s. See Evtimov v. Milanova, [2009] Ark. App. [208], [300] S.W.3d [110] (March 18, 2009). In Evtimov, the requesting spouse could hardly communicate in English, was earning minimum wages from two part-time jobs, and was living out of his car inasmuch as the marital home was awarded to the more affluent spouse, who was earning а six-figure income as a professor at UALR. If we were correct in affirming the denial of rehabilitative alimony in Evtimov, we surely do not err in affirming in this case.
In the instant case, Ms. Page’s circumstances certainly are not “dire.” She is younger than her ex-husband, employed, and still owns the hоme that she owned prior to the marriage. I submit that it does not appear equitable for Mr. Evtimov to be denied alimony in Pulaski County after a four-year marriage, Ms. Whitworth to be denied alimony in Grant County after a twenty-year marriage, and Ms. Page to receive alimony in Garland County after being married less than a year.
Finally, there is a suggestion that this case is being affirmed because the amount of alimony that was awarded was only $350 a month for one year, and because