90 P. 481 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1907
Appeal on behalf of plaintiff from judgment and order denying her motion for a new trial.
The plaintiff, who is appellant here, is the widow of Samuel Page, deceased, who died intestate on June 24, 1899. Besides his widow, he left surviving him her unborn child in esse, who was born alive but died on the same day, and three sons and a daughter, the defendant herein, all children by a former marriage. Plaintiff, in her own right as widow and as sole heir of her deceased child, brings this suit to set aside and have declared null and void certain deeds, whereby the said Samuel Page, in his lifetime and long prior to his marriage to appellant, conveyed to defendant certain real estate described in the complaint, upon the ground that at the time of making the deeds Samuel Page was in a sick, weakened and exhausted condition, and, on account of great physical and mental weakness, incapable of making any deed, or doing any business whatever. That taking advantage of his condition, this defendant and her brother, Solomon C. Page, did, by means of fraudulent representations made to said Samuel Page, induce him to make and deliver to defendant the said deeds to the real estate. The answer contains no denial of the allegations as to the mental and physical condition of Samuel Page at the time of executing the deeds; nor any denial as to the fraudulent representations alleged to have been made by defendant. There is a denial that Samuel Page was, at the time of his death, the owner of the land in question, or that he had been, subsequent to May 1, 1897, the owner of any part thereof, or held any interest therein other than a life estate to a portion thereof. As a defense to the action defendant relies upon two judgments, which are pleaded by way of estoppel.
The conveyances from Samuel Page to the defendant were made on December 9 and 11, 1896, and the marriage of plaintiff to Samuel Page occurred on February 4, 1899. About one year after the conveyance of the property to defendant, Samuel Page commenced an action against her, having for its purpose the annulment and setting aside of the deeds whereby he had theretofore conveyed the real estate to the defendant. Pending the trial of this action Samuel Page died. A special administrator of his estate was substituted as plaintiff, who, under the order of the court, prosecuted said action to a final determination and judgment was rendered in favor of defendant *385 therein. At the time of filing the answer herein said judgment had become final. At the trial of this action defendant offered in evidence certified copies of the judgment, findings, complaint, amended complaint, and the order substituting the special administrator as plaintiff and his supplemental complaint in the former suit brought by Samuel Page; to all of which objections were made upon the ground that they did not constitute the entire record of the case. Other objections were made, which will be noticed in discussing the effect of the former action as an estoppel.
To constitute an estoppel the judgment pleaded in bar must be a valid judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction, and these facts must be shown in order to justify the reception in evidence of such judgment. The usual and appropriate manner of making this proof is to offer the judgment-roll. Conceding, but not holding, this mode of proof to be exclusive where a direct attack is made upon a judgment (McKinlay v. Tuttle,
The further objection is made that the action was not between the same parties and did not involve the same issues. A solution of these questions must dispose of the appeal.
Samuel Page commenced his action against this respondent December 9, 1897, and prior to his marriage to appellant herein. His death occurred June 24, 1899, and as she claims by right of succession and as sole heir of her deceased child, it follows that her title, if any, was acquired at a date some eighteen months after he, Samuel Page, had instituted suit against this defendant to regain the property involved and wherein this judgment was rendered. The rule is statutory that when a matter has once been adjudicated by a competent tribunal, its determination "in respect to the matter directly adjudged" is conclusive, not alone between the actual parties themselves, but also as to "their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action." (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1908.) A judgment binding upon an intestate is binding upon his heirs at law. (Jones on Evidence, see. 603;Ross v. Banta,
Appellant insists that the issues determined in the case of Samuel Page against respondent are entirely different from those involved in this action; that the question of Samuel Page's competency or capacity to convey the lands was not in issue in the former action and has never been adjudicated. For the purpose of determining whether the issues are the same, resort may be had to the amended complaint and findings introduced in evidence. (Wixson v. Devine,
The court found that Samuel Page was not induced through fraudulent representations to make the deeds to this respondent; that there was no conspiracy between respondent and her brother to obtain the property; and that Samuel Page was not infirm of body, mind or memory. The former case involved the same issues as this, was brought for the same purpose, tried upon its merits, and appellant, claiming under the same title as the successor in interest of Samuel Page, and by reason of her privity with him, is estopped by the adjudication therein had.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to pass upon any other points made.
The judgment and order denying appellant's motion for a new trial are affirmed.
Allen, P. J., and Taggart, J., concurred. *388
