Page v. FrazierPage v. Frazier
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Lynch
The plaintiffs appeal from an adverse decision on the merits of their claims of negligent misrepresentation against defendants Attorney Charles E. Frazier, Jr., 3 and the Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank (bank), which retained Frazier to perform a real property title examination on property being purchased by the plaintiffs. A judge of the Superior Court, who heard the case without a jury, dismissed the complaint after making comprehensive findings of fact and rulings of law, summarized below. 4 We granted the plaintiffs’ motion for direct appellate review. We affirm the judgments.
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, purchased a house in Wellfleet in 1964. Beginning in 1967, the plaintiff Robert G. Page (Page) sought to ascertain the ownership of an abutting, unimproved parcel of slightly over 1.1 acres; Page was interested in acquiring the land primarily for protection and reasons of privacy, as well as for investment purposes.
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In November, 1972, Page entered into an agreement to purchase the parcel for $14,500, from heirs of Lorenzo Dow
Page’s application was approved on November 22, 1972. Thereafter the bank retained Frazier, an experienced conveyancing attorney, and a vice-president and trustee of the bank as well, to certify the title to the property and to draft the necessary legal instruments. The judge found that it was the bank’s practice at that time to require an attorney so retained to certify a good, clear, marketable title. The bank also requested from the sellers’ attorney, and received on or about December 8, 1972, a general list of title references to deeds, probate decrees, and wills to assist Frazier in his examination of the title. In February, 1973, the sellers’ attorney forwarded to the bank a proposed deed without title references. When executed ultimately in April, 1973,
The judge found that Page was not “particularly conversant with the intricate elements or ramifications of title examinations. However, Robert Page [was] a high-level executive possessing concomitant intelligence, ability and knowledge of business transactions. [He had] both purchased and sold real property for his personal use on a number of occasions prior to the transaction in issue.” Page had engaged Frazier in 1967 to review his will and had from time to time inquired of Frazier as to possible real estate sites in Wellfleet. In purchasing property prior to 1972, Page had retained another attorney.
With respect to the instant transaction, in addition to the mortgage application form, the following documents involving Page or Frazier were in evidence: (1) a letter from Frazier to Page, dated March 3, 1973, requesting the plaintiffs’ signatures on an enclosed proposed mortgage deed, mortgage note, and disclosure form showing a bank attorney’s charge of $125 for recording and for title certification, payable by the plaintiffs;
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(2) a letter from Page to Frazier,
The judge found that no record title had been established in the plaintiffs and that no good, clear, marketable title in them was ascertainable, based on Frazier’s examination. She further found that, although the plaintiffs had shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Frazier was negligent in the performance of his title examination, they
We consider first the plaintiffs’ contention that there is a statutory basis for their claim against Frazier. We recognize that the Legislature has modified the common law, to a certain extent, through the provisions of
We turn next to the plaintiffs’ argument that an attorney-client relationship existed between them and Frazier. Although they have not specifically contended that the judge’s finding of no express or implied attorney-client relationship is unsupported by or contrary to the evidence, we consider their argument in that light. Under
We decline to reverse the trial court’s judgment on the basis of our holding in
Craig.
While that decision is an example of our recognition that tort liability may exist in the absence of privity of contract, see
McDonough
v.
Whalen,
365 Mass. 506 (1974);
Carter
v.
Yardley & Co.,
319 Mass. 92 (1946), recovery under the principles of
Craig
is limited to instances “where the defendant knew that the plaintiff would rely on his services.”
Rae
v.
Air-Speed, Inc.,
386 Mass. 187, 193 (1982). See
Capitol Indem. Corp.
v.
Freedom, House Dev. Corp.,
487 F. Supp. 839, 842 (D. Mass. 1980);
Anthony
v.
Vaughan,
356 Mass. 673, 675 (1970). See also
Markell
v.
Sidney B. Pfeifer Found., Inc.,
9 Mass. App. Ct. 412, 444 (1980), quoting
Broomfield
v.
Kosovo,
349 Mass. 749, 755 (1965) (“The catalyst ... is the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s reliance upon him”). The present plaintiffs signed a mortgage application,
We also agree with the judge that this case does not come within the ambit of the
Craig
decision. This is not to say that an attorney should be absolutely insulated from liability to nonclients, or that, in a proper case, a nonclient alleging negligence against an attorney would be foreclosed under the
Craig
principle of foreseeable reliance.
11
See
The plaintiffs also seek recovery from the bank for its alleged negligent misrepresentation that Frazier’s title examination had revealed no irregularities. In support of this claim the plaintiffs seek to bring their case within our decision in
Danca
v.
Taunton Sav. Bank,
385 Mass. 1 (1982). This reliance is misplaced. In
Danca,
the plaintiffs seeking a mortgage loan from the defendant bank were told by its mortgage officer and vice-president that the bank required a plot plan for which the plaintiffs were charged, to assure itself that the location of their house on its lot (within a real estate development) was in compliance with the town’s zoning by-law. The bank ordered the plan from a firm of engi
On our view that this case presents no demonstrated duty by Frazier or the bank to the plaintiffs with respect to performance of the title examination, the plaintiffs’ arguments advancing liability on the theory that Frazier was an employee or agent of the bank are unavailing.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Because of the view that we take of the case it is not necessary for us to decide the issues raised by the defendant Frazier.
The trial judge also dismissed on the merits a claim of breach of warranty against the bank, and dismissed four other counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint alleging violations of G. L. c. 93A,
The plaintiffs brought their action jointly as the subject parcel was taken by them as tenants by the entirety. The trial judge found that all relevant evidence was submitted by Robert G. Page singularly. We therefore adopt, where appropriate, the judge’s reference to the plaintiffs as “Page.”
The plaintiffs have noted the use of this language, which appeared on the application for a mortgage loan on unimproved land, and which the judge termed as “statutory.”
Page was neither billed for this charge nor did he pay it. This fact, however, would not preclude a finding that an attorney-client relationship existed. See Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261, 262 (D.C. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
The judge specifically found: “Despite the one statement to the [bjank at the conclusion of the transaction wherein Frazier referred to himself as the ‘Attorney for the Pages,’ I find that the only express contract between the plaintiff and Frazier was relative to the recording of the deed. As Frazier was representing the bank, I find no privity of contract between Page and Frazier nor any attorney-client relationship.
“As reflected in my ‘Findings,’ the plaintiff has not proven by a fair preponderance that an implied attorney-client relationship came into existence.” The judge properly recognized that, in view of her ultimate conclusion, a motion to dismiss could have been granted on the negligence claims. To avoid the possible necessity of a retrial, the judge made findings with respect to negligence and damages. While we do not pass upon the judge’s finding of negligence, we assume that finding was correct for the purposes of determining the questions before us.
The plaintiffs do not question the legal standard applied by the judge to the facts found. See New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, 675 n.3 (1977).
We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that an agreement between Frazier and Page that Frazier would properly record the deed (see note 8, supra) carried the underlying obligation to “determine whether the instrument accomplished what it purported to do.” See Brandlin v. Belcher, 67 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1001 (1977) (“While neither a retainer nor formal agreement is required to establish the attorney-client relationship . . . , the relationship with respect to a particular transaction is nevertheless required to create the duty of an attorney to act for his client in the transaction” [citation omitted]); Kurtenbach v. Tekippe, 260 N.W. 2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977) (“In a legal malpractice action it is not sufficient merely to prove an attorney-client relationship existed with respect to some matters. It is necessary to establish that the relationship existed with respect to the act or omission upon which the malpractice claim is based”). For the same reason we do not accept the evidence of Frazier’s prior and subsequent representations of Page as relevant to the instant claim of negligent title examination.
In such a case the trier of fact would not be limited to applying the criteria suggested in the Craig decision, but could weigh the same factors as are considered in determining whether an express or implied attorney-client relationship exists. In the present case, the judge resolved the particular circumstances against the plaintiffs.